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ABSTRACT
The Australian national flag is the primary symbol of the nation. The flag produces and
reproduces national identity through its presence in all spheres of the public domain.
This thesis is an examination into the national flag’s representational force. It focuses
on how the flag makes meaning in accordance with dominant discourses of nation and
nationhood through an analysis of its uses and applications across a range of
institutional sites. The thesis also takes into consideration the meaning-making
potential of the national flag for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. This work
deploys a wide-range of historical and contemporary sources that include art and
literary responses to the flag. The thesis also draws on a range of theoretical works on
nation alongside the use of vexillology as a focused study of flags. A critique of the
messages and meanings that the Australian national flag transmits raises important
questions pertaining to the way the nation is constructed and maintained. While the
thesis does not proffer a definitive solution to the many complexities surrounding
Australian national identity, it offers the opportunity for further study as debates about
changing the flag continue to circulate in the public sphere.
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CHAPTER ONE: Raise the National Standard
This land was never given up
This land was never bought or sold
The planting of the union jack
Never changed our law at all.1
(Yothu Yindi with Peter Garret & Paul Kelly 1992).

Introduction
The above lyrics are from Treaty, a song composed in 1990 by Yothu Yindi in
collaboration with musicians Peter Garrett and Paul Kelly (Corn 2009). These words reject the
colonial authority of the British flag and demonstrate that Aboriginal people remain the
sovereign owners of land that was never ceded or sold. The words of Treaty affirm that despite
British colonisation, Aboriginal law has survived. Treaty was written in response to a broken
promise by the Australian Government. The words of Treaty provide a fitting epigraph for this
thesis; they categorically refute the signification of the Union Jack and Britain’s claim of
sovereignty over Australia. In 1988, as the white nation celebrated two hundred years of British
colonisation, Indigenous people publicly called for a treaty. In June 1988, then Prime Minister
Bob Hawke attended the Barunga Festival in the Northern Territory where he was presented
with a petition. The “Barunga Statement” as it became known, called for a treaty, land rights,
self-determination, an end to discrimination, and the protection of Indigenous human rights. At
the Barunga Festival Hawke promised, “[T]here shall be a treaty negotiated between the
Aboriginal people and the Government on behalf of all the people of Australia” (qtd. in
Brennan et al. 2005: 16). Hawke’s commitment to a treaty 30 years ago did not eventuate. The
Lead singer of Yothu Yindi, Dr Mandawuy Yunupingu notes “[T]he intention of this song was to raise public
awareness about this [the promise of a Treaty by 1990] so that the government would be encouraged hold to his
promise. The song became a number-one hit, the first ever to be sung in a Yolngu language, and caught the public's
imagination. Though it borrows from rock 'n' roll, the whole structure of “Treaty” is driven by the beat of the
djatpangarri that I've incorporated in it. It was an old recording of this historic djatpangarri that triggered the song's
composition. The man who originally created it was my gurru (maternal great-grandmother's husband) and he
passed away a long time ago in 1978. He was a real master of the djatpangarri style” (qtd. in Special Broadcasting
Service [SBS] 2013).
1

1

Barunga Statement was later gifted to Parliament House in Canberra and is on permanent
display as part of the parliamentary art collection. A public emblem of a broken promise.
This thesis is an inquiry into the socio-cultural effects and symbolism associated with
the Australian national flag. The work will examine this primary symbol of national identity
from a range of standpoints, and in particular, it will engage with Indigenous perspectives.2 In
order to explore the bodies of knowledge which have emerged surrounding flag and nation, I
draw from a diverse range of texts and contexts, from books, journal articles, theses, scholarly
works and media reports that relate to the Australian nation and its flag, as well as the flag’s
uses and applications in public and private domains. Indigenous sources are used whenever
possible; not only as a means to challenge Western epistemology, but also as a way to garner
knowledge, to provide a ‘balanced’ body of work and thus develop a greater understanding of
the responses elicited by the Australian national flag.
The thesis embarks on this analysis with a view to critically evaluating the Australian
flag, its origins, functional contexts, and its meaning-making potential, with an emphasis on
the ways in which the nation’s most prominent symbol works to discursively produce and
reproduce national identity. My questions are: how does the Australian national flag signify
the nation given the placement of its colonial insignia, the Union Jack, in the flag’s upper left
corner, and what are the effects of this signification on both Indigenous and non-Indigenous
people? In other words, what kind of nationalism is being created and maintained by the
Australian flag and how is this nationalism received and understood by Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people in light of over two hundred years of colonisation marked by a continued
lack of treaty/ies or constitutional inclusion?

2

For this thesis I use the terms Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people or Indigenous people unless
specifically writing about Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people.

2

My research comes at a timely opportunity to contribute to discussions in the public
domain which surround national identity and its associated symbols. Currently there are four
former British colonies which retain the Union Jack on their national flag: Tuvalu, Fiji, New
Zealand, and Australia. Both Fiji and New Zealand have recently reviewed the designs of their
flags which, like Australia, feature the Union Jack in the top left hand corner. In 2014 former
New Zealand Prime Minister, John Key, announced that New Zealanders would have the
opportunity to change their national flag by a referendum. Key declared that the current
national flag, “remains dominated by the Union Jack in a way that we ourselves are no longer
dominated by the United Kingdom” and he urged New Zealanders to “take one more step in
the evolution of modern New Zealand by acknowledging our independence through a new
flag” (qtd. in Chapman 2014).
To begin the process of changing the flag a panel of twelve leaders from a variety of
backgrounds was selected to represent a cross section of the New Zealand public. New
Zealanders were then asked to identify core values they considered to be important. The top
five values noted were freedom, history, equality, respect, and family. The public was then
invited to submit and share alternative flag designs. Some 10,292 were received. From these
the three most popular symbols were identified as the Southern Cross, Fern and Koru.3 The
favourite five colours nominated were white, blue, red, black and green respectively. With
these values, symbols and colours in mind the Flag Consideration Panel selected 40 flags to
create an official long list.4
The panel then spent ten weeks in consultation with the New Zealand public and in
September 2015 a shortlist of five flags was announced. A subsequent binding postal

3

The silver tree fern is found throughout New Zealand and is a widely recognised national symbol. The koru is
an unfurling frond of the New Zealand silver fern. In Maori culture this is a significant symbol in that it represents
new life, strength and perpetual growth.
4
This information was presented by Malcolm Mulholland, member of the New Zealand Flag Consideration Panel
at the 26th International Congress of Vexillology (ICV 26), 31 August 2015.

3

referendum resulted in the Silver Fern flag being selected by the public as the official preferred
alternative flag. In March 2016 New Zealanders voted in a second referendum to decide
whether to keep their current national flag or endorse the preferred alternative. New Zealanders
voted against changing their flag. 56.6 per cent of the 2.2 million voters chose to keep the
current national flag. New Zealand’s process of selecting a flag by referenda stood in contrast
to Fiji, where the decision rested with the government.
In 2013, as part of its national renewal process, Fiji issued a new currency. The image
of British Queen Elizabeth II had featured on Fiji’s currency since 1969 and was replaced with
Fijian flora and fauna. Fiji’s interim Prime Minister, Frank Bainimarama, also announced that
Fiji would change its flag. These measures were taken, “to reinforce a new Fijian identity and
a new confidence in being Fijian on the global stage” (qtd. in Australian Broadcasting
Corporation [ABC] News: 2013a). Bainimarama stated that the Union Jack on Fiji’s flag refers
to a respected past but it has no place in the country’s evolution as a modern nation, “Fiji’s new
flag should reflect its position in the world today, as a modern and truly independent nationstate” (qtd. in ABC News: 2015). At the 2016 Rio Olympic Games, Fiji won its first Olympic
gold medal. Prime Minister Bainimarama was moved “to witness the way Fijians have rallied
around the national flag as our Rugby Sevens team brought home Olympic gold for Fiji …”
(qtd. in Ewart 2016). As a result the Fijian Government voted against changing the flag.
In Australia in 2010, a Morgan Gallup Poll found that 69% of 652 respondents aged
over 14 answered ‘yes’ to the following question: “[S]hould the Union Jack remain in the
Australian flag?”. This figure was up 16% from a previous 1998 poll and according to the
findings was at its highest since 1982 (Morgan 2010). These results indicate an ongoing
attachment for the Union Jack which in turn suggests that the Union Jack has a significant
bearing on Australia’s current perceptions of national identity. Executive Chairman “of
Australia’s most highly regarded research company”, Gary Morgan “is often called upon to
4

provide political and social comment” (Morgan 2017). His analysis of the 2010 poll however,
reveals a distinct bias,
[D]espite recent unwarranted calls for a new Australian Flag, the Morgan Poll shows
that the clear preference of Australians is to stick with the current design that was first
flown on September 3, 1901 in Melbourne over the Australian Parliament and has so
well represented our nation for over 100 years since (Morgan 2010).

In his evaluation Morgan, “whose clients include many of Australia’s leading companies,
institutions and government departments” (Morgan 2017), is forthright in his assertion that the
national flag in its current formation serves “our” nation well.
Ralph Kelly from the Flag Society of Australia (FSA / Flags Australia) states that
proposals to change the national flag are rejected for two main reasons:
1) The status quo should endure because the case for change is not accepted.
2) The national flag is symbolic of the nation and it should be honoured without
alteration (Flags Australia 2013).
Kelly explains that many proponents of the national flag make no distinction between flag and
nation. The flag is a symbol of loyalty to Australia. Therefore, if the flag and nation are
‘imagined’ as one, it is not difficult to understand resistance to change. Currently much of the
rhetoric which surrounds the flag is framed by comfortable terms of reference which speak of
tradition, national sentiment, and values. Geoffrey Blainey, an influential historian noted for
his conservative stance, claims that the national flag,
is the main symbol of national loyalty and national unity. It links the living and the
dead. It is the only flag, in the history of the world, to command the loyalties of the
people of an entire continent (2005: 131).

5

Blainey’s claims are not unfamiliar or unusual in the context of discussions about Australian
nationalism. He espouses a view of nation that is both institutionally endorsed and embraced
by many citizens. What is absent from these discussions are Indigenous perspectives. Therefore
the task for this thesis is to investigate the discourses surrounding the national flag and to
initiate possibilities for another way of ‘seeing’ or ‘re-viewing’ the national flag.
The Australian National Flag

Figure 1: The Australian National Flag (Flags Australia 2013).

The Union Jack is situated on the upper left-hand corner of the Australian national flag.
Its position is significant. In vexillology, the upper left-hand corner is known as the canton and
is the official point of honour for a flag. The upper left canton sits closest to the flagpole and
thus, as the last part of the flag to ‘wear out’, occupies a position of privilege. The Union Jack
is the term commonly used to refer to the Union flag of the United Kingdom. The term “Union
Jack” dates from 1801 when the saltire of St Patrick of Ireland was added to the cross of St.
Andrew of Scotland and the cross of England’s St. George.5 A saltire is diagonal cross whose
arms extend to the edges of a flag or shield. Aside from the Union Jack, the rest of the

5

The heraldic invisibility of Wales relates to its status. Wales has never been classified as a kingdom (Groom
2007).

6

Australian flag is known as the “field” and is charged with white stars. The Federation or
Commonwealth Star sits directly beneath the Union Jack and points to the centre of the English
red cross of St. George. On the fly, or right-hand side of the flag, there are five smaller stars to
represent the constellation, Crux Australis, which is more commonly known as the Southern
Cross, a constellation visible only in the skies of the southern hemisphere. The honoured
section of the Australian flag belongs to the flag of Britain. In 1770, the British flag was used
to take possession of the east coast of the continent.
“Captain Cook”
The British colonisation of Australia commenced on 29th April 1770 when Lieutenant
James Cook6 sailed into Botany Bay, the country of the Gweagal and Bidjigal people of the
Dharawal Eora nation. Frederick Wood notes that the Englishmen spent some time observing
the local people, who were cooking fish, before a group rowed towards the shore. Resistance
to the British was immediate, Wood explains, “[A]s they drew near, two natives seized their
spears and prepared to resist the landing party … the natives threw their spears at the boats,
and the Englishmen fired muskets” (1940: 27).
Once the party landed, Cook planted a flag on Kurnell’s Milgurrung Beach and wrote
in his journal,
[D]uring my stay in this harbour I caused the English colours to be displayed on shore
every day, and the ship’s name, and the date of the year to be inscribed upon one of the
trees near the watering place (qtd. in Salt 2000: 19).

Cook’s words speak to his understanding of posterity as an enduring reminder of British
colonial conquest. Today these colonial colours, the British red, white and blue remain a
prevalent manifestation of Australian identity. The place where Cook first set foot on land is

6

Cook becomes a Captain in 1772.

7

marked by an obelisk. In 1881 Prince Albert and Prince George visited the area and planted
four pine trees. In 1970, the bicentenary of Cook’s landing, Queen Elizabeth visited the park
which is now heritage-listed and known as “The Landing Place Reserve”. The significance of
the royal imprimatur on the landing site of invading forces cannot be understated. The planting
of trees signifies foundations, growing roots, in this instance, establishing foundations and a
new beginning sanctioned and authorised by the highest order of British authority: the Crown.
The final erasure of pre-colonial occupation is captured by the name: “The Landing Place
Reserve”, a name connoting a place of “landing” that removes colonial violence from purview
and produces imagery of a peaceful park where others simply “landed”, a memento of a
moment of neutrality. Kurnell, the original site of Aboriginal dispossession is thus implanted
with a flag, trees, and a name that erases all traces of pre and post invasion history.
Maria Nugent (2009) provides a detailed account of the eight days and nights Cook and
his party spent around Kurnell. On the fourth day, a sailor, Forby Sutherland, died and became
the first white man to be buried in Australian soil. Cook named the south point of the bay in
the sailor’s memory.7 Sutherland was mythologised by nineteenth century colonial poets.
Henry Kendall claimed that Sutherland’s grave was sacred and his body in the ground
represented the start of settler Christian society. In 1825 Barron Field further cemented colonial
claims of possession and legitimacy by arguing that Sutherland’s Christian burial was of greater
import than the planting of the flag,
“… and thence a little space
Lies Sutherland, their shipmate; for the sound
Of Christian burial better did proclaim
Possession than the flag, in England’s name” (qtd. in Nugent 2009: 70).

Today Sutherland’s ‘Shire’ is home to nearly a quarter of a million people and covers some 369 Km2 (Sutherland
Shire Council 2017).
7
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As the first white man to be buried, the dead sailor became, to borrow Nugent’s economic
metaphor, a “holding deposit – a claim to the country until the colonists arrived” (Nugent 2009:
70). ‘Firsts’ matter in the construction of history. As a discursive form of reference ‘firsts’ mark
the end of one era and the beginning of another. ‘Firsts’ also connect the colonists to the
landscape and seemingly erase any traces of ‘others’ (Nugent 2009). Bruce Pascoe argues that
prior to colonisation democracy was practiced in Australia, “more perfectly than anywhere on
earth” (2007: 113). John Maynard substantiates this by drawing attention to some of Cook’s
personal observations,
[I]n a personal and highly revealing logbook account Cook reflected on the shocking
inequality of living conditions in Britain, where raw sewage flowed through the streets,
filth and disease was rampant and opportunities of bettering oneself were largely
discouraged. In stark contrast Cook observed Aboriginal Australia as being a healthy
paradise of equality (2014a: 16).

Maynard claims that Cook’s reflections have been largely ignored by historians. Bain Attwood
proffers a reason for this, “History was not only the colonisers’ discourse; it was also a
colonising one” (1996a: viii). To put this more stridently, the mythologising of history provides
“a privileged shelter for the sovereignty of consciousness” (Foucault 1997: 12). The dismissal
of Cook’s comparison between Britain and Australia can thus be understood as an historical
erasure, a deletion that has augmented a particular view of Indigenous people’s pre-colonial
social structures. Throughout the eight day encounter the local people resisted and attempted
to avoid the landing party. On the eighth day they chose to boycott the area thus ending Cook’s
hope of a noteworthy meeting (Nugent 2009).
Cook continued on his voyage of ‘discovery ‘sailing to an island seventeen kilometres
off the tip of Cape York Peninsular in north Queensland. The traditional owners, the Gudang
people and Kaurareg people, know the island as Bedanug. It was here that Cook felt certain no
other European had previously landed. On Wednesday 22nd August 1770, Cook once more
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planted the Union Jack and declared the whole of the east coast of Australia to be a British
possession,
[N]otwithstand[ing] I had in the Name of His Majesty taken possession of several
places upon this coast, I now once more hoisted English Coulers [sic] and in the Name
of His Majesty King George the Third took possession of the whole Eastern Coast . . .
by the name New South Wales, together with all the Bays, Harbours Rivers and Islands
situate upon the said coast, after which we fired three Volleys of small Arms which
were Answerd [sic] by the like number from the Ship (qtd. in State Library of New
South Wales [NSW] 2018).

The hoisting of the British flag accompanied by the pomp and ceremony of a volley of firearms
was indicative of the intentions of those whose force was yet to be realised. The practice of
using a flag to take possession of land can be traced back several centuries. For example, during
the Crusades flags were officially recognised as a way of transferring privilege or title to land.
Throughout the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries, as European colonists explored and seized
lands in other parts of the world, the international legal principle of Discovery mandated that
by planting their flag in the ground the ‘discovering’ European nation attained property rights
and sovereign authority over the newly ‘discovered’ lands and peoples (Miller et al 2010).
Having planted the flag on Bedanug, Cook imposed a further linguistic declaration of British
ownership and named the island “Possession Island”, a name it bears to this day. A white stone
monument sits on the headland above the beach commemorating the place where Cook and the
British flag claimed possession on behalf of King George III.
The ongoing failure to recognise Indigenous sovereignty in Australia can be traced back
to 1768 when two directives contained in the Secret Instructions, which detailed the specifics
of the voyage and were handed to Cook by the British Admiralty, were disregarded. First, if
Cook ‘discovered’ land that was inhabited, he was instructed to make an alliance with the
people and garner their consent before taking possession. Second, Cook was ordered to take
possession of the land only if it was uninhabited:
10

[Y]ou are also with the Consent of the Natives to take Possession of Convenient
Situations in the Country in the Name of the King of Great Britain: Or: if you find the
Country uninhabited take Possession for his Majesty by setting up Proper Marks and
Inscriptions, as first discoverers and possessors (Museum of Australian Democracy
[MoAD] 2011a).

Cook knowingly instigated the illegal dispossession of Aboriginal land. Evidence supports the
contention that he took matters into his own hands, “‘[A] man would not accomplish much in
discovery who only stuck to orders’” (Cook qtd. in Moorehead 1987: 62). Land ownership
conferred exclusive rights for its use, administration, and future direction as part of the British
Empire. Whoever lived on Crown land automatically became British citizens with rights and
obligations under British law. However, for Indigenous people these rules and regulations were
insurmountable. For example, as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were not
Christian they could not swear under oath, therefore any transgressions committed against them
were legally inadmissible (Dingle 1988). Furthermore, as British citizens, Indigenous people
could not wage war to defend their lands; if they killed or injured another British subject in
protest of their dispossession, it was deemed a criminal offence. Tony Dingle asserts, “[T]he
rules of war did not apply on the frontier but the criminal law did” (1988: 56). It was on the
basis of the claims made during Cook’s voyage relating to “terra australis”8 and
representations of “the aborigines” that “the British Government determined in 1785 that New
Holland9 was a terra nullius, that is, no-man’s land” (Attwood 1996a: viii-ix).
Under British law, land that was not cultivated or seen to be inhabited with fixed abodes
was deemed to be ‘empty land’ (Miller et al 2010). Terra nullius was the legal justification for
the occupation of Australia. Cook’s refusal to abide by official dictates manifest in his actions

8

Terra Australis Incognita, Latin for unknown southern land, was an imaginary continent which featured on
European maps from the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries.
9
Following the mid-16th century expeditions of the Dutch explorer Abel Tasman, the southern continent was
referred to as New Holland.
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and proclamations, the foundational basis upon which the colonial project came to rely.
Rosemary Hunter asserts, “[T]he dispossession of the indigenous owners of this country was
achieved by force but justified by Captain Cook’s law, which was a legal doctrine developed
specifically by European jurists to facilitate colonialism” (1996: 6). As a result of Cook’s brief
Australian voyage of ‘discovery’, a British penal colony was established. On 26 January 1788,
eighteen years after Cook left Australian waters, the First Fleet, led by Captain Arthur Phillip,
arrived at Kurnell. Unable to locate a suitable supply of fresh water, the fleet continued north
and landed at Sydney Cove. There, the British flag was unfurled once more and guns again
fired to announce the invasion.10 In 1938, the white nation celebrated 150 years of
(dis)possession, and on 26 January a re-enactment of the landing and flag raising ceremony
was staged.

10

John Kirwan (1934) claims that in 1828 Australia had a white population of 58,000. Some 40,000 lived in
Sydney and its surrounds, the remaining 18,000 were in Tasmania. British authorities were uneasy, could “the
two English-speaking isolated communities of New South Wales and Tasmania [constitute as] an effective
occupation of a great island continent” (Kirwan 1934: 7-8). With this in mind, and underpinned by the known
wealth of untapped agricultural and mineral resources, London sent official instructions to Sydney. On Christmas
Day, 1826, a party of soldiers and convicts occupied King George’s Sound (Albany), in Western Australia and
“the first official claim was made of British sovereignty all over Australia” (Kirwan 1934: 8-9).
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Figure 2: “The pages of History were rolled back 150 years on the morning of Anniversary Day, January 26, 1938, when the
landing ceremony of Captain Arthur Phillip, on the shores of Sydney Cove, was faithfully re-enacted” (Ziegler 1938: Chapter
11:4).

In white Australia “Captain Cook” is renowned as something of a heroic figure. His
name is taught to Australian children from an early age and popular culture is replete with the
mythology of Cook’s ‘discovery’. There are, however, challenges to the official doctrine of
Cook’s historical legacy. Maynard offers a distinctly oppositional view to that proffered in
official narratives, likening Cook to a “time-travelling bogeyman” who,
transcends time and space to wreak havoc across the continent upon the Aboriginal
inhabitants over the course of the past 243 years. In this manifestation he represents
white Australia in all its guises including invasion, occupation, dispossession and the
conducting of a symphony of violence (2014a: 16).

Maynard draws attention to the way in which, for many Aboriginal people, “Captain Cook” is
a metaphor, a euphemism for white Australia. Maynard notes that Cook has been embedded in
Aboriginal narratives since first contact, and that the realities associated with his failure to
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formally recognise that the Australian landscape was inhabited and sustained prior to his arrival
are well understood. He argues that the perpetuation of Captain Cook narratives demonstrate
the continuing persistence of Aboriginal worldviews. Hunter contends that Captain Cook
narratives facilitate a way for Aboriginal people to assert truths which have been denied or
obfuscated. She explores two Aboriginal truths: firstly, “Aboriginal Law is older, more
venerable and generally superior to the immoral Captain Cook law relied on by the European
invaders” and secondly, “the land belonged originally and still rightfully belongs to the
Aborigines, and so its forcible acquisition by Europeans has no legitimacy” (Hunter 1996: 4).
Hunter’s truths stand in sharp contrast to dominant settler-colonial narratives and make a
significant contribution to an anti-colonial discourse that has, since invasion, challenged the
‘truths’ associated with official Cook narratives. As Nugent argues, “[T]his is no closed chapter
of history. It is a past that is continually kept alive by constant talk about it” (2009:105).
Under the auspices of the Australian flag, which privileges the British flag, Captain
Cook narratives and artistic responses11 continue to reflect the nature of relationships between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. They disclose the enduring violence of colonisation, its
legacies of massacres,12 dispossession, enforced relocation, the removal of children and the ongoing litany of inequality that continues to affect many Aboriginal people. Nugent points out,
“the name of Captain Cook became shorthand among Aboriginal people for ‘a large set of
people, processes and regulations’ that had dispossessed them of their territory” (2009: 123).
Many Aboriginal people distinguish between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Captain Cooks, to the

Jason Wing recalls being taught in high school that James Cook discovered Australia, “[T]his colonial lie is
further reinforced by a huge bronze sculpture in Hyde Park, Sydney, which is situated on a massacre site” (Wing
2017: 129). Wing’s reaction to this statue is one of physical repulsion and in response he produced a sculpture.
Captain James Crook (2013) features a bronze bust of Cook. In order to portray Cook’s criminal status Wing
covered Cook’s face with a balaclava. His work triggered a vitriolic online response, “… their disgust at my
disrespectful and inaccurate version of Australia’s history and my alleged defamation of Captain Cook’s great
name … prove that colonial propaganda and racism is alive and well …” (Wing 2017: 129).
12
Most recently a digital map which begins to document the scale of massacres has been developed by Professor
Lyndall Ryan, “[T]he map shows massacres were widespread with intense periods of warfare, and often included
soldiers and police” (Power 2017: 6). The massacres, Ryan states, “were conducted in secrecy and few perpetrators
were brought to justice” (qtd. in Power 2017: 6)
11
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extent that new Captain Cooks have become a euphemised reference point for colonial
violence,
[W]hen the old Captain Cook died, other people started thinking they could make
Captain Cook another way. New people. Maybe all his sons. Too many Captain Cooks.
They started shooting people then. New Captain Cook people…Those are the people
that made war…They are the ones who have been stealing all the women and killing
people. They have made war. Warmakers, those New Captain Cooks … And then they
made a new thing called “welfare”. All the Captain Cook mob came and called
themselves “welfare mob”…They wanted to take all of Australia … All the new people
wanted anything they could get … (Paddy Wainburranga qtd. in Mackinolty and
Wainburranga, 1988: 359).

This way of seeing the ‘settlers’ and their descendants provides a counter discourse which calls
into question the traditional colonial settler-histories of triumph and progress. By default,
Captain Cook narratives comprise frames of reference that express the realities and tensions of
ongoing power relationships inscribed by colonial rule.
In Australia colonial narratives continue to frame white understandings of history. For
example, on 15 March 2013, then Federal Opposition Leader Tony Abbott made a pledge to
become a Prime Minister for Aboriginal affairs, “[H]e said Australia could not feel ‘relaxed
and comfortable’ unless Aboriginal people had comparable health, education and social
opportunities to other Australians” (Keyzer and McGee 2014: 19). One year later Abbott
addressed the Melbourne Institute and declared,
I guess our country owes its existence to a form of foreign investment by the British
government in the then unsettled or, um, scarcely settled, Great South Land (qtd. in
Koori Mail 16 July 2014: 4).

Former Member of Parliament, Nova Perris responded, “British settlement was not foreign
investment. It was occupation” (qtd.in Koori Mail 16 July 2014: 4). National Congress of
Australia’s First Peoples co-chair, Kirstie Parker said Abbott’s remarks “were wrong in fact,
law, and history [and] clearly demonstrate how far some Australians have to go in
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understanding this country’s true history” (qtd. in Koori Mail 16 July 2014: 4). Abbott’s
comments are revealing, indicative of a “Captain Cook mindset”, which favours the terra
nullius version of history. Statements such as this transmit a fundamental message of white
superiority and are strategic to both the formation of knowledge and relations of power. Michel
Foucault claims that “a statement is always an event that neither the language (langue) nor the
meaning can quite exhaust” (1997: 28 emphasis in the original). Once uttered, the statement
either enters the mind to linger, or materialises in print. A statement therefore exists with the
capacity to be both repeated and reinvented and is inevitably linked with others which have
gone before and are yet to follow.
The manipulation of Australian history has long suited the dominant interests, but not
without a cost. Gerry Georgatos argues that when groups are unrepresented it causes a tension
which
humiliates identity by making it a liability, cultural and historical and therefore we
[minority groups] engage in what should be unnecessary, in the politics of identity,
when equality should have brought us together in harmony (2013: 20).

While notions of “harmony” are somewhat ambiguous what Georgatos alludes to is the amount
of ‘wasted’ energy which is expended by minority groups who daily battle for the basic human
rights of justice and equality. For the wider population, the project of national “harmony” is
something of a fantasy inspired by flag-waving and the commandeering of a swathe of national
symbols. I suggest that it is the flag, and its attendant paraphernalia that work to inspire
hegemonic ideals of harmony. The flag’s colonial insignia functions to reassure, to lay to rest
anxieties. Under the banner of the national flag, the nation has the appearance of ‘unity’,
however, without its visible comfort, the nation is forced to look inward at itself. It is the fear
of this knowledge that drives the continual reinvigoration of national symbols without which
non-Indigenous Australians would have to concede to the ongoing consequences of illegitimate
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occupation. Ghassan Hage argues that fear is fundamental to Australia’s “colonial paranoia”
which he states is, “a combination of the fragility of White European colonial identity in general
and the Australian situation in particular” (2003: 49).13
Thesis Background: Flagging Inclusion
Ben Wellings asserts the national flag is a metaphor of the nation and should
“symbolize unity over division: whatever our political views, ethnicity, class, gender or
regional location, the flag and nation are supposed to be above such potential sources of
division” (2010: 15). As I seek to discover the Australian national flag’s ‘unifying’ capability
through its dissemination, the representational force of the Union Jack holds particular interest.
In 1770 Cook used the British flag to claim Australia as a possession for King George III. The
British flag, the Union Jack, is the flag of my birthplace. It is the national symbol which
socialised me as a child. Growing up in England, the Union Jack represented my national
identity and symbolically connected me to the broader British population. I was socialised well.
When I migrated to Australia in 1984, I recall gleaning comfort from that little bit of
‘home’ which was sitting up there on the Australian flag – I felt included. Wellings echoes this
sentiment commenting that his previous connection to the Union Jack meant settling in
Australia was, “easier in a country where I only ever felt half-foreign” (2010: 22). My
experience was similar. Somehow, the flag provided me with a sense of complacency and the
promise of eventual assimilation into the cultural milieu. I wasn’t quite ‘outside’ or ‘inside’; I
‘sort of’ fitted in. I knew the language, and many of the social customs and despite a few
cultural differences, the political, religious and legal landscape were similar, comprehensible,
and not difficult as a migrant to navigate. Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues that British
migrants “feel included in the nation because prepossession has been claimed on their behalf,
hence their implicit understanding that the nation is a white possession” (2015: 29).
13

See also Hage in Thornton (2017).
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Furthermore she claims, British migrants’ amalgamation into “the narrative of Australian
migration history works to separate them from the history of Indigenous dispossession” (2015:
28). Moreton-Robinson’s premise is compelling. On my arrival and for some time after, I
viewed the Australian flag through a blinkered white migrant lens of privilege, and I did indeed
feel somewhat ‘removed’ from the brutal realities of Australian history.
For many years it did not occur to me to question why the Union Jack featured on the
Australian flag. Nor would I have considered what the flag might symbolise to Indigenous
people. I did not wonder if it were acceptable, or indeed appropriate, that the Australian national
flag had been colonised by the British flag just as the continent had been. When I returned to
study and learned about the colonial history of Australia, I began to think about what the
placement of the Union Jack might mean for those whose land and cultures had been colonised.
These questions, accompanied by a need to know more, generated further questions.
Eventually, I realised that a process of unlearning was taking place and that old and comfortable
information was being replaced by less comfortable knowledge. Like most citizens of modern
democracies, I had been institutionally socialised throughout my life into what Michael Billig
refers to as “banal nationalism”, a term used to encompass “the ideological habits which enable
the established nations of the West to be reproduced” (2013: 6).
My interest in this thesis has thus been forged out of a combination of life experience
and academic learning. It is an inquiry that has developed over time. In recent years I have
reflected on the colonial symbolism of the national flag, its emblematic force, and its on-going
effects. My discomfort with the flag’s colonial signification continues to challenge me and to
impel my research. For many the flag is a symbolic endorsement of tradition, national values
and a history encoded by a white, Christian ethos. Examples of this are located on the
Australian National Flag Association’s (ANFA) homepage: “[I]t is our history book … you
can’t change history” states Lindsay Fox, and Blainey asserts “[I]t is the flag of the people as
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well as the nation” (qtd. in ANFA 2012a). The national flag as it stands today was not designed
until 1901, and did not become the official national flag until Queen Elizabeth II gave her
assent on 14 February 1954 (Kwan 2006). Prior to this, the national flag of Australia was the
British Union Jack. And so, in reality the Australian national flag represents a selective and
extremely small part of the continent’s history.
Carol Foley argues that the Union Jack, with its three Christian crosses is more than a
mere colonial reminder of a past relationship with Britain. She states “[W]e are recognised
throughout the world primarily as a Christian people, with Christian ethics and morals, and
these ethics are interwoven into our social institutions” (1996a: 93).The Union Jack, she claims,
stands in testimony to “our” British origins: of governance, language, education, democracy,
religious and spiritual inheritance. Conversely, for Indigenous people, what does the Union
Jack stand in testimony to? Noel Pearson identifies the need for inclusion and argues that,
“Australia’s Indigenous heritage should rightly sit alongside these fundamental British
traditions and institutions” (2013: 23).
Since invasion, Indigenous people in Australia have experienced systemic and ongoing
hardship. Paternalistic policies and practices were designed to foster deprivation and exclusion
and resulted in generations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people being denied access
to their land, kinship networks, cultural practices, languages, wages, and health services.
Indigenous people were educated according to colonial mandates. In some areas it was
obligatory and in other areas, forbidden. Until the mid-twentieth century Indigenous people
were excluded from participating in political, social and legal systems. The systematic
application of exclusion is enshrined constitutionally: of the 128 sections of the Australian
Constitution14 there is no recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. George

The Australian Constitution (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900) is Australia’s founding
document. It took over a decade to develop and was drafted without Aboriginal input or consultation. The
14
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Williams notes, “Australia is the last democracy with a constitution permitting laws that
discriminate on the basis of race” (2012: 10). Section 25 of the constitution allows the states to
disallow entire races of people from voting. The ‘races power’ in section 51(xxvi) allows the
Federal Parliament to initiate laws that discriminate for or against people based upon their race.
Pearson argues that the Australian Constitution is a racist document and that the
“allowance and promotion of racial discrimination is at odds with fundamental tenets of
democracy” (2013: 23). Former Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, acknowledges that prior to
Federation 1901, there was a decade of planning in which the colonies debated how the
Constitution was to be crafted,
[B]ut there is no record of any Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander person taking part.
Indigenous people did not ordain our Constitution nor contribute to its drafting. They
had no opportunity to vote for it, and yet all were affected by what it said and what it
failed to say. They were affected by provisions that even by the standards of the time
seem questionable and strike us now as harsh and inhumane. But they were also affected
by the “great Australian silence”15 which fell upon our founding document. Because
among the 128 sections of the Constitution, there is no acknowledgement of Australia’s
First Peoples (qtd. in National Indigenous Times 20 February 2013: 19).

To include Indigenous people in the Australian Constitution or change its discriminatory bias
requires a referendum, as Gillard explains,
…recognition [of Indigenous people] is not a matter for politicians or experts. Instead,
the Constitution belongs to the people. It was created by them. It serves them. And it is
amendable by them alone (qtd. in National Indigenous Times 20 February 2013: 19).

constitution came into force on 1 January, 1901. As the modern Australian nation was born it was specific in its
exclusion of Aboriginal people. Section 127 stated, “[I]n reckoning the number of the people of the
Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal natives shall not be counted”
(Sanders 2005: 220). Section 51 (xxvi) authorised the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to, “[T]he people
of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any state, for who it is deemed necessary to make special laws”
(Sanders 2005: 220). It was not until the 1967 Referendum that these exclusionary clauses were removed: section
127 was deleted and section 51 (xxvi) was revised and the middle phrase deleted.
15
In his delivery of the 1968 ABC Boyer Lectures, William Stanner coined the term “The Great Australian
Silence”. This phrase describes what Stanner argues is the historic and deliberate neglect of Indigenous people in
all facets of Australian life (see Chapter Two).
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The fundamental principle of inclusion thus rests with the wider population and in the twenty
first century the reasoning for this is extraordinary. Australia’s founding document “belongs”
to the people who created it. This document was “created” by white society, it “serves” white
society and as it stands today, it “belongs” to white society. This is the discourse of white
prerogative. Such leverage satiates the dominant mindset with inherently false notions of power
and legitimacy as it relegates Indigenous people once more to the behest of the white majority.
Crucially, Pearson states it is “not for mainstream Australia to confer recognition upon
Indigenous people, but for Indigenous people to decide whether that type of recognition was
something they wanted” (qtd. in Maxwell 2015: 5). Narrungga Elder, Tauto Sansbury argues
“[T]hey could have put something in the Constitution from day one but they didn’t” (qtd. in
Koori Mail 23 September 2015: 3). Since invasion, the political and social climate has excluded
Indigenous people, and this has had significant impacts on health and wellbeing outcomes.
The 2014 Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) ‘Poverty in Australia Report’
finds that the determinants of disadvantage can interrelate and perpetuate social exclusion.16
The multi-dimensional nature of disadvantage, such as material inequality, political and social
exclusion, means that for many Indigenous people, poverty and adversity are intergenerational
and according to Daphne Habibis & Maggie Walter are “directly related to the history of blackwhite relations in Australia” (2010: 75). While the detrimental effects of both structural and
social racism are well documented, it is only in more recent years that research has found that
the experiences of racism negatively impact physical and mental health and wellbeing. In July
2013, the Federal Government launched its new Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health
Plan. Pat Anderson,17 chairwoman of the Lowitja Institute, Australia’s National Institute for

16

The seven social exclusion indicators identified are: health, education, employment, material resources, social
connection, community and personal safety (ACOSS 2014).
17
Pat Anderson received the 2016 Human Rights Medal for her significant contribution and lifetime commitment
to the health and wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (Koori Mail 11 January 2017: 9).
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Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Research, considers it ground-breaking because
for the first time racism is identified as a key driver of ill-health. Anderson calls for social and
political change through education and debate and for all Australians to understand that racism
in all its forms has health implications for Indigenous people. Anderson’s dialogue concerning
“connection” is significant. Not only must Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people be able
to connect with their families, communities and cultures, “[W]e must also feel connected to the
rest of society. Racism cuts that connection” (Anderson 2014: 20).
How do these findings which clearly identify the health implications of racism, however
“casual”, and the importance of social connection, intersect with the national flag? Does the
Australian national flag have the capacity to provoke feelings of disconnection or exclusion for
Indigenous people? In relation to this and the fundamental importance of both inclusion and
connection Lowitja O’Donoghue’s view of the flag is worth citing in detail,
[O]ur national flag should be a symbol of our national ideals and of the people we want
to be. We regard ourselves as independent, individual and inclusive – but our existing
flag, our national symbol says none of this...
We are a country that prides itself on diversity and tolerance, yet some of us cling to a
flag that represents a monoculture and intolerance. We are a country that has debated
important national issues such as justice, rights and identity, yet the current flag
symbolises quite the opposite – complacency, dependency and subordination (qtd. in
Ausflag 2013)

O’Donoghue raises important questions about the flag’s (in)capacity to both truthfully
represent the nation’s history and also, its ability to symbolically project the nation’s current
and future aspirations. In marking “complacency, dependency and subordination” as notable
facets of the flag’s representational force, O’Donoghue brings to the fore the fracture between
symbol and reality, between the national flag as a material object and its symbolic power to
represent the nation. She pinpoints the racial hierarchy upon which the nation is built, and
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draws attention to the exclusion that is clearly made visible through the iconography of the
national flag.
Conclusion
This inquiry is both an analysis and a cultural history of the Australian national flag.
The thesis is also an exploration into Australian national identity that encompasses some of the
questions that demand my attention. As a research project, this work seeks to disclose the
‘what’, ‘why’, and ‘how’ of the Australian national flag through an examination of its history,
its uses and applications in the public domain, and its political force as a socio-cultural regulator
of this nation state. I question what it might mean for Indigenous people to come into daily
contact with this prominent symbol. Furthermore, I ask how the force of the flag is maintained:
what sustains it? What gives it life in the national imagination?
This investigation will throughout be attentive to the manifold ways in which whiteness
and nation interpellate through national symbols which forge identity, power and knowledge.
This methodology will be discussed in Chapter Two. An exploration into how and why the
modern nation was created will be discussed in Chapter Three. Following this, in Chapter Four
I will examine how the modern Australian nation has been maintained. Chapter Five will
provide information relating to the history of flags, the construction of both the Union Jack and
Australian flag, and will consider various applications of the flag. Chapter Six will investigate
the longstanding resistance of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to colonial rule as
a prelude to Chapter Seven which will look specifically at Indigenous responses and reactions
to the Australian national flag. At this introductory point, I draw from the metaphorical
“between the flags” of the Australian beach where the nation is instructed to swim in order to
maintain ‘safety’ and ‘cohesion’. Through the study of vexillology I aim to provide another
way of understanding Australian society. Who is included and who is not? By exploring the

23

binary of this question, I hypothesise that somewhere between the flags lies a national identity
that can be re-imagined through a symbol which includes all of its citizens.
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CHAPTER TWO: Methodology
The scraps, patches and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a coherent
national culture, while the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a growing circle
of national subjects.
(Bhabha 1994: 209).
Introduction
Repeated exposure to national signs, when combined with a nationalist discourse,
constitutes, as Homi Bhabha notes, the signs of a “coherent national culture”. The recurring
utility of the national flag across all institutional sites makes a significant contribution to the
illusion of coherence. In this chapter I outline the theoretical framework which will underscore
my analysis of the Australian national flag. I begin with a review of the literature. For several
decades, the literature available has identified that the ‘functions’ of national flags have been
under-researched. From my research, it is also evident that there is a noticeable absence of
Indigenous viewpoints in the literature which relate to the Australian national flag. An
examination of how whiteness functions will help to reveal its relationship with the formation
and maintenance of Australian national identity. The union of flag and nation is a site of
conflicting opinions that constitutes tension for many people. I draw from the work of Martin
Nakata to explore the parameters and opportunities which exist at what Nakata calls the
“cultural interface”.18 I also examine Michael Billig’s theory of “banal nationalism”19 to
ascertain the effectiveness of the flag as a seemingly neutral and unremarkable symbol of day
to day life. In order to facilitate a way to understand how the Australian flag intersects and
influences the socio-political landscape, this methodology is informed by work in the field of
vexillology.

18
19

Disciplining the Savages: Savaging the Disciplines (Nakata 2008a).
Banal Nationalism (Billig 2013).
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Scot Guenter argues that the focused study of flags, vexillology, can facilitate “deeper
understandings of the complex processes of social behavior and cultural systems” (2010: 1). In
the Australian context, analysis of the national flag’s uses and applications, and an exploration
into its relationship with nation building, discloses much about Australian society, both past
and present. Australian national identity is underscored by the illegitimate nature of British
settlement, the ongoing repercussions of which are compounded by a systemic failure to
recognise Indigenous sovereignty. Patrick Sullivan claims “Australian national identity will
remain hollow at the core until we develop a sense of belonging together” (2011: 122). Sullivan
stresses the importance of including Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people at all levels
of the nation, as does the Assembly of First Nations (AFN). The introduction of the AFN draft
interim charter promotes and advocates for an ongoing dialogue and engagement, “between the
First Nations and all levels of the Australian government and industry” (Koori Mail 16
December 2015: 30). Patrick Dodson calls for national political leadership to “forge new
systems of governance that include Indigenous people as honoured partners in Australian
nation building” (2007: 28). Most recently the Referendum Council20 recommends, “a
referendum be held to provide in the Australian Constitution for a representative body that
gives Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander First Nations a Voice to the Commonwealth
Parliament” (Referendum Council 2017a). The inclusion of an Indigenous advisory body into
the Australian Parliament would, for the first time, provide Indigenous people the opportunity
to discuss the laws and policies that concern them.21

20

The Referendum Council was established in December 2015 to advise the Prime Minister and Opposition
Leader on Constitutional recognition. Widespread consultation with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people
from across the nation culminated with a convention at Uluru in the Northern Territory. Supported by the majority
of delegates the ‘Uluru Statement from the Heart’ was drawn up (See Appendix A) and on 30 June 2017 the
Referendum Council issued its recommendation for constitutional change.
21
On 26 October 2017 information was leaked to the media that revealed the recommendation for a “Voice to
Parliament” had been rejected by the Turnbull government. Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, Indigenous Affairs
Minister Nigel Scullion and Attorney-General George Brandis released a joint statement in which they argue, “the
idea of a representative assembly for Indigenous Australia – in addition to the House of Representatives and
Senate – would be inconsistent with the fundamental democratic principle of all citizens having equal civic rights”
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Sullivan (2011) also claims that through language, practice and values non-Indigenous
people must recognise and acknowledge their implication in the lives of Indigenous people.
The following statement identifies the core values of the Australian National Flag Association,
[I]t is vitally important, in this time of rapid change, that our National Flag with the
history, heritage and traditions that it represents be NOT destroyed by unrepresentative
and divisive lobby groups pushing radical political views.
Welcome to ANFA a patriotic and voluntary organisation dedicated to promoting pride,
respect and understanding in the Australian way of life by acknowledgment of the
principles for which our Flag of “Stars and Crosses” proudly represents to our
generations and those coming.22

From this it is evident that the ANFA is strident in protecting what it deems to be the symbol
of “the Australian way of life”, which is replete with British “history, heritage and traditions”.
In this endorsement of the national flag, any recognition of Indigenous people is absent. The
words used by the ANFA are not new; they have been part of Australian national discourse for
over a century. In 1914, the Sydney Daily Telegraph explored reactions to the Union Jack from
around the British Empire and branded any denouncer of the flag as an “infuriated extremist”
(qtd. in Crowley 1973: 206). A range of responses included, a “wild Irishman” who described
the flag as “dirty” and a “strike-leader in South Africa” who consigned the flag to “hell”, while
in India “once more” the flag “was held up to hatred as the symbol of oppression by the orators
of unrest” (qtd. in Crowley 1973: 206). From these examples it becomes apparent that for over
one hundred years the British Union Jack has been a symbol of division.23

(Hunter 2017: 6). The date has a significant resonance. On 26 October 1985, Uluru, formerly known as “Ayers
Rock” was ‘handed back’ by the Australian Government to its traditional owners. For cultural reasons, the Anangu
traditional owners have decided to ban people from climbing Uluru. The last climbing day will be on 26 October
2019 (Koori Mail 15 November 2017:1).
22
This extract is taken from the ANFA membership form, made available at the National Flag Day Ceremony in
Martin Place, Sydney, 3 September 2015. The membership form includes the following pledge: “I promise
allegiance to Australia and our National Flag of “Stars and Crosses.” To serve my country and all its people
faithfully and to uphold Australia’s laws, customs, values and traditions to the best of my ability”.
23
Throughout the world the Union Jack continues to leave its mark. It is a living symbol, as the flags of New
Zealand, Fiji, Tuluva and Australia testify. In order to give the flag a more contemporary relevance there have
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The Daily Telegraph pays tribute to the Union Jack stating it holds “so many millions
of mankind in affection or respect or fear” (qtd. in Crowley 1973: 206). The notion that for
some this flag is a symbol of “fear” is dispelled by the newspaper through rhetoric which defers
to Britain’s strength, arguing that the flag offers protection and achievement, and is “vitally
related to justice and civilisation, and to all else that makes for the happiness and betterment of
mankind” (qtd. in Crowley 1973: 206). The virtues of the British Empire are extolled and
Australians are duly instructed on how to attach themselves to both flag and Empire,
[T]he way to get a healthy and inspiring pride in our Empire-citizenship and in the flag
as the Empire’s symbol is to get the Empire idea into our minds and to cultivate it (qtd.
in Crowley 1973: 207).24

The development of nationalism is thus fostered through a set of discursive practices that come
into being as the material artefacts of nation. These include an array of symbols, artworks,
literary works, film, television programmes and so on that constitute national culture in its
many and various formations. Nationalism is widely disseminated and so it enters the psyche
of the body politic as a creed that is shared among the citizenry. Nationalism depends upon a
tangible sign for its efficacy so the importance of a nation’s flag cannot be overstated. Set a
century apart, the above-mentioned examples from the ANFA and Daily Telegraph propel a
discourse, a set of statements and practices, which seeks to uphold and embellish the virtues of
British heritage. Discourses carry with them the ability to be reinvented and rejuvenated, thus
the transmission of past assumptions and values are never entirely extinguished; they lie in
readiness, patiently waiting to (re)present themselves.

been calls to include a fourth cross. A cross of thin black stripes, “to remind the citizens of the living legacy of
colonialism” (Eriksen 2007: 6).
24
This was the era of Australian nation creation. On 12 March 1913 the foundation stone of the nation’s capital
was laid. The Attorney-General stated that “Canberra was the visible sign” of the nation and argued, “[T]he people
are incapable of nourishing abstract ideals. They must have a symbol” (qtd. in Crowley 1973: 194).
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Theoretical Background
What the Literature Revealed
There is a dearth of literature on Indigenous views of the Australian national flag. It
could be argued that this missing dialogue, unmasking Indigenous peoples’ views about the
“scraps” of material which create the Australian flag, and its symbolism, are excluded from
public discourse precisely because they challenge the legitimacy of the colonising culture.
Through this silencing white privilege remains secure and race inequality is kept in place. In
her critique of the Australian national flag, Foley conducted a survey in 1994. The focus of her
research was to explore Aboriginal responses to the possible merger of the Aboriginal and
Australian national flags.25 Foley wrote to between sixty and seventy different Aboriginal
groups and received answers from approximately 40 per cent. Overall, the responses called for
the removal of the Union Jack, and for the Aboriginal flag to remain an exclusive symbol of
Aboriginal identity. As outlined by Foley reactions to the survey included the following:


“Have something that symbolizes the whole Australia, not something that
separates our two cultures”.



“Anything is better than the Union Jack”.



“I believe in no uncertain terms that the Union Jack must go … the large star
representing the states, again as a symbol of colonisation, should go” (1996a:
180).

Of the mooted cultural exchange of the Union Jack with the Aboriginal flag, Foley writes,
[A] few people noted that to replace the Union Jack with the Aboriginal flag was merely
to exchange the flag of one cultural group for another, which would be equally divisive
in a flag that should be representative of us all and not single out any one cultural group
for special treatment (1996a: 181).

25

The proposal being to replace the Union Jack in the upper left corner with the Aboriginal flag.
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Foley’s use of the term “special treatment” as something to be avoided in a flag warrants
comment given the “special treatment” favouring white Australia that is encoded in the current
national flag. Foley argues that her sample is, “of course, far too small to generate any findings
that can be extrapolated to the broader Aboriginal community” (1996a: 180). What can be
“extrapolated”, however, is that since at least 1994 there has been a specific call by Aboriginal
people for the Union Jack to be removed from the Australian national flag, and that this request
has not received considered attention.
The literature reveals that there is a gap in the research relating to the relationship
between flags and national identity. Whitney Smith (1975) contends that the origins, forms,
functions and messages of flags are little understood. William Crampton argues that writers
have neglected “the important role of non-verbal, non-abstract, symbols, [and] the idea that
these can be consciously and deliberately employed in a coherent programme for the
establishment of a national identity” (1994: 6). Karen Cerulo (1993) points out that research
into symbols is in its infancy and that reactions to national symbols have been underresearched. In order to recognise the power that symbols exert over the national audience
Cerulo states that a thorough social and symbolic investigation is required. Once the
representational force of national symbols is better understood, questions pertaining to power
and national identity can be further investigated. Catherine Palmer (1998) claims theoretical
debates about the social processes which have constructed national identity are limited, as key
theorists have failed to address the ways in which the nation is daily maintained.
More recently, Thomas Eriksen and Richard Jenkins assert that “national differences in
the meaning, political significance and uses of flags are rarely studied at all” (2007: xiii). They
acknowledge that while the political and symbolic importance of flags has been recognised by
scholars of nationalism, there has been a lack of in-depth studies relating to the influence of
flags on national identities. They argue that flags have been poorly theorised and are “only
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mentioned in passing in most social science studies of nationalism” (Eriksen and Jenkins 2007:
xiii). Edwin Crump (2012) states also that flags as symbolic devices are under-researched.
Social psychologist David Butz (2009) concurs, noting that little research has been conducted
to garner the implications of flag exposure. Butz stresses the particular need for field research
“to examine the function and implications of national symbols in areas where differing group
identities are strong, as such investigations may reveal their truly divisive nature” (2009: 799).
The importance of having a deeper understanding of the responses elicited by national symbols
has significant consequences. In fact Butz asserts that there are “real-world” implications
associated with investigating national symbols for both the public policy and social inclusion
arenas which, “will be useful for future legislative decisions and efforts to create identityinclusive national symbols” (2009: 800). The critical application of vexillology deepens our
understandings about the power exerted by flags, “in creating and changing individual and
group identities, in maintaining or challenging the power structure in any given society”
(Guenter 2001: 205). Elizabeth Kwan (1994a) claims that while the Australian flag has been
mentioned by Australian historians of nationalism, its role has not been explored, an argument
she has reiterated in recent times, “Australian flags’ symbolism and the perceptions of those
flags are both areas needing research and analysis” (2015 pers. comm., 5 Oct).
In Australia, the national flag has been employed as an unambiguous signifier that
heralds hegemonic understandings of national identity as it simultaneously connects the nation
to Britain, as both the “mother land” and the colonising force. From the outset, Australian
national identity was and remains to some extent, implicated by British nationalism. As Richard
White has argued, “Australia has long supported a whole industry of image-makers to tell us
what we are” (1981: viii). Notions of national identity, White claims, need to be explored in
order to ascertain, “what their function is, whose creation they are, and whose interests they
serve” (viii). White puts forward a number of arguments in which national identity, as a
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phenomenon of the modern western nation, has been created and is manipulated by those in
power. Ideals of national identity, according to White, have been created through relationships
of reciprocity and validation between those who have historically defined Australian identity
– the intelligentsia (writers, journalists, artists and academics) and the economic powerbrokers. National identity therefore serves a social function and it is in the dominant interests
to control it.
In 1968, eminent Australian anthropologist, William Stanner delivered the Boyer
Lectures in which he examined the status of Aboriginal people and their relationship with the
wider white population. In recent decades Stanner’s lectures have come to occupy a central
place in academic discourse and debates regarding race relations in Australia. His term “cult
of forgetfulness” is renowned and has without doubt had a significant impact on revisionist
histories. Stanner identified both the structural inequality within Australian society and the
amnesia that accompanies it,
[I]t is a structural matter, a view from a window which has been carefully placed to
exclude a whole quadrant of the landscape. What may well have begun as a simple
forgetting of other possible views turned under habit and over time into something like
a cult of forgetfulness practiced on a national scale (1974: 24-25).

Michael Billig perceives “forgetfulness” as a deliberate omission underscored by ideological
intent and he argues that social scientists have knowingly overlooked how the nation is
reproduced,
… the sociological forgetting is not fortuitous; nor is it to be blamed on the absentmindedness of particular scholars. Instead, it fits an ideological pattern in which ‘our’
nationalism (that of established nations …) is forgotten: it ceases to appear as
nationalism, disappearing into the ‘natural’ environment of ‘societies’ (2013: 38).

Billig examines how the dominant values of nation are perpetuated on a daily basis and the
ease with which society becomes indoctrinated. He seeks to unravel the concept of nation
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which exists, he contends, in the collective thought process of nationalist rhetoric and practice.
To draw attention to this is a challenge, for apart from the days of overt, staged nationalism,
and times of crises, nationalism is so laboriously repeated and so deeply embedded within the
day to day cultural landscape that it’s rarely given a second thought.
Under the Blanket of Whiteness
Moreton-Robinson claims that in Australia “[W]hiteness is both the measure and
marker of normality ... In its corporeal form, whiteness is a signifier of many things – including
nationhood” (2008a: 66-67). The Australian national flag is the primary symbol of nationhood
and is thus the most significant form of white Australian cultural capital: a material device the
national flag is recognisable, portable, inexpensive, accessible, and can be found in all manner
of places. An examination of the flag therefore demands an investigation into how whiteness
operates both at a material and philosophical level in the day-to-day socio-cultural milieu.
George Yancy comments that “undoing whiteness is inextricably linked to undoing those
structural power relationships that continue to privilege whites” (2008: 242). Richard Dyer
states that, “[T]he point of looking at whiteness is to dislodge it from its centrality and authority,
not to reinstate it” (2003: 305). In this work whiteness is understood as an invisible set of
practices that endows inherent and routinely unacknowledged privileges upon its recipients.
Moreton-Robinson sees whiteness as a condition that operates discursively to reproduce
itself: “whiteness”, she argues, “is constitutive of the epistemology of the West; it is an invisible
regime of power that secures hegemony through discourse and has material effects in everyday
life” (2011a: 75). As a normative set of practices whiteness routinely goes unchallenged by
those who benefit from it, because, as Marcia Langton asserts “white Australians do not see
themselves as having a ‘race’” (1999: 35). Therefore to be “involved in the process of
racialising whiteness” (Moreton-Robinson 1999: 29), is not only a commitment to combatting
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racism (McKay 1999), but it also enables a critical understanding of whiteness as a form of
agency which is manufactured to maintain the hierarchy of racial privilege.
In her influential work, Whiteness as Property, Cheryl Harris (1993) explores how
whiteness became a valuable form of property through the oppression of Indigenous people
and the appropriation of their lands. She argues also that whiteness has been ‘created’ through
practices based on racial exclusion and subjugation. Whiteness is omniscient, structural and
pervasive, forged from the appropriation of Indigenous lands. Harris asserts,
[W]hiteness has functioned as self-identity in the domain of the intrinsic, personal, and
psychological; as reputation in the interstices between internal and external identity;
and, as property in the extrinsic, public, and legal realms. According whiteness actual
legal status, converted an aspect of identity into an external object of property, moving
whiteness from privileged identity to a vested interest (1993: 1725).

Harris draws attention to the legal structures which legitimate and protect the inherited
expectations of whiteness. She states that whiteness as property, “is a ghost that has haunted
the political and legal domains in which claims for justice have been inadequately addressed
for far too long” (1993: 1791). Harris understands whiteness as an insidious force, both tangible
and intangible, a condition that permeates the nation based on the principle of ownership
through racialised notions of privilege. In relation to the construction of national identity,
Harris argues that whiteness is a central feature.
In Australia, the centrality of whiteness in the construction of nation has been
sanctioned by the law. Since first contact, laws have been set in place and enacted to enhance,
protect and serve the vested interests of white authority. From Cook’s foundational act of theft
and the construct of terra nullius, to the White Australia Policy,26 Australia was conceived and
legally ratified for “the white man”, as evidenced by the Bulletin magazine. With the

26

The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 is commonly referred to as the White Australia Policy. From 1901-1973
the White Australia Policy sanctioned a white Australian nation.
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emergence of the new Australian nation in 1901 the Bulletin (published for over one hundred
years), set about constructing corresponding understandings of national identity, “Australia is
our country … It represents, in a sense, the last chance of the white race … there is no other
place on earth where a new and purely white community can be reared …” (the Bulletin 1906
qtd. in Crowley1973: 96). In order to establish and secure this racialised order throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, racially discriminatory domestic policies of ‘Protection’
and ‘Assimilation’ were employed to constrict and control all facets of life for Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people. In the twenty first century, white policies of repression have
continued, sanctioned by both sides of politics.
For example the Liberals, under the leadership of John Howard, led the Northern
Territory Intervention27 a policy that continues, albeit under a different name of ‘Stronger
Futures’ endorsed by both Labor leaders, Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard. Policy continues to
dictate issues of ‘race’ in the Australian nation and as such, renders it a modern day anomaly.
New Zealand, Canada and the United States, like Australia, are considered ‘settler’ colonial
states, however Australia stands apart as it has no treaty with Indigenous people. Fiona Nicoll
explains that “the racialised trope of perspective pushes Indigenous sovereignty claims towards
the pole of ‘subjectivity’ while granting the everyday imposition of white sovereignty an aura
of ‘objective authority’” (2011: 20). Ongoing practices and policies of whiteness ensure that
Indigenous sovereignty remains circumscribed. This is a systemic failure. As Yancy notes,
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The Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 was passed 18 August 2007. It was a reaction
to the Little Children are Sacred report which identified a wide range of criminal and predatory abuse against
children. All the claims were “fused together to create the impression of a storm of paedophilia” (Rundle 2007:
43). The responsible Minister, Mal Brough admitted he did not read the Act of 500 pages before it was passed,
and incredibly the word ‘children’ does not appear. The magnitude of the measures enforced were drastic. Among
other things the Racial Discrimination Act was suspended, income protection introduced, and the Community
Development Employment Scheme was abandoned. Aboriginal lands were seized for up to five years, the use of
alcohol and pornography was restricted (80% of homeland areas were already voluntarily alcohol free and there
was no evidence of serious pornography use). The Howard Government did not consult with Aboriginal people
or child protection experts, instead it sent the army into the Northern Territory to deal with the ‘National
Emergency’ (Concerned Australians 2010). Ten years on and the intervention has been assessed as a $587 million
failure which achieved nothing, “locals still faced low employment, substandard education and inadequate food,
housing and health facilities” (Koori Mail 31 May 2017: 13).
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“whiteness continues to be a living, breathing historical construction, a social ontological
performance that has profound, pervasive, and systemic oppressive consequences for nonwhite
people” (2004: 14).
Dyer states, “[A]s long as race is something only applied to non-white peoples, as long
as white people are not racially seen and named, they/we function as a human norm” (1997:
1). Whiteness is a ubiquitous force that interrelates with sets of social and institutionalised
practices and so has the capability to unify diasporic sections of the population. Dyer claims
that whiteness “as a coalition” is more effective than class in “uniting people across national
cultural differences” (1997:19). In this “coalition” of cultural amalgamation race is seemingly
absent. White people are multifariously stereotyped in terms of reference according to: nation,
class, sexuality, ability and gender. “Whiteness” Dyer argues “generally colonizes the
stereotypical definition of all social categories other than those of race” (2003: 307). Yancy
contends that all whites, even the most poor who share similar class and economic struggles to
those of blacks, are better placed in society, “to be a poor white does not mean that one inhabits
a space of ‘post-whiteness’” (2004: 7). Furthermore, “[U]nder the system of white hegemony,
poor whites also manage to reap aesthetic and psychological rewards as a result of possessing
the valued property of whiteness” (Yancy 2004: 8). These insights provide the space to further
understand the modus operandi of whiteness and to disrupt that which is routinely accepted.
Or to put this more eloquently,
[W]e must question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings that we normally
accept before any examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset;
we must oust those forms and obscure forces by which we usually link the discourse of
one man with that of another; they must be driven out from the darkness in which they
reign (Foucault 1997: 22).

Larissa Behrendt argues “[I]t is only when we understand how the ideologies of
colonialism have permeated today’s institutions that we can begin to break the grip of the
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historical legacy” (2003: 8). Behrendt also claims that “seemingly neutral institutions are
actually charged with colonial ideologies, legacies and a psychological terra nullius that cause
disparate outcomes” (2003: 21). Behrendt highlights how apparently innocuous products of
nation are in fact “charged” with racism. As the most prominent signifier of nation, nationalism
and national identity, the national flag occupies a very specific place in the repository of
everyday symbols. The flag’s ubiquity ensures that it is ‘flagged’ permanently across the
nation, in every town and city, in every institutional site, at all manner of celebrations and
events, a potent reminder, emblematic of ‘who we are’, and equally, who ‘we’ are not: a symbol
of both racial superiority and racial subjugation.
Yancy asserts that “[T]he social ontology of whiteness is a species of racism” (2004:
14). In marking whiteness as a species, Yancy brings it to ‘life’ and thus whiteness is imbued
with a corporeality that refutes notions of it as casual, passive or inert. Conceived of as a living
entity, whiteness embodies agency; thus, it has the capacity to flourish, or to die. Yancy states
that white people routinely evade “discussing their own social, political, economic, and cultural
investments in whiteness” (2004: 4). Yancy argues here that habitual avoidance is an activity
that the “species” of whiteness must perform in order to perpetuate white privilege; in other
words, without the activity that ensures the survival of the species, whiteness could disappear.
Therefore, as he further argues, “whiteness will never be innocent” (2004: 6). Whiteness must
always and necessarily be activated by avoidance – and by a range of oppressive practices that
ensure its supremacy. Yancy states that whiteness “systematically excludes, derails, polices,
segregates, and murders” (2008: 238). Colonial systems of governance are grounded in
widespread oppression. Ruth Frankenberg asserts an investigation into colonial history
identifies how and why,
race, culture, and nation slide so smoothly one into another in the present, providing
alibis for each other in contemporary social, cultural, and political discourses about
race, nation, identity, ownership, and belonging (1997: 9).
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An analysis of Australia’s political, economic and social history demonstrates that the
construction of whiteness and nation are tightly connected. The modern Australian nation,
forged from the matrix of white patriarchal sovereignty and nationalism is thus conceived “as
norm, as transparency, as national/natural state of being” (Frankenberg 1997: 16). Louise
Chiodo notes, “[T]o be white in Australia is to occupy a position of structural advantage and
perceived race neutrality that often remains unmarked and unnamed” (2015: 43). Chiodo
highlights the lack of Indigenous presence in the planning of urban, institutional and civic
spaces, arguing that these spaces are a “significant form of cultural capital … [which] reflect
and reaffirm ideas about whiteness, Australian-ness and possession” (2015: 43). The nation’s
flag, which adorns many of these sites of cultural capital provides a powerful visual
augmentation of white sovereignty.
Moreton-Robinson notes that while whiteness has been theorised as various forms of
power, rarely “are the theoretical focuses drawn to the social constructions of white identity”
(2015: xviii). An examination of these forces, she argues, will enable whiteness to be analysed
in ways other than from the perspective of cultural difference. In addition, if theorising
incorporates Indigenous sovereignty and a colonial nation-state then, “a different picture of
analysis emerges. The existence of white supremacy as hegemony, ideology, epistemology,
and ontology requires the possession of Indigenous lands as its proprietary anchor” (MoretonRobinson 2015: xix). White patriarchal sovereignty is understood as a regime of power that
has its origins in the illegal possession of Aboriginal land. White Australians therefore “receive
unearned social benefits as the inheritors of a racially based system of wealth and privilege …
built upon the European invasion of Indigenous lands” (McKay 1999:4). Moreton-Robinson
asserts that the modern Australian nation and its identity were constructed through the
disavowal of Indigenous sovereignty, thus “[R]ace indelibly marks the politics of possessive
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investments in patriarchal white sovereignty, which are often invisible and unnamed in
everyday discourse and academic analyses” (2007: 101).
Moreton-Robinson claims that “[P]atriarchal whiteness operates possessively as a raced
and gendered epistemological a priori within knowledge production as universals, dominant
norms, values and beliefs” (2011b: 414). In Australia the stalwart institutions of the nation
remain firmly in the grip of a white patriarchal social order. Andrew Bragg, member of the
Australian Republican Movement, draws attention to Australia’s top 200 companies of which
only 5 per cent of the CEOs are women. Furthermore, he notes the reluctance to endorse women
in leadership roles is matched by a reticence to engage with an Australian republic. Despite the
fact that “business gets symbolism” he claims, “there are virtually no public utterances from
business leaders on the dated symbols of a foreign hereditary head of state, knights and dames
or the Union Jack” (2016:14). As Bragg points out, relationships of power are intricate. This
example demonstrates how Australian patriarchal institutions are affiliated with the British
monarchy and its symbols which raises the supposition that the symbols of British authority
continue to reinforce the power and legitimacy of Australian powerbrokers.
As an unnamed inherited phenomenon, whiteness extends a sense of normalcy, and so
for many white people whiteness deflects criticism. What results from this is a ‘whiteness as
rightness’ ideology which sets in motion a general acceptance of white ways and ‘things’ –
celebratory days and symbols, for example. Any perceived threats to the status quo are met
with resistance. Whites “will defend its values and place negative sanctions upon Indigenous
people who contradict or expose the hypocrisy of white values in practice” (Moreton-Robinson
1999: 33). Former Federal Liberal MP Dennis Jensen publicly criticised programs designed to
improve outcomes for Indigenous people which led to the following exchange on Twitter,
“Hell, how long ago was colonialism? Get over it … every country in the world has
been successfully invaded in the past!”
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@TheKooriWoman28 responded: “Do I snap my fingers and forget 213 years of
oppression Mr Jensen? Which has created effects that are still being played out.”
Dr Jensen responded: “It is time to unify Australia, not divide based on a victim
mentality. What do you do when knocked down, just blame … So you have personally
lived 213 years? Work out ways to maximise your own life experiences, you can’t for
deceased ancestors” (qtd. in Harrison: 2013: 5).

These comments by a serving Federal parliamentarian exemplify how whiteness provides a
“culturally-constructed centrality” from which a white person, “evaluates and judges” (Yancy
2004: 9). Jensen uses a common colonial strategy: he dismisses the ongoing effects of invasion
while simultaneously laying the blame for disadvantage with Aboriginal people. While
relationships of power between white Australia and Indigenous people have altered over the
course of colonial history, whiteness has effectively kept, and continues to keep Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people on the periphery of nation-building and decision-making.
Since first contact Indigenous people have studied white people. Moreton-Robinson
claims that whiteness is “ever present in the psyche of Indigenous people, but not because of
its absence” (1999: 35). Where white citizens fail to see their whiteness, Indigenous people are
acutely aware,
[W]e are positioned as not being entitled to an equal share in the resources of Australian
society as our interests are not included within the sphere of the interests of the nation.
Indigenous people know that white culture does not respect, value or view as legitimate
and valid our knowledges and rights on our own terms (Moreton-Robinson 1999: 35).

The habitual neglect of the white citizenry to disseminate whiteness not only reinforces white
privilege but it also affords little space for scrutiny. Nicoll (2011) argues that very few white
people have an embodied ontological awareness of being in Indigenous sovereignty; rather,
they form an opinion which refuses to engage with Indigenous discourses and thus they assume

28

“Koori” is used to describe an Aboriginal person who comes from New South Wales and Victoria.
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a standpoint on Indigenous sovereignty. Being in Indigenous sovereignty Nicoll explains,
requires us to understand ongoing Indigenous sovereignty struggles and the racialised nature
of Australian historiography. She argues that those who understand the history of Australia,
the ongoing violence and failure to engage with sovereign owners, become “exposed to the
alienating experience of being subjects of a white nation which denies there ever was a war, let
alone that it is continuing”, through knowledge, “the embodied white subject … exists on the
ground of race relations rather than hovering above it” (2011: 30). Whiteness is thus a
comfortable site of privilege that does not advocate for its citizens to be in Indigenous
sovereignty, nor does it welcome change or promote self-reflection. This fait accompli can be
countered Nicoll asserts, through acts of Indigenous resistance to white sovereignty and by the
enduring presence and agency of Indigenous sovereignty. She claims that Indigenous
standpoints provide the space for white subjects to “unlearn” white privilege (2011: 29).
Langton argues that “Australians do not know and relate to Aboriginal people” and she
asserts that the “most dense relationship is not between actual people, but between white
Australians and the symbols created by their predecessors” (2008: 119). Moreton-Robinson
claims that white race privilege needs, “to be owned and challenged by white feminists engaged
in anti-racist pedagogy and politics” (2000: 351). This is the space of power and tension, and
in order to understand it more fully I now engage with the work of Martin Nakata whose often
autobiographical style of theorising sits in contrast to that of white academia: a point illustrated
by Nicoll who notes that while the white patriarchy dominates Indigenous affairs, “the first
person singular and plural will tend to be conflated with the object rather than the subject of
research” (2000: 374). Moreton-Robinson asserts that discourses of whiteness produce
‘knowledges of deficit’ and position Indigenous people as “always lacking” (2008b: 130).
Nakata’s autobiographical stance effectively counters dominant ways of knowing.
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Lifting the Blanket of Whiteness
Martin Nakata’s scholarship provides the opportunity for non-Indigenous subjects
(researchers, educators and the wider population) to include Indigenous Knowledge29 into the
everyday. Nakata’s methodology creates space for generating new knowledge and
understandings that draw attention to issues which might not have been given prior
consideration by the wider population, perspectives that relate to the Australian national flag
for example.30 A critical engagement with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander standpoints
therefore encourages new knowledge by “bringing in accounts of relations that ‘knowers’ [nonIndigenous people] located in more privileged social positions are not attentive to” (Nakata
2007: 12).31
Colleen McGloin engages with the work of Nakata in an attempt to better understand
his call for white Australians to be more self-reflexive. Nakata calls for “non-Indigenous
academics to become conversant with his methodologies, and for them to begin engaging at
the level of dialogue with the issues he raises in his work” (McGloin 2009: 36). McGloin argues
for non-Indigenous academics to connect with Nakata’s methodologies in order to understand
“how to embed Indigenous knowledge into academic disciplines, curricula … and by
extension, into public discourse” (2009: 40). McGloin also notes the value of experiential
knowledge as a pedagogical tool. The importance of experiential pedagogy is twofold, not only
is it an effective tool to teach non-Indigenous people, but, as Nakata argues, it is also a way to
“do” Indigenous Knowledge, “Indigenous epistemological basis of knowledge construction

Capital letters are used in keeping with Nakata’s work. Nakata notes Indigenous Knowledge with an upper case
‘K’ is used to identify with an epistemological understanding of knowledge systems; a lower case ‘k’ identifies
fragmented articles of a knowledge system (2002).
30
See Appendix B.
31
Over the course of my research I found that when I discussed my work with non-Indigenous friends or peers I
received a consistent response, which in effect stated, “I have never thought about the national flag in terms of
what it might mean to Indigenous people.”
29
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and the ways of “doing” knowledge are … in ways of story-telling, of memory-making, in
narrative, art and performance …” (Nakata 2007: 10). For non-Indigenous researchers,
Nakata’s approach to race theory provides a basis for the real, lived realities of Indigenous
subjects to teach the on-going effects of colonial racism.
Nakata deconstructs Western structures of knowledge production in order to explore
the duality between Indigenous and non-Indigenous systems of thought and knowledge. The
deconstruction of western ways of ‘knowing’ provides a means to challenge dominant
discourses and discriminatory representations. Nakata initially argued against the principle of
marginalised people explaining their life experience to the wider population, he questioned,
“why people from dominant groups couldn’t understand my position by reflecting on their own
actions” (1993: 53). A lack of self-reflection further skews power towards non-Indigenous
people. If viewpoints of the dominant group are considered normative then they ‘naturally’
require no comment, in contrast counter-perspectives inevitably attract attention and therefore
demand explanation. As a means to counter dominant ways of ‘knowing’, personal experience
is employed to “bring home very powerfully the implications and effects that flow on to peoples
lives from institutional and governmental practice” (Nakata 1993: 53). 32 Nakata asserts, “I
choose to inter-weave my personal story into my more academic work, rather than abide by
Western academic or literary protocols” (2008b: 135). Nakata’s perceptions of the white world
are based on his life experience and family history, which result in, “what is now a very political
and critical stand that I take towards academic work” (1993: 56). And he states, “you can see
why my standpoint must necessarily be differently located from the standpoint of western

Nicoll testifies, reading Ruby Langford Ginibi’s Don’t Take Your Love to Town, she explains, “I expected to
consume an autobiography but instead found myself encountering a text that was a revelation of the harsh realities
of Indigenous existence and an injunction to do something about them” (2000: 370).
32
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educators …” (1993: 61). At the intersection of Indigenous and western domains, lies a
complicated space of tension and conflict, theorised by Nakata as the “cultural interface”.
The cultural interface is a site of both friction and potential productivity that provides
a way to understand the very real and polarised ambits of western and Indigenous
epistemologies. Nakata conceptualises the cultural interface as the beginning point which
considers how,
Knowledge systems as they operate in people’s daily lives will interact, develop,
change, and transform. It accepts that all Knowledge systems are culturally-embedded,
dynamic, respond to changing circumstances and constantly evolve. It is not strictly
about the replacement of one with the other, nor the undermining of one by the other.
It is about maintaining the continuity of one when having to harness another and
working the interaction in ways that serve Indigenous interests, in ways that can uphold
distinctiveness and special status as First peoples (2002: 286).

Nakata draws attention here to the cultural interface as a site of potential change, based on an
understanding and experience of colonialism and its effects on Indigenous people in the
everyday, and the need for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ knowledge to be
afforded an equal and respected status.
Theoretical Approach
Discourse Analysis
I want to unravel the national flag’s capacity for imparting particular types of
knowledge about who or what we are, or who we can be or might be in terms of national
identity. The flag as a textual symbol creates a very particular reality in Australian public life.
However, its meanings are not fixed: on the contrary, the flag undergoes many transformations
in its efforts to (re)invigorate national sentiment. These are not renovations of the flag itself,
but of its uses and applications, the debates, statements and discussions which keep it alive.
Despite sporadic and what appear momentary shifts in the discourses surrounding the flag, in
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its current form, the national flag maintains a particular set of colonial meanings which carry
with it the material presence of knowledge systems, founded on racial, religious and cultural
superiority.
Discourse analysis reveals how dominant values and knowledges can be (re)produced
and (re)distributed with uncanny ease. As Foucault ascertains, “… there is no knowledge
without a particular discursive practice; and any discursive practice may be defined by the
knowledge that it forms” (1997: 183). White has argued that in Australia knowledge production
was inextricably linked with relations of power and reciprocity, this in turn defined hegemonic
values and sustained notions of what is accepted as true or false. Foucault identifies these
systems of thought as being located in the fields of general history, the analysis of which,
seeks to discover that whole domain of institutions, economic processes, and social
relations on which a discursive formation can be articulated; it tries to show how the
autonomy of discourse and its specificity nevertheless do not give it the status of pure
ideality and total historical independence; what it wishes to uncover is the particular
level in which history can give place to definite types of discourse, which have their
own type of historicity, and which are related to a whole set of various historicities
(1997: 164-165).

Drawing from Foucault I will identify the sets of statements which accrue around the
national flag in its many and varied contexts in order to discover not only its primary and
obvious intentions, but also to reveal its capabilities for exclusion. Discursive practices in the
Foucauldian sense are the foundation upon which bodies of knowledge emerge. They are the
organising principles of an episteme and play an active role in determining both language and
thoughts. These principles form the basis from which knowledge about objects of inquiry come
into being and how, once inserted into discourse, what we ‘know’ becomes ‘naturalised’,
unquestioned and certified as ‘truth’. Foucault alerts us to follow,
the thread of analogies and symbols, [to] rediscover a thematic that is more imaginary
than discursive, more affective than rational, and less close to the concept than to desire;
its force animates the most opposed figures, but only to melt them at once into a slowly
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transformable unity; what one discovers is a plastic continuity, the movement of a
meaning that is embodied in various representations, images, and metaphors (1997:
150).
In deploying a Foucauldian analysis of the discourses that construct and maintain nationalism,
I will simultaneously consider the opposing episteme of Indigenous knowledge to counter the
embedded hegemonic understandings in the national flag. When considering oppositional ways
of knowing, I will attempt not only to deconstruct some of the powerful symbolism of the
national flag, but also to foreground the possibility for a counter discourse that emphasises a
different conception of flag and nation based on some of the philosophical principles of
inclusion and cooperation that have ensured the enduringness of Indigenous cultures. The
“representations, images and metaphors” of the national flag are its textual symbols, and they
transmit various messages, including those of whiteness and national exclusion.
Banal Nationalism
Billig’s concept of “banal nationalism” makes it possible to theorise the ways in which
members of established democratic nations are unconsciously enculturated with national
identity on a daily basis. Billig’s application of the word ‘banal’ ought not to be confused with
meaning harmless or trite. On the contrary banal nationalism in this context refers to an
insidious and pervasive practice. Banal nationalism maintains and (re)produces national
identity through widespread and commonplace ideologies and habits, “[I]n routine practices
and everyday discourses, especially those in the mass media, the idea of nationhood is regularly
flagged” (Billig 2013: 154). Banal nationalism’s focus is on the unconscious aspects of
nationalism; reading a newspaper or listening to the weather for example, are so routine that
they draw no attention. Billig argues, “the citizenry are daily reminded of their national place
in a world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not
consciously registered as reminding” (2013: 8).
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Billig draws attention to how the nation is routinely flagged via the sports pages of
newspapers, “[E]very day, the world over, millions upon millions of men scan these pages,
sharing in defeats and victories, feeling at home in this world of waved flags” (2013: 122).
Billig notes the extant relationship between sport, war and masculinity. He argues that the
bonds created through sport helps to prepare citizens to be ‘armed’ and ready to fight for the
protection of their nation, “[O]n foreign fields, the men win their trophies, or lose their honour,
doing battle on the nation’s behalf” (Billig 2013: 122-123). Sport, he argues, not only echoes
warfare, but is a symbol from which to understand war. Metaphors of war are frequently
deployed in sporting commentary: ‘charging’, ‘shooting’, ‘attacking’ and ‘firing’. Routine
reminders which serve to prepare the populace for future conflict, when “our country needs us
to do-or-die. The call will already be familiar; the obligations have been primed; their words
have long been installed in the territory of our pleasure” (Billig 2013: 125).
Banal nationalism co-exists, and most significantly, underpins the more conscious,
readily recognised forms of nationalism. In other words, the banal signifiers of national identity
fortify the more visible aspects of nationalism which emerge on national days and in times of
crises (Skey 2009). Apart from brief, overt outbursts, nationalism in established western
nations is conceptualised as a phenomenon which usually belongs to emerging nations and is
thus considered to be emotionally and politically charged. Understanding nationalism in this
way is deceptive and has been facilitated by an abundance of historical literature and imagery
focusing on the triumphant establishment of nations across the world. Theories of nationalism
have thus entered the realm of ‘common sense’, where taken-for-granted assumptions about
the naturalness of nations presides. Billig claims that nationalism is a form of social life which
needs to be believed in and replicated on a daily basis in order for the nation to be (re)produced,
and he argues, “[N]ationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is
the endemic condition” (2013: 6).
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Billig’s work on national flags distinguishes between flags that are consciously waved
and saluted, and flags which are not. Waved flags are traditionally associated with nationalism
and habitually demand an outward show of emotion. In contrast, unsaluted and unwaved flags
demand little or no attention. Billig asserts that of all the signifiers, it is the unwaved flag which
is the metonymic image of banal nationalism. Unwaved flags are tacit symbols which litter the
subconscious landscape as they routinely ‘flag’ the nation. Unwaved flags adorn the everyday.
They are found on flagpoles scattered throughout the land and are highly adaptable. I have seen
the national flag on shop fronts, stationery, clothes, linen, trucks, cars, footwear, jewellery,
tattoos, on greeting cards, exercise books and electronic devices. The unwaved flag “attracts
no special attention. It belongs to no special, sociological genus. Having no name, it cannot be
identified as a problem” (Billig 2013: 6). This statement establishes that a relationship exists
between the flag and the populace which appears to be unproblematic.
Unwaved flags as banal reminders of nationhood meld into the cultural landscape and
as Palmer notes, they work to “gently remind people of who they are rather than leap out with
flashing lights, brass bands and calls to defend the nation” (1998: 181). The proliferation of
routine ‘flaggings’ assures the national flag’s place in the Australian landscape as a symbol
whose very power lies in its inconspicuous insertion into the everyday The pervasiveness of
unwaved flags, adorning such a vast range of everyday cultural paraphernalia, comprise
perhaps the most crucial component of national indoctrination. In other words, I would suggest,
in their seeming unobtrusiveness lies their proselytising force.
Drawing on and extending Billig’s thesis not only highlights the ways that citizens are
indoctrinated with national ideals on a daily basis, but also provides a framework from which
to hypothesise the reasons why non-Indigenous debates which surround the national flag
routinely fail to incorporate Indigenous perspectives. Billig argues that scholars, in particular
social scientists, have frequently overlooked the banal reproduction of national ideals, “[T]he
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gaps in language, which enable banal nationalism to be forgotten, are also gaps in theoretical
discourse” (2013: 8). In order to rectify this neglect Billig calls upon social scientists to
“distance ourselves from ourselves and from that which we routinely accept as obvious or
‘natural’” (2013: 15). This means, as a non-Indigenous researcher I must critically engage with
nationalism and whiteness as an ideological force that permeates all discourses and is encoded
in sets of practices which regulate the body politic according to principles of same / Other,
them / us. These are principles which demand constant repetition in order that ‘we’ know who
‘we’ are and what ‘we’ stand for. Challenging the assumptions associated with the ‘naturalness’
of nationalism opens up debates about legitimacy. In Australia the continent was taken without
consent or a treaty, as a result, “the Australian nation-state has a legitimacy problem that
remains unresolved” (Brennan et al 2005: 5).
As banal nationalism has been neglected by scholars, Billig asserts that the unwaved
flags have been neglected by the citizenry, “… flags each day hang limply in public places.
These reminders of nationhood hardly register in the flow of daily attention, as citizens rush
past on their daily business” (2013: 38). Butz (2009) argues that banal or pervasive flag display
may be responsible for an unconscious and automated increase in feelings of national belonging
for some, but not for others. Crucially, he states “repeated exposure to symbols that threaten
racial identity may have important implications for psychological well-being” (2009: 794).
Butz’ hypothesis correlates with those articulated by Indigenous leaders. Parliamentarian Linda
Burney, for example claims,
I do find it difficult, and have always found it difficult to accept that Union Jack in the
corner, and my view is that wouldn’t it be wonderful to have an Australian flag that
represents the colours and the diversity and the depth and the ancientness of people in
this country (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 24).
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Anthony Mundine, a boxer and activist is committed to uniting Australia. He states that the
Union Jack
symbolises the invasion, the murder, the pillaging, and on and on. I think we need to
address that – it’s dividing Australia, rather than uniting Australia … At the moment, I
can’t fly it. And I want to fly the Australian flag. I want to fly it for the Australian
people. But let’s do it together (qtd. in Jackson 2012: 7).

Lead singer of Yothu Yindi, Mandawuy Yunupingu was an Elder and educator who worked
tirelessly in the fight against white Australian racism. Yunupingu is remembered by his brother,
Djungatjunga Yunupingu, who acknowledges that “his brother was a rock star, but more
importantly an advocate of reconciliation and education equality who wanted one flag for
Australia” (Johnston 2013: 5). At Yunupingu’s memorial an Indigenous elder stated, “[L]et us
all raise one flag, so we can all call Australia home” (qtd. in ABC News 2013b). Burney,
Mundine and Yunupingu testify that the Australian national flag in its current formation
disallows notions of national belonging and ‘unity’. Eriksen argues that if a country is largely
homogenous then the national flag may ‘unify’ at the cost of “categorically excluding the
minorities” (2007: 5). It could be argued that the Australian flag “categorically” excludes
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, who comprise three per cent of the population, as
the flags’ colonial imagery, values and status remain ineluctably woven into the fabric of the
white Australian nation.
Findings from an American study indicate that an axiomatic relationship between
American-ness and whiteness influences a diverse range of perceptions which surround the
American national flag. Using Billig’s thesis of banal nationalism, Manuel Madriaga (2007)
explores the significance of the American Flag33 in determining which members of the
community are included or excluded. This study is useful, however, it is important to note that

33

In keeping with Madriaga’s work I use a capital ‘F’ when writing about the American Flag.
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it has its limitations. Of the 25 respondents 10 were white, 9 were black and 6 were Latino. All
were male military veterans. Madriaga notes that a similar study could be undertaken in the
United Kingdom, “where people of colour stand out as not being British” (2007: 67). Madriaga
claims that national symbols displayed on a daily basis are a persistent reminder of the extant
boundaries found within the populace. National symbols transmit notions of ‘us’ and ‘them,
signals of identity which, Madriaga argues, have racial overtones. Madriaga also asserts that
there is an official or public face of the Flag which in theory binds all Americans together,
irrespective of race or ethnicity. It is this face of the Flag in which whiteness goes unmarked
and unnoticed which,
makes it difficult for people of colour to participate meaningfully within the American
collective. Their subjectivities are restrained and hidden in private behind ‘white
masks’. Being racialised and having to wear a ‘white mask’ in public can skew one’s
attachment to the symbolic ideal of the Flag (Madriaga 2007: 54 emphasis in the
original).

In Madriaga’s study, the black respondents demonstrated an attachment to the
American Flag, yet their responses were influenced by issues of race and injustice. One
respondent states, “… to me, the American Flag means freedom, freedom of expression even
though it has a lot of flaws in race relations and stuff like that …” (2007: 59). Madriaga notes
the black respondents all “straddle the public and private faces of the American Flag, where
senses of similarity (us) and difference (them) go hand-in-hand” (2007: 59). This was not the
case for the white respondents, all of whom shared an “attachment to a past in which the Flag
was praised and its symbolic significance was not questioned” (Madriaga 2007: 57). Madriaga
finds that for the white respondents race was not an issue, and notions of whiteness were absent,
“[T]heir interpretations [of the Flag] were ‘race’-neutral, leaving ‘whiteness’ unmarked”
(2007: 56). Madriaga demonstrates that there is an indicative link between whiteness, the Flag
and American-ness. For the white respondents, there was no apparent link between the Flag,
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and racial difference. However, non-white respondents were compelled to “discuss their racial
and ethnic distinctiveness while discussing their allegiance to the Flag. By doing so, they not
only flag their Otherness. They also flag ‘whiteness’ in notions of American-ness” (Madriaga
2007: 67).
In Australia racism in favour of whites tends to go unremarked, as returning to Foley
demonstrates,
we need to remember that the concept of Australia as a nation is greater than the sum
of its individuals and communal parts. It includes also our particular way of life, which
is directly connected to our British heritage, whether we are black or white and whether
we like it or not.
A national flag is symbolic of the cohesion which exists between those individuals and
communities and represents the collective ethic that has developed over time. Thus, we
need to take care that we do not lose sight of the essence of the nation in the quest to
satisfy and recognise particular groups within it (1996a: 196).

Foley states that the Australian nation and British heritage are synonymous. She cautions
against losing sight, or perhaps letting go of this “essence”. By urging us not to “satisfy and
recognise particular groups” within the nation, Foley seeks to assimilate all to the collective
ethic of “our British heritage”. By failing to recognise white Australians as a “particular group”
Foley confirms Madriaga’s findings. She conceives white Australians, and by default the flag,
as being raceless.
In her discussion of the Australian national flag Foley recognises that the “feelings” of
Indigenous people are fundamental when considering to retain or reject the Union Jack. Foley
recognises that the Union Jack must be a “positive affront” for Indigenous people, some of
whom consider the Union Jack to be the “Butcher’s Apron” as it “is covered with the blood of
the dispossessed Aboriginal people” (1996a: 98). This horrific analogy, Foley argues, must
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surely be reason enough to dispense with the Union Jack. However, to counter this argument
she states,
[W]hile it is undeniably true that the Union Jack symbolises British invasion and
dispossession, it is also true that it symbolises a political and judicial system that now
enables the Aboriginal people to voice their grievances openly without fear of reprisal
and with the definite hope that their grievances will be addressed (1996a: 98).

What Foley fails to consider are the systems of governance which were in existence and had
flourished for millennia before Cook. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander nations were
sophisticated, sacred and sustainable, as evidenced by the Encounters: Revealing Stories of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Objects from the British Museum exhibition.34 The
objects on display, including the Gweagal shield and spears taken by either Cook or Banks at
Kurnell, were on loan, returned to Australia for the first time since 1770. June Oscar, states that
the artefacts,
draw attention to the unsettled and emergent dialogue that is ever unfolding between
our Indigenous nation’s claims to self-determination and sovereignty, which we have
never relinquished, and the Australian nation-state’s imposed governmental and
legislative authority over the entire continent (2015: 26).

From Foley’s perspective however, it is evident that whiteness is the considered norm; the
platform from which opinions and practices surrounding the national flag and its nation are
justified.35
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Encounters was held at the National Museum Canberra from 27 November 2015 to 28 March 2016.
Browsing Canberra’s Parliament House gift shop in September 2015 I noted copies of Foley’s book (1996)
were for sale and on prominent display at the service desk.
35
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Conclusion
The various approaches to analysis discussed in this chapter will be deployed
throughout the thesis. Understanding the relationships between nation, whiteness and identity
makes visible the scope and scale in which citizens are shaped in everyday life. As the epigraph
details, the deployment of banal nationalism is imperative to the national agenda as it underpins
the more common understandings of nationalism and facilitates with ease its (re)production.
Bhabha notes that people form “a complex rhetorical strategy of social reference: their claim
to be representative provokes a crisis within the process of signification and discursive address”
(1994: 208). The replication of the nation emerges from a diverse, but hegemonic, range of
routine practices, symbols and everyday discourses. Billig comments, “[N]ational identities are
rooted within a powerful social structure, which reproduces hegemonic relations of inequity”
(2013: 175). “… hegemonic relations of inequity” are mirrored in the Australian national flag,
where under the guise of history, sentiment and tradition we find whiteness, nation and identity
inextricably woven into its fabric. Clearly national symbols have the potential to impede
feelings of identity and belonging. With this in mind, and in order to develop a more in-depth
understanding of the parasitic relationship which binds nation and symbol, I now turn my
attention to the creation of the modern nation. Through the work of various theorists of nation
and nationalism, I discuss what the modern nation is and how it was created.
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CHAPTER THREE: Whose Nation Australia?
Today, nearly all my people live in shambling, broken-down places with poor houses, poor
roads, bad schools, little or no health care, with whitefellas in a welfare industry who service
us when they can, if they want. We are captives of welfare, which means we are wards of the
state relying on handouts from public servants to get by, and therefore our lives are controlled
by governments and public servants who can do what they want, when they feel like it. And
people suffer from their neglect - just look at our communities and the lives too many of our
people are forced to endure. Although the wealth of the Australian nation has been taken from
our soil, our communities and homelands bear no resemblance to the great towns and
metropolises of the modern Australian nation.
(Galarrwuy Yunupingu 2008: 39-40).

Introduction
The modern western nation was forged during an era of political and social unrest. The
years between 1700 and 1914 saw agricultural, industrial, political and scientific revolutions
sweep through Europe.36 These revolutions were the catalyst for change out of which the
dominating framework of “the West” emerged. Western principles were then dispersed across
the globe as Europe claimed vast areas for itself through colonisation. This was the era of
European domination. It was a time of discovery and power which began to cement the idea of
nation as a western stronghold of superior order. Edward Said claims,
… so far as the West was concerned during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an
assumption had been made that the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently
inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West (2003: 40-41).

36

Three political revolutions are considered to be landmarks for the beginning of the modern political era: the
English Revolution 1688-1689, the American Revolution 1776-1783, and the French Revolution 1789-1799. All
three events changed the history of the world and are considered ‘true’ revolutions because they transferred power
from some people to others, either by force or the threat of force (Roberts 1985). The English and American
Revolutions focused on questions of sovereignty, and the need to defend existing legal, practical and customary
freedoms. The English Revolution resulted in one monarch being replaced by another. The American Revolution
was more forceful. The deposition of the monarchy resulted in the establishment of a republic, and in 1783 the
British were forced to recognise the independence of the United States of America. The French Revolution was
different. It occurred at a time when the French monarchy was powerful on the international stage. However, it
took place in a country where many conditions of the Middle Ages were still prevalent. This revolution ended
feudalism and the privileges enjoyed by nobles and Church leaders alike. It reformed administration, provided
education and equality for the people. The French Revolution showed the world a new way of thinking about the
possibilities of social change and “identified politics as the proper instrument for achieving such change, for
challenging and infringing vested rights and interests” (Roberts 1985: 284-285).
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In 1815, Europe had colonised approximately 35 percent of the world. By 1914, this figure had
increased to 85 percent (Said 2003). The modern Australian nation was officially created
during this time as the British Parliament passed legislation permitting Australia to govern as
an independent nation. On 1 January 1901, the six British colonies federated and became the
Commonwealth of Australia. In Part One of this chapter I engage with a range of theorists who
provide various ways of understanding how and why the modern nation evolved. These have
been selected according to their usefulness in providing a comprehensive understanding of the
formation of the modern nation, and also, for their ability to impart a more cogent view of
Australia’s construction as a colonised nation-state. In Part Two, I proffer a counter discourse
of what constitutes nation through the perspectives of Aboriginal theorists, leaders and
community Elders who question the legitimacy of the Australian nation state.
PART ONE: The Creation of the Modern Nation
Ernest Renan
In 1882 Ernest Renan delivered a lecture in France titled Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?
(What is a nation?). Renan asserts that it was the French Revolution which allowed France to
own the concept of nationality, “[W]e should not be displeased if others imitate us in this. It
was we who founded the principle of nationality” (1990: 12). With the rise of French
nationalism came the associated symbols of the French Revolution: the French national flag
and national anthem, “La Marseillaise” were both adopted in 1794 and are recognised as being
the source for national flags and anthems as we know them today. 37 In his quest to identify
what a nation is, Renan hypothesises that in themselves, language, religion and geography are
insufficient explanations. He speculates that nations such as France, England, Germany and
Russia will continue for centuries as individual historical units, no matter what will befall them,
“the crucial pieces on a chequerboard whose squares will forever vary in importance and size
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Exceptions to this are the Dutch flag (see Chapter Five) and British national anthem.
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but will never be wholly confused with each other” (1990: 9). If on one hand, geography,
religion and language do not fully explain what a nation is, yet on the other, the assertion can
be made that nations such as England, Russia, France and Germany will remain as individual
units for centuries to come, one therefore has to consider what the other components are, in
order to fully understand the phenomenon of the modern Western nation-state.
Language and race, Renan notes, invite people to unite but do not compel them to.
Renan claims that languages are historical formations and race should have no applications in
politics, “to make politics depend upon ethnographic analysis is to surrender it to a chimera”
(1990: 14). An excessive preoccupation with language and race, Renan asserts, is fraught with
danger,
[S]uch exaggerations enclose one within a specific culture, considered as national; one
limits oneself, one hems oneself in. One leaves the heady air that one breathes in the
vast field of humanity in order to enclose oneself in a conventicle with one’s
compatriots. Nothing could be worse for the mind; nothing could be more disturbing
for civilization (1990: 17).

Renan promotes the importance of diversity as he argues against monocultures. Renan’s belief
that nationality can no longer be defined by religion draws attention to the fact that in the
modern nation, theological dogma has been replaced by a ‘state religion’. Examples of this new
religion include what Renan calls the “cult of the flag” (1990:17). This analogy is corroborated
by Smith who states “as the highest expression of nationality, the flag is likely to be the center
of a cult, replacing the king or high priest who received adulation in prenationalist days” (1975:
56). Renan argues that to reject the “cult” is akin to a refusal to engage in military conscription.
Through Renan’s work, we begin to understand how a simple piece of cloth has the power to
amalgamate citizen to state.
Renan contends that historical error is crucial to nation building. This argument is
compounded by his assertion that the analysis of history has the potential to undermine the
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principle of nationhood, “[I]ndeed, historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which
took place at the origin of all political formations” (1990: 11). According to this standpoint, a
collective forgetting about violence is a necessary tenet from which national stability and social
cohesion can be established. Renan notes the importance of community bonds and geographical
features but he states, they are not enough to define a nation,
[M]ore valuable by far than common customs posts and frontiers conforming to
strategic ideas is the fact of sharing, in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets, and of
having, in the future, [a shared] programme to put into effect, or the fact of having
suffered, enjoyed, and hoped together. These are the kinds of things that can be
understood in spite of differences of race and language … suffering in common unifies
more than joy does. Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value
than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort (1990: 19).

Following Renan, the importance of truth-telling and addressing “national memories” is
significant in that this provides a framework for acknowledgement and responsibility from
which a colonising culture might begin to rectify the wrongs of its past.
Renan likens the nation to a soul, a spiritual principle consisting of two elements; one
lies in the past and the other in the present. The former refers to a collective legacy of national
memories, which, when combined with the latter, create “the essential conditions for being a
people” (1990: 19). It is here, in Renan’s discussion of the present, that he introduces the
concept of ‘will’ and ‘consent’: “the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of
the heritage that one has received in an undivided form” (1990: 19). Renan’s formula for
nation-building constructs the nation according to a set of what he sees as ethical principles
founded on inclusion, consent, and sharing, where recognising the wrongs of the past, as well
as the successes, and considering the future as a ‘shared’ endeavour are fundamental to nation
building.
Ernest Gellner
Ernest Gellner ranks as one of the most influential theorists of the nation (Bosworth
2007; Sutherland 2012). Gellner’s work on nationalism,
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still represents the single most important attempt to provide a theory of nationalism as
a whole. It is one grounded in an overall vision of human history and an insistence on
the uniqueness of the modern world (Breuilly qtd. in Gellner 2006: liii).
In Nations and Nationalism (1988) Gellner establishes that nationalism emerged not only from
the throes of revolution and colonisation but also as a response to a population explosion in a
rapidly urbanising world. In order to sustain economic growth a labour force was required that
needed to be both mobile and literate. As a result, education became a state responsibility and
an obligatory norm. Under these conditions the ubiquitous role of the state flourished and with
the establishment of pervasive “high cultures” (standardised literacy and education-based
communication systems) nations began to be conceptualised and defined in terms of culture,
which
constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently
identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy …
under these conditions only, nations can indeed be defined in terms both of will and of
culture, and indeed in terms of the convergence of them both with political units. In
these conditions, men will to be politically united with all those, and only those, who
share their culture. Polities then will to extend their boundaries to the limits of their
cultures, and to protect and impose their culture within the boundaries of their power.
The fusion of will, culture and polity becomes the norm, and one not easily or frequently
defied (Gellner 1988: 55 emphasis in the original).
When the modern Australian nation was born, colonial values, “will, culture and polity” fused
to become an indomitable force. Prior to 1900 there was no actual nation of “Australia”, there
were six colonies: New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia,
Victoria, and Tasmania. All were governed by Britain as separate countries. After a ten year
debate the colonies federated, and on 1 January 1901 the Commonwealth of Australia was
proclaimed, “Australia was the first nation in history to vote itself into existence” (Hartcher
2017: 30). At this time, 98 percent of the population was white. In order to maintain the status
quo, and to protect Australia from perceived threats, the Immigration Restriction Act 1901,
known as the White Australia Policy was implemented. The alignment of Commonwealth and
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culture was substantiated by the nation’s political agenda. The White Australia Policy was not
officially abolished until 1973, the official authority of white rule was thus inscribed in a
binding legal statute until then, to echo Gellner, “[I]t is precisely by binding things together
that traditional visions perpetuate themselves and the prejudgements contained within them”
(1988: 22).
Gellner states that nationalism is “the external manifestation of a deep adjustment in
the relationship between polity and culture” (1988: 35). Nationalism’s strength lies in its ability
to be routinely accepted as a natural phenomenon, and when the principles of nationalism
combine, only then the nation is created,
[N]ations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though longdelayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing
cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates preexisting cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one
(Gellner 1988: 48-49 emphasis in the original).
Gellner argues that formal exclusion is a central tenet of nationalism upon which political
legitimacy relies. Australia’s “political legitimacy” has been established by the socio-legal
exclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Indigenous people have been
systematically excluded from all political processes and were not given citizenship rights until
1962, nor counted in the census (which has been held every five years since 1911), until 1967.
As I write, nearly 120 years after Federation, Indigenous people have yet to be ‘recognised’ in
the Australian Constitution, and repeated calls for a treaty, or treaties, remain unanswered.
Understanding the historical realities which constructed the Australian nation, reveals how “a
dominant identity generates an image that fosters ‘sameness’ and ‘otherness’, inclusion and
exclusion, presence and absence” (Behrendt 2003: 56). It is also through the process of
acknowledging colonial history that I can begin to understand the force of the nation’s most
strident emblem, to borrow from Gellner, “it is by insisting on prising things apart that we have
liberated ourselves from them” (1988: 22).
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Eric Hobsbawm
Eric Hobsbawm, a British Marxist historian is renowned for his work on nationalism.
He identifies the nation as a modern and historically recent phenomenon. Hobsbawm asserts
that nationalism precedes the nation and is in principle a set of relations between national and
political units. The modern nation, shaped during the era of the French Revolution, is
understood by Hobsbawm as being multi-faceted, a place where territory, politics and social
aspirations intersect. After the revolution, politics were democratised and the allegiance once
afforded to secular or religious rulers was no longer guaranteed. The people demanded to be
heard, and through their elected state representatives they had a voice. In return, the state
needed the people for both money and protection which was obtained by way of taxes and
soldiers. Over time, agents of the state became more invasive and infiltrated every stratum of
society,
[I]n the course of the nineteenth century these interventions became so universal and
so routinized in ‘modern’ states that a family would have to live in some very
inaccessible place … not to come into regular contact with the national state and its
agents (Hobsbawm 1995: 80-81).
Agents of the state were employed at schools, post offices, railways, and in the police and
military forces ensuring regular contact with the people. Their powers were reinforced through
compulsory primary school attendance, military conscription and the keeping of state records.
The everyday practices that took place between state and citizen shaped society in multiple
ways; from birth to death the citizenry was regulated to prescribed national ‘norms’ that would
count, record and manage their everyday lives, “[G]overnment and subject or citizen were
inevitably linked by daily bonds, as never before” (Hobsbawm 1995: 81).
This was a time of social restructure, a time to create, “to ‘educate our masters’, to
‘make Italians’, to turn ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ and attach all to nation and flag” (Hobsbawm
1995: 91). Social changes coincided with emerging notions of race which sustained ideologies
of racial supremacy. It was during these times that,
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the citizens of a country became a sort of community, though an imagined one, and its
members therefore found themselves seeking for, and consequently finding, things in
common, places, practices, personages, memories, signs and symbols (Hobsbawm
1995: 90).
The states used their influence to communicate with their citizens particularly through primary
schools, “to spread the image and heritage of the ‘nation’ and to inculcate attachment to it and
to attach all to country and flag …” (Hobsbawm 1995: 91). Towards the end of the nineteenth
century Hobsbawm asserts that nationalism’s basic loyalty was “not to ‘the country’, but only
to its particular version of that country: to an ideological construct” (1995: 93).
Hobsbawm identifies Australia as a nation-state “whose specific national
characteristics and criteria of nationhood have been established since the late eighteenth
century” (1995: 78). Since this time public symbols and ceremonies have been created to
produce a sense of nation-ness which supported the colonial agenda. Through the
indoctrination of shared beliefs and like-minded values, a diverse population coheres in an
illusion of unity. Through various institutions and mediums, national values and beliefs are
discursively fostered and transmitted. Nationalism is thus fabricated through a regime of social
engineering, and through the invention and use of artefacts.38 Supporting Renan’s argument,
Hobsbawm argues that nations have been created by historical error and that nationalist
historians have falsely documented their nation’s story. In other words, “[N]ationalism requires
too much belief in what is patently not so” (Hobsbawm 1995: 12). Hobsbawm contends that
nations are a “dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be
understood unless also analysed from below” (1995: 10).

38

Australian nationalism is currently in the process of being both re-imagined and re-constructed. In April 2017
the Coalition Turnbull government proposed tightening eligibility for Australian citizenship with the introduction
of a more rigorous English language and Australian values citizenship test.
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Benedict Anderson
Benedict Anderson argues that nation, nationality and nationalism are social structures,
the result of historical events which when merged with political and ideological forces,
command “profound emotional legitimacy” (1991: 4). Anderson proposes that the nation is “an
imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (1991:
6). It is “imagined” because of the impossibility for the members of the nation to ever connect
with or know their fellow compatriots, “yet in the minds of each lives the image of their
communion” (1991: 6). It is imagined as “limited” because every nation, no matter its size, has
“finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (1991: 7). It is imagined as
“sovereign” because the concept of the nation was created in the age of Enlightenment and
Revolution at a time when the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained hierarchical dynasty was
fiercely contested. The resulting sovereign state is the “gage and emblem of this freedom”
(1991: 7). The nation is imagined as a “community” because it is perceived to provide “deep,
horizontal comradeship” despite the reality of inequality and exploitation (1991: 7). The power
of nation-ness, Anderson claims “is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of
our time” (1991: 3).
Historically speaking the events and consequences of British settlement in Australia are
recent and they occurred at a time of great social and political change. For example, with the
onset of the American Revolution the British could no longer transport their convicts to the
American colonies and required another repository to house its burgeoning ‘criminal’
population. Australia was thus established as a British penal colony yet colonisation was also
driven by Britain’s desire for land and its potential wealth. The Australian nation was forged
out of colonising acts and the imposition of social, political, economic and legal structures that
were founded on British principles; ‘Australia’ thus evolved to command “profound emotional
legitimacy”.
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Anderson argues that once the nation has been constructed in the imagination it is then
plied, manipulated and transformed through repeated messages inscribed in the national
consciousness which inspire a “love” of nation. Anderson states that devotion is captured from
national subjects via “[T]he cultural products of nationalism – poetry, prose fiction, music,
plastic arts – show this love very clearly in thousands of different forms and styles” (1991:
141). Anderson’s insight into cultural artefacts highlights how they work to attach citizens to
nation. Anderson makes it clear that there is a diverse, yet relentless, bombardment directed at
national citizens to ensure they do not, or cannot, forget who they are and where they belong.
This fundamental principle of nationalism is addressed in the following chapter.
Australia: the ‘imagi-nation’
There is a substantial amount of evidence pointing to the various foundations of nationmaking. Despite critiques of Anderson’s work,39 many theorists have built on the concept of
an “imagined community” to explore the exigencies of modern-day nation building. Billig
argues it is the imagined nation which gives nationalism a “strong social psychological
dimension” that “is part of a wider ideological, discursive consciousness” (2013: 10). White
claims similarly that “‘Australia’ for the most part is something we carry around in our heads”
(1997: 13). Sarah Maddison adds, “Australia, exists more in the hearts and minds of its citizens
than it does in any constitution or parliament” (2011: 23). Australia, as an “imagined political
community”, is channelled through the minds of like-minded citizens who hold fast to notions
of shared experiences and have or have not comparable values and aspirations. In other words,
the concept of shared or national values so often cited in these times in relation to revised
citizenship requirements, for example, is able to seamlessly incorporate notions of dissent as
expressions of democratic standards. This broadening of the “imagined community” can be
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For example Konstantin Sietzy (n.d) argues that pre-modern communities were just as likely to be imagined
as modern nations.

64

tightened at will to exclude if expressions of difference exceed the imaginary possibilities of
those who orchestrate the nation’s values.
Maddison claims that white Australians are challenged and disturbed by that which
unsettles the comfortable notions of their imagined community. They prefer not to confront the
violent way in which the modern Australian nation was created as the realities of colonisation
produce feelings of national insecurity and a lingering collective guilt. These anxieties have
been transmitted inter-generationally and are fortified “by a form of defensive nationalism that
will not allow an honest attempt to redress past wrongs” (Maddison 2011: 24). Defensive
nationalism is procured by a strong desire to protect the hegemonic imaginings of Australia
and it shields like-minded citizens from both responsibility and action. Expressions of
defensive nationalism are seen as hostile by Maddison, who alerts us to the flag-waving
hysteria of Australia Day40 which she claims, given its chosen date is an incongruous attempt
to reinforce positive notions of Australian-ness. Historical denialism, another form of defensive
nationalism is “a tool of racial politics” (Beresford 2012: 332; see also Renan 1990; Hobsbawm
1995). Historical denialism continues to inform the national imagining, and, following Billig,
must be understood as part of Australia’s “wider ideological, discursive consciousness”.
Moreton-Robinson states that the manipulation of history and historical denial serve to
legitimise the argument that “there was no theft, no war and no need to have a treaty” (2007:
100).
Australian national identity is inseparably linked to its colonial history, its myths and
imaginings which are bolstered by celebratory national dates and symbols. To challenge them
is contentious. As Maddison notes, there is a price to pay for questioning national mythologies
which, she argues, can incur the label of being “un-Australian” (2011: 34). To be labelled ‘un-

26 January is known as “Australia Day”, it marks the arrival of the First Fleet who landed in 1788 and
established a British penal colony. For many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people this day is known as
“Invasion Day” or “Survival Day”, and is a day of profound grief and sadness.
40
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Australian’ is to be marked by the inherent penalty of social exclusion; to be ‘un-Australian’ is
to be outside of the body politic. In contrast, she argues that Australians who choose an identity
“saturated” by colonial history “continue to stand in solidarity with past generations and the
crimes they have committed” (2011: 28). Maddison draws attention here to the importance of
our present day responses to the past, and her thinking can be transferred to our present day
responses to the flag.
National imaginings have long been a fundamental driver in the creation of the
Australian nation, and the national flag has been “saturated” accordingly. In its current
formation the national flag promotes a colonial identity and a white history. Despite professed
claims of ‘unity’, the national flag remains a territorial signifier in the ongoing battlefield of
Australian identity: it stridently separates ‘us’ from ‘them’. To connect with and broaden our
understandings of the concepts of ‘Australia’ and Australian national identity allows new ways
for the nation to be re-imagined. For Kayleen Malthouse and Terry O’Shane a re-imagined
Australia, with Constitutional recognition for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people for
example, conjures,
an opportunity to make this land of the fair go truly fair for all Australians. We have
the opportunity to change for the better the way we do business in Indigenous affairs
… so that all our grandchildren grow up in a better and fairer Australia (2017: 24).
Timothy Brennan
Timothy Brennan’s essay (1990) The National Longing for Form discusses how the
novel was produced and worked in conjunction with the newspaper to ‘create’ the nation. With
the demise of the authority of both Crown and church a new regime of power relations emerged,
the full force of which was directed towards the colonised world,
… the world became Europe’s ‘little circle’ – just as beleaguered and constrained as
the ethnic and linguistic sub-communities had been under the rule of the imperial
church, and the monarchies of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance (Brennan 1990:
55).
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Brennan argues that the nation-state was not invented in Europe and then transported to the
colonial outposts. He claims that the nation-state was in fact, “forged in acts of separation from
the European centers of Madrid and London” (1990: 58). Brennan also suggests that although
nationalism evolved from the imperialist countries, they were unable to articulate national
aspirations until the era of colonisation. With colonial expansion came new opportunities to
construct and cement the idea of the nation-state. Brennan asserts that “European nationalism
itself was motivated by what Europe was doing in its farflung dominions” (1990: 59). Echoing
Renan’s earlier observation Brennan notes that a nationalist doctrine replaces the social
function of religion.
Brennan draws attention to the selective nature of nationalism. Since the Second World
War, as interest in nationalism grew, Brennan argues that Europe conveniently developed
amnesia and the terms of nationalism were reversed. Nationalism was no longer “freedom from
tyranny” it was “the embodiment of tyranny” (Brennan 1990: 57). Nationalism became
associated with social unrest and extreme right-wing politics due to the rise of imperial
nationalism and post-colonialism. The former saw extreme group loyalties in countries such as
Italy, Germany and Japan strengthened by repressive dictatorial movements and the latter sees
the legacies of colonialism rarely acknowledged in European responses to Third World issues.
Theorists of nationalism demonstrate various understandings of how the modern nation-state
is created. Many of the principles articulated can be applied to colonised contexts but there are
limitations unless full consideration is given to the historical rise of “the West” as a conceptual
– and arguably geographical – formation that has come to dominate thought about so-called
modern democratic nation-states. Stuart Hall provides an invaluable contribution to such
thought.
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Stuart Hall
Stuart Hall’s thinking about the construction of “the West” is significant for two
reasons. First, Hall provides a way to understand how “the West” evolved to dominate the
globe. Second, Hall gives an astute analysis of how national cultures work to preserve the
nebulous concept of “the West”. Hall identifies “the West” as an historical construct which
arose from the break-up of feudalism and emerged from specific economic, social, political
and cultural developments. He argues that it was through the formation of discourses that
western claims of superiority were bolstered, “Europe began to describe and represent the
difference between itself and these ‘others’ it encountered in the course of its expansion”
(1994a: 291 emphasis in the original). According to Hall, “the West” represents a complex
system of meanings and encompasses any society characterised as modern, advanced,
developed, industrial, urban, secular, and capitalist, regardless of its geography. “The West” is
as much an idea, as it is a location. In contrast to Anderson’s “imagined community” which
designates a specific geographical and cultural boundary, “the West” is a movable entity that
contracts and expands according to socio-political and economic markers that designate who
and what can be included. Hall notes that the idea of “the West” did not reflect an already
established society; it was however, “essential to the very formation of that society” (1994a:
278). “The West” is thus a concept which functions in various ways to embody sameness or to
‘siphon off’ difference.
To elaborate, first, “the West” classifies the world into binary groups of ‘western’ or
‘non-western’ according to, as noted, perceived or real similarities and differences. “The West”
is also employed as a tool to influence structures of thought and knowledge; Western thinking
has a long, established historical presence in the imaginings of “the West”. Second “the West”
is encoded in imagery, represented by verbal and visual language that constitute an
amalgamation of what different places, people, cultures and societies ‘are’. Third, “the West”,
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as an image and a discourse operates as a benchmark and facilitates ways to measure and
compare different societies. Finally, “the West” functions as an ideology that provides all
‘Others’ an example of ‘Enlightened’ culture. Nations belonging to “the West” are perceived
as modern, economically, socially and politically, and as such, are ideologically sanctioned as
superior to those who do not belong. Said’s work on Orientalism (2003) provides an argument
pertaining to the West in relation to the East which underscores Hall’s thesis. Hall’s work
expands, however, by noting how national cultures emerge to bestow a strident sense of identity
on citizens based on the cultures of ‘others’. Different societies were constructed as the
antithesis of “the West”, and quickly became central to the discourse relating to notions of
“civilization, refinement, modernity and development in the West. ‘The Other’ was the ‘dark’
side – forgotten, repressed and denied; the reverse image of enlightenment and modernity”
(Hall 1994a: 314). The discourses which surround this concept of “the West” still hold
considerable influence even though the world order is shifting in the new millennium. As Hall
notes, discourses “go on unfolding, changing shape, as they make sense of new circumstances.
They often carry many of the same unconscious premises and unexamined assumptions in their
blood-stream” (1994a: 314).
Hall stresses, despite the general assumption that nationality is an inherent part of the
human condition, cultural identities are not genetic. National cultures, he explains, are created
not only by cultural institutions, but also by symbols and representations. Hall claims that
symbols are intrinsic for national culture, which is in turn, the principle source of cultural
identity, and he argues that national culture is a discourse which is used to organise and
influence our actions and understandings. National cultures are a discursive formation “crosscut by deep internal divisions and differences, and ‘unified’ only through the exercise of
different forms of cultural power” (Hall 1994b: 297). Hall dismisses ideas of the nation as a
unified cultural identity consisting of “only one people, one culture or ethnicity. Modern
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nations are all cultural hybrids” (1994b: 297 emphasis in the original). The promotion of
national identity as a unifying force, Hall asserts, is in fact, an application of cultural power.
Hall argues that a nation is more than just a political entity; rather it is discursively
shaped by a range of signs from which ‘meanings’ are produced. A nation’s people are its legal
citizens, who, via the medium of national culture that manifests in art, literature, music, and
the day to day trappings of cultural expression, facilitate the national concept of what, for
example, it means to ‘be’ Australian.41 To borrow Hall’s ideas about the construction of
national culture, the narration of the Australian nation,
provide[s] a set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national
symbols and rituals which stand for, or represent , the shared experiences, sorrows, and
triumphs and disasters which give meaning to the nation (Hall 1994b: 293 emphasis in
the original).

Hall asserts that shared imaginings enrich our ‘humdrum’ existence as they connect, “our
everyday lives with a national destiny that preexisted us and will outlive us” (1994b: 293). This
is an important point. Hall is alerting us to the need for ceremony, performance, imagery and
public display – all of the paraphernalia that constitute shared imaginings of nation and that act
to reassure through their repetition.
Homi Bhabha
Homi Bhabha’s work (1990) begins to uncover some of the symbolism inscribed in
nation through literary narrating strategies. Bhabha claims that nationalist discourses work hard
to sell the nation as a, “continuous narrative of national progress, the narcissism of selfgeneration” (1990a:1). However there is an ambivalence associated with this practice, which
Bhabha asserts, ‘haunts’ the idea of the nation. Bhabha recognises that the “marginal or
‘minority’ is not the space of a celebratory, or utopian, self-marginalization” (1990a: 4). To

Bill Fairbanks co-founded the Green Australia Party in 1989 and helped to establish Landcare Australia, “[H]e
also discovered Matthew Flinders’ little known 1804 map in England. Realising that Flinders had called the
continent “Australia”, Fairbanks promoted this first naming as “Australia’s Birth Certificate” (Tanner 2015: 35).
41
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work in this space, to provide counter-narratives, is to contest the normalising tendencies of
the dominant group which claims authority over the (re)production of the national interest.
Counter-narratives facilitate ways to study, “the field of meanings and symbols associated with
national life” (Bhabha 1990a: 3). Counter-narratives also provide a “substantial intervention
into those justifications of modernity – progress, homogeneity, cultural organicism, the deep
nation, the long past” (Bhabha 1990a: 4). National symbols and narratives carry with them a
potent mix of emotions; they are laced with tradition and sentiment, exclusion and myth.
Therefore new and more inclusive ways which seek to re-locate and re-imagine the Australian
nation often generate discomfort and anxiety for those who have a vested interest in the
dominant imaginings of who and what we ‘are’.
Bhabha connects the diasporic experience of European mid-nineteenth century mass
migration and colonial expansion to the project of nation building, and he asserts that “[T]he
nation fills the void left in the uprooting of communities and kin, and turns that loss into the
language of metaphor … of home and belonging” (Bhabha 1990b: 291). As people migrated
en masse to emerging nations, many held fast the memories and traditions of their homeland.
Claire Sutherland notes the “collective memory they perpetuate may refer to a past, idealised
or even imagined home” (2012: 139). Imagined migrant memories carry with them the
potential to be transferred inter-generationally. Such memories are powerful and have the
capacity to produce emotional, economic, cultural and political affiliations to the perceived
‘homeland’. Bhabha’s understanding of diasporic communities ‘haunting’ the concept of
nation can also be transferred to the reality of colonisation that made diasporic, through
enforced relocation and removal from traditional homelands, many Aboriginal communities
throughout Australia.
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PART TWO: Counter-Australia
Terror-Australis: A ‘Haunted-Nation’
Prior to colonisation the Australian continent was occupied by Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people whose population densities varied depending on the location. The land
mass comprised of many nations and there were some 250 distinct Indigenous languages with
over 600 dialects spoken (Peterson et al. 2005). Following white invasion, Aboriginal people
were forced off their lands and subjected to a regime which ruptured their connections to
country and resulted in the destruction of a way of life (Coe 2014). The effects of enforced
relocations have been transmitted through the generations to produce disparate health and
wellbeing outcomes for many Indigenous people. This situation is compounded by Australia’s
reticence to acknowledge its violent past,
[A]s a nation, Australia suffers because it has never confronted the fact that an entire
continent was taken from its Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Too few
Australians are able to examine our shared colonial past seriously without averting their
gaze from the unpalatable facts (Pascoe & Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Studies [AIATSIS] 2012: 84).

Present day white Australia has inherited great wealth and privilege from a brutal history, a
reality that undermines the national pride often aspired to in nation-building, as Hage argues
“it should be noted that whatever traces of colonial confidence existed in Australia are built on
genocidal practices, and so remain haunted by these constitutive deeds” (2003: 51). The
dispossession of Aboriginal people of their lands is a form of genocide which continues to mark
the nation.
In Western Australia at the beginning of the twentieth century Aboriginal people who
were deemed sick were rounded up by policemen and other officials “over an area of hundreds
of thousands of square miles. Regardless of tribe and custom and country and relationship, they
were herded together” and sent to isolated islands in chains, “the women on Dorre′ and the men
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on Bernier” (Bates 1944: 97). A century later, the ongoing practice of genocide through the
removal of Aboriginal people from their land is still part of the official agenda. In Australia
there is no state recognition of national genocide.42 Wadjularbinna Nulyarimma, of Doomadgee
Aboriginal Community in Queensland states “[T]he genocide, the acts of genocide are
continuing in every law and legislation white Australia makes for us and every time they take
more of our land” (qtd. in Balint 2014: 235). Jennifer Balint argues that if the consequences of
state actions, “contribute to ongoing destruction of a people” and if there is “no recognition of
their impact, there can be no break with the past” (2014: 248).
Dodson contends that the current battleground for cultural assimilation is located in the
vast regions of northern and central Australia, where Indigenous people “maintain their
languages, own their traditional lands under Western legal title, and practice their customs”
(2007: 22). He also states that the “recurring denigration of Aboriginal culture and existence
highlights how short we Australians have fallen in terms of mutual respect for each other, and
sustains the blot on our national soul” (2007: 22). Jon Altman and Boyd Palmer claim that
Indigenous people maintain strong connections to their country and “many have special
relationships with one or more particular places, often known as homelands” (2005: 148).
Homelands remain fundamentally important to Aboriginal people, particularly in the Northern
Territory, Western Australia and outlying parts of Queensland, these regions are frequently
called ‘remote’ or ‘very remote’ areas.43 As I write homelands in Western Australia are under
serious threat of closure. John Pilger argues that “traditional life”
is anathema to a parasitic white industry of civil servants, contractors, lawyers and
consultants that controls and often profits from Aboriginal Australia …The homelands
are seen as a threat, for they express a communalism at odds with the neo-conservatism
that rules Australia. It is as if the enduring existence of a people who have survived and
42

See below and also Chapter Seven.
Speaking at a forum “Women Speak Out For Treaty” at the Redfern Community Centre, Aboriginal Elder,
Auntie Rosalie Kunoth-Monks drew attention to the fact that “remote communities” are not remote to the people
who live there. These places are home, and for those who live there, it is the cities which are “remote” (20 March
2015).
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resisted more than two centuries of massacre and theft remains a spectre on white
Australia: a reminder of whose land this really is (2015: 12).
Western Australia is Australia’s richest state, yet in October 2014, without consulting
Aboriginal community members, then Premier Colin Barnett announced that as a result of
Federal Government cuts to funding services, his government could no longer afford to provide
the basic services of water, power, sanitation, rubbish collection and schools to some 274
homelands with an estimated population of 12,000 (Koori Mail 19 November 2014: 7). Former
Prime Minister Abbott stated “[I]t’s not the job of the taxpayers to subsidise lifestyle choices”
(qtd. in Pilger 2015: 12). Abbott’s statement ignores the intrinsic connection between
Aboriginal people and their country, which is not a “lifestyle choice”, as the testimonies of 127
Aboriginal people from central Australia published in Every Hill Got a Story – We Grew up in
Country (2015) demonstrate. Compiled and edited by Marg Bowman, the book cover states
Nyinanyi ngurangka – being on country – is not a ‘lifestyle choice’ but a hard-won
right, a spiritual and cultural duty, a constant battle, a source of happiness and
opportunity and the meaning of life all at the same time (qtd. in Koori Mail 26 August
2015: 13).
Abbott’s comments imply there is a real problem with Aboriginal people living on their
lands because it is at the expense of the wider community. He fails to acknowledge that “health
and cultural outcomes are better for Aboriginal people who are able to continue living in their
communities” (Bainbridge 2015: 5). His comments are also at odds with the findings of the
Closing the Gap Prime Minister’s Report of 2015 which states quite clearly,
[C]onnection to land, culture, spirituality, ancestry, family and community are all
important to the social and emotional wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
peoples. Poor social and emotional wellbeing reduces the likelihood of people going to
school, getting jobs or accessing health services. It also increases the likelihood of
having alcohol and other substance abuse problems (Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet 2015: 30)
The continuing dismissal of Aboriginal people by the Australian state stands in direct contrast
to Bhabha’s vision for a future in which we not only “change the narratives of our histories,
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but transform our sense of what it means to live, to be, in other times and different spaces, both
human and historical” (1994: 367 emphasis in the original).
Australia has no post-colonial pact with Indigenous people which Hage states “has left
Australian culture with a continuous sense of unfinished business” (2003: 51). MoretonRobinson claims that refusing to recognise Indigenous sovereignty is “unfinished business”
which “continues to psychically disturb patriarchal white sovereignty” (2007: 93) and Dodson
argues, “we are a nation trapped by our history and paralysed by our failure to imagine any
relationship with First Peoples other than assimilation whatever its guise” (qtd. in Gilmore
2009: 11). These scholars highlight the significant effects associated with the ongoing failure
of the Australian nation-state to address, recognise or engage with Indigenous sovereignty –
the nation as a whole is therefore haunted, undermined, and national confidence tainted. Pascoe
expresses thus the discomfort which haunts the white Australian nation,
[T]oday’s conscience is a small voice but it whines inside us like a dentist’s drill and
we try to dismiss that annoyance by dulling the pain rather than correcting the cause. If
it was a rotten tooth we’d tear it from our head (2007: 113).

The Australian nation has long been imagined as both egalitarian and legitimate. Yet
the nation has been founded on ethnocentric histories which reflected the world view of the
writer and perpetuated stereotypes through distortion. According to Pat Cavanagh, “Aboriginal
people have undoubtedly been treated badly by Australian historians. They have been ignored,
stereotyped, patronised and certainly underestimated by successive generations of historians”
(1999: 157). The principles of historical (mis)representation can also be adapted to other areas,
and in particular to the “successive generations” of Australian politicians who have routinely,
and continue to undermine Indigenous rights in the political agenda of nation building,
… we are tired of being treated like political footballs. We are tired of our wins being
short-term and short-lived. We are tired of politicians who wear blinkers with respect
to our rights, and tired of our gains being flicked away on government whim, or when
governments or policies change (Malthouse and O’Shane 2017: 24).
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The actions of the present are a continuum of the past. However, with a treaty or written
agreement Dodson asserts that “many of the causes of past and present discord, and division
between all of us diverse peoples in the one land, might be resolved” (2007: 21). Until this
happens, the modern Australian nation remains ‘haunted’, terrorised by its deeds, both past and
present,
[A]lthough their scars are less obvious, white Australians have also been injured by the
illegitimate means by which this country was founded. The trauma will not begin to
heal until we create ground rules for how to live together. For that reason, a treaty is
inevitable (Watson 2013: 21).
Nicole Watson’s argument is instructive. She highlights how the nation as a whole, remains
damaged through the foundational lie of terra nullius. Watson argues that a treaty will begin
the healing process.
“Always Was, Always Will Be Aboriginaland” (Gilbert & Williams 1996: 50-51).
The epigraph to this chapter demonstrates that the modern Australian nation provides
for its citizenry in different ways. In the twenty first century the repercussions of colonisation
continue to be the cause of real life problems for many Aboriginal people. Aboriginal
understandings of nation prior to colonial invasion were at odds with the introduced European
ideas of nation and country where a land mass constituted a nation, as opposed to a language
group (McGloin 2008). McGloin elaborates on the notion of “country” as this applies to
Aboriginal people,
“Country” in the indigenous context refers to a cultural and spiritual place of origin. It
can refer to land or sea. “Country” incorporates cultural values and practices, stories
and histories. The term “country” does not carry the meanings associated with a nation
state. It is, however, a political entity in that it denotes a place that ascribes identity and
stewardship, and dictates the Law and the obligations of its indigenous custodians.
Country encompasses the geographical location of spiritual belief and communal
kinship networks (2006: 93).

76

Djambawa Marawili, an Elder of the Madarrpa people states the Aboriginal communities that
manage to retain notions of “home” and “country” pass on those politics of identity and
stewardship and apply their own spiritual and legal doctrines: “We are of the country”, which
was given by “our ancestor to our grandfather, to our father and to us. And now I have to hand
it over to the future generations. For us we cannot leave this country” (Marawili qtd. in Chenery
2015: 29). This understanding of country encompasses a range of interrelated knowledges, for
example: legal knowledge, cosmology, knowledge of the ocean, the land, the spiritual world
and so on; it formulates a body of knowledge crucial for the survival of Indigenous people in
Australia for some sixty thousand years. “Country” according to this knowledge is where one
comes from, or connects to, and is supposed to be in order to fulfil a role in the social life of
that place. Understood in this way, country represents a place of social, cultural and spiritual
responsibility where knowledge of survival is paramount. This does not suggest that there was
no form of cultural pride in belonging to a particular place or language group. Nor does it imply
that the social order was without conflict. What it does indicate, though, is a lack of Bhabha’s
“ambivalence” grounded in a concrete understanding of belonging, of where one ‘fits’ and
where one’s duties and social responsibilities are to be carried out. Country in this context is a
way of being based on, and informed by, cultural survival over millennia.
For Aboriginal people the land was experienced as “a nurturing force and a home shared
with everything that grew, moved and breathed within it” (Burnum Burnum1988: 12). The
continent was imbued with both similarity and difference pertaining to a landmass which
accommodated hundreds of separate nations, each with differing languages and dialects,
traditions, and cultures. The complexity of Aboriginal social and economic organisation, and
the networks of communication, rights and obligations proffered a balance patently different
to that of the invading British “with their wide commercial and industrial motivations and
patchy interest in the social welfare of the citizens” (Burnum Burnum1988: 30). Out of this
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schism the white Australian nation grew, buttressed by longstanding policies of exclusion
which habitually focused on, and were directed against Indigenous people. Since first contact,
and in the wake of the longstanding nature of colonial relations Aboriginal leaders and activists
have been constant in their resistance to the imposition of colonial rule and the illegitimate
seizure of their lands.
Ghillar, Michael Anderson of the Euahlayi Nation
As issues of legitimacy and sovereignty remain unresolved, Ghillar, Michael Anderson
of the Euahlayi Nation, spokesperson for the Sovereign Union and co-founder of the 1972
Aboriginal Tent Embassy44 continues his long fight for Indigenous rights. Forty years ago,
Anderson admitted he was having trouble getting the Australian government and white
community to accept Aboriginal people on their own terms. Anderson blames the British,
“…because the British have always, everywhere they went, used colonisation to split
communities” (1975: 20-21). Anderson’s argument can be extended to the British flag. The
Union Jack is Britain’s most prominent symbol and in the Australian context was both a
primary tool and weapon of British colonisation. It could be argued, then, that the symbolic
purpose of this flag has indeed been to “split communities”. The maintenance of the Union
Jack on the Australian national flag indicates that there is a duality attached to this honoured
section. For some the Union Jack acts as a hypervisible signifier of colonisation which signals
division, yet for others it is the source of national pride.
Anderson refutes the territorial integrity of the Australian State. He claims, “… neither
the British nor the Australians can provide any documentary evidence of our Peoples ceding
our sovereignty, or acquiescing to the invaders” (2013a: 17). In asserting the wrongs of the
British tenure of Australia, the Euahlayi people have written to the Queen of England declaring
their independence, as well as their pre-existing and continuing statehood. The Euahlayi have
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See Chapter Six.
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requested “the documents, where war was declared against the Peoples of the Euahlayi Nation
or where … the Peoples of the Euahlayi voluntarily ceded their sovereignty to Great Britain”
(Anderson qtd. in Bagnall 2013a: 7). As the Euahlayi Nation stretches from New South Wales
into Queensland, Anderson has also demanded that both the New South Wales and Queensland
governments provide written evidence which detail the transfer of title deeds from the Euahlayi
to the Crown.
Anderson was impelled to take action in an attempt to make the Australian governments
concede that Aboriginal lands, “were stolen as part of the invasion of the country by white
colonialists” (Bagnall 2014a: 3). Geoff Bagnall argues that Anderson’s assertion of
independent sovereign rights strikes at “the very core, the very foundation of the white colonial
settlement of his peoples’ country” (2014a: 3). Documentary evidence has not been provided
and the official response of New South Wales states “[T]he Euahlayi People are ‘oppressing’
the State of New South Wales, according to a Supreme Court judgment” (Bagnall 2014b: 3).
The seemingly straightforward request for documentary evidence to show how and when the
Euahlayi Nation was legitimately acquired by the Crown was unforthcoming with the court
deeming the subpoena “too broad” and “an abuse of process” (Bagnall 2014b: 3). Anderson
argues if the Crown had genuine title to the land of the Euahlayi people, “they would be only
too pleased to hold it up in neon lights for all to see rather than consider the subpoena
oppressive” (qtd. in Bagnall 2014b: 3). Given the nature of British colonisation and its brutal
history, “oppression” seems an extraordinary turn of phrase to use against the Euahlayi people.
Habibis and Walter explain,
[L]anguage is an important source of cultural power and it is through its use that images
of hierarchy are fixed. Language carries meanings and emotions. It forms the basis of
social definition and social action, and is reflexive, acting back on the subject while
fixing the object in social space (2010: 118).
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The word “oppression”, as used by the Supreme Court, is an example of the State’s reappropriation of the terms of reference deployed to describe the lived realities of many
Indigenous people. Its use brings into play relations of power which must be continually reasserted in order to maintain hegemonic control and justify legitimacy. In this case the sanctity
of State of New South Wales is positioned by the Court as ‘threatened’ by the Euahlayi whose
claims for documentary evidence are determined to be “an abuse of process”. Anderson’s
appraisal of the institutions of white power is forthright. He states that the courts “belong to
the system” which was “set up by the establishment that stole the land and preside over their
laws” (qtd. in Bagnall 2014a: 3). As a result Anderson argues “the nature of Australian society
and its laws are a fraud and they operate a nation state on lands seized not by consent but by
murder” (qtd. in Bagnall 2014b: 3).
Anderson clearly calls into question the legality of the Australian nation-state which he
argues was founded by brutal acts of dispossession and is underpinned by a lack of
documentary evidence. Anderson also draws our attention to how, at an international level,
Australia has managed to secure and legitimate its status as a nation through the High Court:
first, as signatory to the Treaty of Versailles45 and second, as signatory to the United Nations
Charter46 (Bagnall 2013b). Anderson argues that these are tenuous claims of sovereignty and
comments on the irony of a nation which purports peace throughout the world, yet fails to
enforce the same principles at home. He claims that Australia’s determination to hold
international despotic leaders to account for war crimes committed against their own stands in
sharp contrast to its domestic policy. In 1999, both the Federal and High Courts ruled “there
was no law against genocide on its own soil, nor does it have any effective remedies for crimes
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The Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919 and outlined conditions of peace in the aftermath of the First World
War. The Treaty of Versailles was the first political treaty signed by Australian officials who were directly
involved in the process. This was a major step for the recognition of Australia as an independent entity under
international law (MoAD 2011b).
46
Australia was a contributor and founding member of the 1945 United Nations Charter which pledges to aspire
to international peace and security.
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against humanity” (Anderson 2012: 9). According to these bastions of power, there was no
genocide. As a method of resistance and a means to assert the truth, Anderson calls on the
youth of “every individual Aboriginal nation” to “engage with their Elders to locate the
massacre sites of their people and, like at Myall Creek47 … establish memorial parks at these
locations in memory of the slain” (qtd. in Koori Mail 20 November 2013: 22).
Anderson also questions the Australian government for recognising the rights of
immigrants and not those of Indigenous people. In an Open Letter to the former GovernorGeneral, Quentin Bryce, he asks why it is that political parties continue to pursue agendas of
assimilation which force Aboriginal people to integrate into the white hegemonic world of
Australian beliefs and customs which is,
absolutely contradictory when we consider the Jews, Catholics, Anglicans etc. who
have their own private schools. Moreover, they have their own churches, mosques
synagogues and temples where they pray and observe their own religion. As Aboriginal
Peoples we are not afforded the same courtesies and respect (2013b: 28).
Anderson’s argument draws attention to the ‘hierarchy of racism’ which seeks to position
Indigenous people at the lowest level. Four decades earlier, renowned Aboriginal activist
Charles Perkins had articulated similar concerns. Perkins highlights the status of race relations
which were extant in the aftermath of the 1967 Referendum and the 1973 dismantling of the
White Australia Policy. He notes that white Australians rarely socialise with Aboriginal people,
however, they will mix with and welcome people from other nations. Accordingly migrants,
“complicate the race situation in this country before a solution can be worked out for the
existing situation” and Perkins predicts, “Aboriginals could become third-class citizens instead
of second-class” (1975: 98).48
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The massacre at Myall Creek, near Inverell NSW occurred in 1838. A group of armed land owners and their
hired hands brutally “murdered twenty-eight men, women and children, shooting them at point blank range or
hacking them to death with swords” (Grassby and Hill 1988: 42).
48
The term ‘Fourth World’ is now used to describe chronic levels of disadvantage experienced by some
Indigenous people who live in First World nations. Australia is a wealthy First World country, however, abject
poverty and disparity in terms of health are a daily reality for many Aboriginal people as the epigraph states.
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Roberta Sykes (1989) agrees that the denial of opportunities at every level of the social,
political and economic domain have positioned Aboriginal people at the bottom of the ladder
and she argues that new migrants identify with hegemonic ideals and practice them in order to
enhance their social position, “…any situation which prevents them from being at the bottom
is obviously in their best interests” (1989: 20). Sykes’ claim represents the ways in which racial
hierarchies come into play to reproduce dominant racialised ideals about who can and cannot
assimilate and under what conditions. The notion of racialised “ladders” that situate various
cultural and racial groups on various “steps” has long been a metaphorical usage that has served
the interests of white Australia. While arguments about where one ‘sits on the ladder’ persist,
white interests are assured and uninterrupted, and claims that the formation of nation
constitutes an act of genocide remain obfuscated. Stan Grant asserts that Australia has
“welcomed waves of migrants” yet Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people “remained a
reminder of what was lost, what was taken, what was destroyed to scaffold the building of this
nation’s prosperity” (2015). The impact of this for Indigenous people has been enduring,
[T]he “wealth for toil” we praise in our anthem has remained out of our reach. Our
position at the bottom of every socio-economic indicator tragically belies the Australian
economic miracle (Grant 2015).

The current socio-political climate rests heavily upon past practice. White Australians and
many migrants reap the benefits provided to them by a nation which “has been established
through the deprivation, misery and suffering of Blacks” (Sykes 1989: 20). Aboriginal Nations
however, are actively engaged in both the revival and reassertion of Aboriginal Sovereignty.
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The Sovereign Union
Sovereign Union “is a liberation struggle” which could only begin when the evil in the
Australian flag, the Union Jack, had been returned from whence it came49 (Sovereign Union
2016). The Sovereign Union is an umbrella organisation for the Aboriginal nations who have
declared their independence50 and for those nations which aspire to so. Sovereign Union is
resurrecting self-governing Aboriginal nations and asserting continued sovereignty over lands,
natural resources and waters. The Sovereign Union was formed in 1999 and its extensive
website is both informative and comprehensive.51 In contrast to the Freedom Movement, which
challenges the white establishment at every opportunity, members of the Aboriginal
Sovereignty Movement are not required to denounce any prior citizenship claims. Sovereign
Union is a movement of assertion, of claiming authority and sovereignty, which was never
ceded, over defined territory.
The Yidinji Nation and the “Crown’s Rubik’s Cube”
The Yidinji Nation calls on the “foreign entity”, Australia, to legitimise itself by
entering into a treaty with the Yidindji government (Howden 2015a: 3). Jeremy Geia, a former
television journalist, who now identifies by his tribal name, Murrumu Walubara Yidinji, was
compelled to take action after years of “reporting the same story about Indigenous disadvantage
and despair” (Brewster 2015). Murrumu argues that the ongoing disparities faced by
Indigenous people are the result of the complex system of white power, which he labels, the
“Crown’s Rubik’s Cube” (Brewster 2015). In other words, the echelons of white power are
impenetrable, unnavigable and virtually impossible to negotiate. Murrumu has renounced his
Australian citizenship, his Australian passport and bank accounts and avoids Australian
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See Chapter Seven.
At the time of writing First Nations Sovereignty has been declared by the Murrawarri Republic, the Euahlayi
Peoples Republic, the Republic of Mbarbaram, Wiradjuri Central West Republic and the Djurin Republic of the
Nyoongar (Sovereign Union 2016).
51
http://nationalunitygovernment.org/
50
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currency. The Yidinji people have their own driver licencing system, passports, birth
certificates and numberplates.
Like the Euahlayi, the Yidinji people are demanding tangible evidence which proves
the Australian and Queensland governments have rights over their land.52 Their requests to see
the documents which detail how their land was originally acquired by white Australia have
been met with silence, “[I]t’s not much of a question to ask. Just give us a look at the
paperwork” however, the powers that be, “refuse to write back to us” (Gaan-Yarra qtd. in
Bagnall 2014c: 2). In the process of asserting their Sovereign Rights, the Yidinji have
relinquished all legal ties with the Commonwealth of Australia and intend to make history by
entering into the first Indigenous treaty with Australia. A treaty would “overcome the legal
conundrum of operating on Yidindji territory without consent” (Howden 2015a: 3). For
example, the Yidinji State claims that the Cairns Courthouse is on Yidinji land and it
incarcerates people over which it has no jurisdiction (Bagnall 2014c). Furthermore, the Yidinji
associate the Commonwealth and State coats-of-arms as symbols of ownership. They call for
their tribal symbol to be flown over the Cairns Courthouse in acknowledgement of their
sovereignty, “[W]e made the demand if they want to stay here, they should fly our symbol of
authority” (Gaan-Yarra qtd. in Bagnall 2014c: 2).
At this interface the tensions of intercultural relations are palpable, and yet the Yidinji
maintain if the Australian government would sit down and talk about entering a memorandum
of understanding with the Yidinji government, “[T]his could be a blueprint for true
reconciliation” (Murrumu qtd. in Howden 2015a: 3). Reconciliation in this context is not used
according to the white precepts of reconciliation; rather, the term is deployed subversively and
infers that for the Yidinji, “true reconciliation” is achievable on their terms through social
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Yidinji territory stretches south of Port Douglas, through to Cairns and inland across the Atherton Tablelands
and 80 kilometres out to sea.
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justice (see Hollinsworth 2006: 252-253) and by recognising Yidinji claims of sovereignty.
Murrumu’s call is endorsed by constitutional law expert and chair of the United Nations
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples, Professor Megan Davis, who argues that there is
“nothing stopping the Commonwealth from today entering into a treaty with the Yidindji
government” (qtd. in Howden 2015a: 3).
Murrawarri Republic
Years of political procrastination and ineptitude brokered the Murrawarri Peoples push
for independence, and on 30 March 2013, the Murrawarri Peoples Council was formed.53 The
Murrawarri Peoples wrote to the Queen to inform her “that the clan groups of the Murrawarri
Republic had declared their continued independent statehood” (Koori Mail 22 May 2013: 28).
The council asked the Queen to produce documentary evidence to show how “sovereignty,
dominion and ultimate title was obtained over the Murrawarri nation and its resources” (Koori
Mail 22 May 2013: 28). There was no response. The silence has been interpreted by Murrawarri
Republic leader, Fred Hooper, as an affirmation that the Murrawarri Nation continues to be a
“free and independent state” (qtd. in Koori Mail 22 May 2013: 28).54 The Euahlayi, Yidinji
and Murrawarri Nations have all adopted their own national flags as emblems of their
sovereignty.
The above examples of Aboriginal Sovereign Nations provide a different way of
understanding the Australian nation whose geographical landmass once comprised of hundreds
of nations but is now recognised as a singular nation state. As a result, very real questions
pertaining to ownership and legitimacy emerge. Given the involvement of the state in the life
of its citizenry (see Hobsbawm 1995), it seems implausible that requests demanding tangible
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The Murrawarri Republic covers an area of 81,000 square kilometres in an area which extends from Northern
New South Wales into Queensland.
54
Most recently 23 Aboriginal Nations from north, north-west, upper western and western New South Wales and
southern Queensland have signed a multilateral treaty. The treaty, signed at the Aboriginal Embassy, asserts the
nations’ sovereign status. Fred Hooper, chair of the Northern Basin Aboriginal Nations (NBAN) affirms that “the
treaty states First Nations people never ceded their sovereignty or titles to the Crown of the United Kingdom”
(qtd. in Flynn 2017: 14).
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evidence of how and when Aboriginal land was transferred into a white possession are unable
to be produced. The years of illegal acquisition of land in Australia were paralleled with the
colonial project of ‘civilising’ and fundamental to this process was a system of meticulous
record keeping. Indigenous leaders who are calling for documentary evidence relating to the
transfer or acquisition of their lands by the British have been whitewashed by elicited responses
which range from silence to accusations of “oppression” and “abuse of process”.
Conclusion55
This chapter brings together a range of approaches that deal with the concept of nation,
a concept that holds the flag as its most prominent symbol of identification. Although there are
disparate views and approaches presented here, there are indeed many similarities which
position the nation-state as a modern, Western entity that has long enjoyed a place of privilege
in the hearts and minds of its citizens. As a final counterpoint to many of the theorists’
standpoints on what constitutes nation, I have included a discussion about Indigenous concepts
of nation and country. Having drawn out some of the ways in which the nation is produced and
reproduced, the next chapter will examine how the Australian nation is discursively sustained
and maintained.
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Since the time of writing this chapter, the political landscape has rapidly changed. Understandings of
‘democracy’ are being re-assessed. War and poverty have resulted in millions of people seeking refuge in western
nations around the world. As a consequence mass migration has uneased the western world which perceives its
values, traditions and ways of life as being under threat. This is turn has led to the rise of far right wing
conservatism and a new style of xenophobic nationalism. Underpinning this is an increasing disenchantment for
national politics and the systems of governance which frequently appear to work for the vested interests at the
expense of the voting majority.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Maintaining an Australian State … of Mind
And just because so much of what subjectively makes up the modern ‘nation’ consists of such
constructs and is associated with appropriate and, in general, fairly recent symbols or suitably
tailored discourse (such as ‘national history’), the national phenomenon cannot be adequately
investigated without careful attention to the ‘invention of tradition’.
(Hobsbawm 2005a:14).
Introduction
It is the case that many of the key scholars who have theorised the nation have neglected
to consider the ways in which nationalism – the maintenance and promotion of the nation – is
daily sustained (Palmer 1998; Billig 2013). Chapter Four will focus on this issue with an
exploration into some of the more specific ways that the Australian nation has been constructed
and is maintained. An examination into the seemingly banal signifiers of nation; place names
for example, disclose much about the racialised and gendered nature of Australian nationalism.
My analysis also foregrounds the production of what, I argue, is a discursive and for the most
part, uncritical acceptance of Australian nationalist sentiment. I also include a discussion about
Australian literature in order to emphasise its particular role and influence over the creation of
modern day Australian traditions and identity. Despite modern Australia being a ‘young’ nation
the country has been immersed in a range of traditions, so I begin this chapter by re-engaging
with Hobsbawm and his work in this field.
Nationalism and Traditions
The emergence of tradition was generated as a response to a rapidly changing world.
The revolutions which swept throughout Europe created significant social upheaval and as a
result, old methods of ruling and securing loyalty required new approaches which saw the state
play an increasing role in shaping the lives of its citizens. Traditions, both official and
unofficial, enhanced and promoted social cohesion, structure and identity. New ceremonies and
public holidays, national monuments, heroes, symbols and clubs became part of the social
engineering process that was required to sustain the modern nation. Hobsbawm’s work on this
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topic is significant. He draws our attention to a responsive public for whom the invention of
tradition signified a ‘civil’ religion as it provided a tangible alternative to the “ancient social
cement, [of] church and monarchy” (Hobsbawm 2005b: 269).
By the end of the nineteenth century the majority of European states and American
republics had developed their national paraphernalia,
[T]hey had capitals, flags, national anthems, military uniforms and similar
paraphernalia, based largely on the model of the British, whose national anthem
(datable c. 1740) is probably the first, and of the French, whose tricolour flag was very
generally imitated (Hobsbawm 2005b: 266-267).

These national insignia provided a tangible way to reinforce the concept of nation. Offering a
range of constants in a world of rapid change, tradition structured its people and grounded
society accordingly. Hobsbawm observes that invented tradition,
is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted
rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and
norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with … a
suitable historic past (2005a: 1).

To secure legitimacy, the modern nation relies upon the uncritical acceptance of its importance
and superiority. This acceptance is augmented by the maintenance of traditions which imply
antiquity and invariance.56 Colonial Australians were unable to employ a claim to antiquity as
was asserted by much of Europe and so they deployed a different strategy or “set of practices”
that would give primacy to the ‘new’ nation. Settler narratives and mythologies based on
pioneering, stoicism and conquest were invoked,
… great things have happened. The huge unknown continent of the South has been
conquered by the explorer and the pioneer. War has been waged, not with men but with
nature: and no war ever waged has made more demand on human courage, endurance,
self-reliance, sagacity (Wood 1913: xiv-xv).
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Note for example how the ANFA draws attention to the ‘age’ of the Australian flag.
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The British race was portrayed as triumphant in both the taming of nature and the establishment
the Australian nation. George Wood notes, “[I]t is as if a deliberate experiment was being tried
to test the quality of the British race in the most unfavourable circumstances that could be
invented” (1913: xiv). Wood refers to the fact that initially colonial Australia was populated
by British criminals and soldiers who struggled with an unfamiliar environment. Out of great
adversity Wood asserts that subsequent generations worked hard towards developing the
“gradual evolution of a little British society learning at the ends of the earth to live the British
life in the midst of unprecedented difficulties” (1913: xiv). This was, according to Wood, “one
of the great exploits of the British Race” (1913: xvi). Wood demonstrates how ideas about the
triumph of the British race were mobilised to discursively shape the Australian nation in regard
to racial superiority, which facilitated “legitimate ownership and formation of the nation with
whiteness and nationality woven tightly together” (Moreton-Robinson 2000: 349).
Colonial Australia could neither make claims of antiquity, nor could it profess a
revolution, the importance of which is illustrated by John Roberts who notes that all
“revolutions try to find new principles for legitimising authority” (1985: 281). Wood reflects
that for Australia this was a difficult task, “[W]e miss the great battles for great causes; the
heroisms and the martyrdoms; the inspiration of the lives of famous men” (1913: xiii-xiv). For
colonial Australians there had been no great war from which to glorify death, sacrifice, duty
and heroism, there were no “wars of defence, for the continent was protected by the fleet of
Nelson; no racial conflict, for the people were as entirely British as the people of the British
Isles” (Wood 1913: xiii). Wood’s testimonial provides evidence of the emergence of the
enduring mythology of the ‘peaceful settlement’ on which the nation has been discursively
constructed.
The lack of conflict is conceptualised by Noel McLachlan who argues that nationalism
and “blood sacrifice” are inextricably linked and this argument goes some way to explain
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Australia’s longstanding attachment to Anzac Day, “… the blood sacrifice seems to have been
the vital thing. In December 1915 one officer talked proudly of Australia having leapt into
‘Nationhood, Brotherhood and Sacrifice in one bound’ as if they were equally important”
(McLachlan 1989: 198). This is a direct reference to the Australian and New Zealand Army
Corps, the Anzacs, who landed at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915. The First World War (19141918) provided the fledgling Australian nation with the opportunity to enter the battlefield of
the world-stage. Under the command of an English officer, General Birdwood, the Anzacs
joined the Allied forces (British, French and Italian troops) in a campaign to seize the Gallipoli
Peninsular from Turkish forces. This was an ill-fated exercise. The Anzacs were landed in the
dark and at the wrong place. They came ashore just after dawn, at what is now known as Anzac
Cove, and were under immediate attack. After eight months of battle and heavy losses the
Anzacs, in defeat, were evacuated. The tenacity shown by these soldiers, however, helped forge
the Anzac legend,
[T]he spirit of Anzac was created on that beachhead and has become indelibly engraved
on the nation’s heart. The Anzac is epitomised in the good-humoured Aussie larrikin;
the irreverent, dismissive of authority, hard working, fast shooting, reliable,
trustworthy, charming, guileless and ultimately expendable Australian ‘good bloke’
(Hocking 2007: 153).

Australia, as a young and modern nation needed a focus for national pride. The Anzac tradition
was quickly established. 25 April has been commemorated as Anzac Day since 1916. Anzac
Day and Australia Day are both celebrated as national days that are marked by a proliferation
of national flags. These national occasions make a significant contribution to the durability of
a national mythology that, following Brennan, “thrives on a selective and ethnocentric history”
(1990: 58).
Nationalism prospers on myth, tradition and social practices which infiltrate the
everyday. It is pervasive, varied, and repetitive and relies for its efficacy on propaganda,
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[A]s we cheer our athletes, hail our business achievements, express our national family
values, vote for our politicians, salute our flag, draw spiritual meaning from our
countryside and claim eternity for ourselves, we distort history. We lie (Bosworth 2007:
12).
Seemingly ordinary social activities are commonplace. They are however, far from innocuous
when understood as practices designed to maintain wide-scale compliance to the national ideal.
Richard Bosworth notes that, “[P]ersuading contemporaries that the nation is as likely to be
wrong as right remains a vexing task” hindered by “popular parlance, and presumably the
popular mind that lies behind it, [that] accepts the nation as self-evident and all-embracing”
(2007:13). Billig argues that nationalism is a theory of a world being ‘naturally’ divided into
communities which is complicated by the fact that nationalism does not have to be experienced
theoretically, “[W]ith the triumph of nationalism, and the establishment of nations across the
globe, the theories of nationalism have been transformed into familiar common sense” (2013:
63). Therefore, the distortion of history, a constituent element of nationalism, is often not
recognised, nor conceptualised as a distortion by citizens who are daily imbued with the
routines of nationalism. One of the more banal (using Billig’s sense of this term) features of
nationalism is the encoding of nomenclature into the colonised landscape.
Nationalism and Names
In the preface to the second edition of Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson notes
that while the original version (1983) had considered the influence of “time” on understandings
of nationalism, it had failed to note its “necessary coordinate: the changing apprehensions of
space” (1991: xiv). In the second edition, Anderson makes note of the power and influence of
maps on the national imagination. As visual illustrations of the geo-political space, maps
“profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion” (Anderson
1991: 164). Roberts claims that maps are more than statements of fact since they translate
“reality into forms we can master; they are fictions and acts of imagination communicating
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more than scientific data. So they reflect changes in our pictures of reality” (1985: 194). The
invention of the chronometer in 1761 facilitated the global classification of imperial possession.
Territory was reconfigured. The earth, now viewed as a geometrical grid, was under
surveillance, “‘filling in’ the boxes was to be accomplished by explorers, surveyors, and
military forces” (Anderson 1991: 173).
Paul Carter argues that to possess a country with names is as effective “as a general
deploying his troops” (1987: 119), while Jay Arthur notes that “[C]olonisation is an event in
language as well as in space” (2003: 17). In Australia, myriad place names symbolise
colonisation as they eradicate previous Aboriginal connections. The colonial practice of
naming is thus a multi-faceted tool that constitutes an assertion of possession through the
linguistic reconfiguration of the landscape. Colonial names reflect the invasive nature of white
settlement and, at the same time, bolster the myth and tradition-making industries by feigning
a sense of belonging to places which were previously void of any valid connection.
James Cook was meticulous in ascribing place names to Australia. During the four
months spent on Australian waters, he named more than one hundred capes, isles and bays,
with over one third of the names referring to the British nautical, political and aristocratic
patriarchal elite (Carter 1987). In effect, Cook provides us with “a white geo-historical”
travellers discourse (Carter 1987: 328) Carter conceptualises Cook’s naming system in
Ptolemaic terms. Ancient Greek mathematician and astronomer, Ptolemy, theorised that the
earth was fixed, and at the centre of the universe. Celestial objects therefore, orbited around
the earth. In Carter’s analogy Cook, as the “earth”, is encircled by successive spheres of names
(1987: 5). The furthest flung names to ‘orbit’ Cook belong to the British royal house. For
example in Queensland the Northumberland Islands and Cumberland Isles celebrate the names
of King George III’s younger brothers. The succeeding circle contains the names of the
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politicians who were influential at the time of the Endeavour’s57 sailing; Rockingham, Grafton
and Shelburne. The next sphere belongs to the Lords of the Admiralty: the men who showed a
particular interest in the Endeavour find their way onto the Australian landscape via places
such as Cape Sandwich, Cape Palmerston, Edgcumbe Bay and so on. Inside this ring of names
come the luminaries with whom Cook was professionally affiliated, Hawke and Howe for
example. Closer still are the names which refer to Cook’s own career; even the names of vessels
on which he served, Three Brothers, Grenville and Eagle have been indelibly stamped onto the
Australian landscape. The innermost circle belongs to the history of the voyage itself and is
complimented by events, crew members (Sutherland for example, see Chapter One) and related
imagery. Cook’s place names were tools for the future, “their very accuracy invited further
exploration, pre-empted premature possession. They … created a cultural space in which places
might eventually be found” (Carter 1987: 32). Cook’s mode of naming shows us that Australia
was founded on the gendered and racial premise of patriarchal white sovereignty.
In Chapter One I noted that Cook did not lay claim to the east coast of Australia until
he came to Bedanug (Possession Island). This was because when he arrived at Bedanug, Cook
felt certain that no other European had visited. It was here that he planted the British flag and
claimed and ‘named’ the east coast of the continent, New South Wales, for the Crown, “…in
the zigzag map created by his passage, Possession Island, far from appearing peripheral, stood
as a symbolic centre, a jewel crowning his outline of names” (Carter 1987: 27). Cook did not
return to Australia, but in 1788, the First Fleet, under the command of Arthur Phillip, landed
and established a British colony. The tradition of patriarchal naming was quickly resumed.
Phillip named the first settlement “Sydney Cove”, in honour of the Secretary of State for the
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HMS Endeavour was the name of the ship that brought Cook to Australia in1770.
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Colonies, Lord Sydney.58 Lord Sydney’s vision for the new colony was to provide for the
“importation of 200 women from Tonga, New Caledonia, and other islands as wives for the
convicts” (Holthouse 1969: 12). Sydney’s fantasy that “the union of convict men and island
women would result in a new breed of human beings” (Berzins 1988: 97) is indicative of the
white patriarchal sense of entitlement upon which the nation was founded. Phillip rejected
Sydney’s plan, arguing that the “island women would ‘pine away in misery’” instead he “urged
the [British] government to send more women” (Berzins 1988: 99).
From the outset, the colonists struggled to articulate their new environment. Arthur
argues, that in Australia,
[T]he language sees double; two landscapes, one present and one ‘remembered’. The
double vision results in expectation and disappointment. The words look for what is not
there, for the other country that didn’t happen” (2003: 24).
Where rivers and lakes, plants and climate failed to meet colonial expectations, place names
were different. Indelibly stamped in the cultural memories of all citizens, place names, whether
on road signs, street signs, or on maps, construct a necessary distortion that permits the reimagining of the landscape. In addition, Australian waters have also been linguistically
colonised. Augustus Agar draws attention to the fact that Bass, a naval doctor ‘discovered’ and
named a strait of water after himself, and Flinders, a young naval lieutenant, ‘gave’ his name
to an island,
[T]hus for all time the name of a British sailor signposts each sea gateway to Australia,
while the Cook Strait, which marks the main entrance to New Zealand, commemorates
the great navigator of the Antipodes (1962: 80).

Anouk Ride finds Australia’s colonial names “absurd”,
[W]hen you are in the middle of the central Australian desert or a northern rainforest,
placenames like these [Guilford, York, Avon Valley Park] recalling the countries and
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Australian state and territory capital cities: Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Perth, Brisbane, Hobart and Darwin
have all been named after, or influenced by the British patriarchy (see Reed 1992).
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towns where white settlers were from – can seem silly, an absurd attempt to mark an
unfamiliar landscape with something more ordinary (2007: 2).
Moreton-Robinson is more forthright, “[T]he persistent presence of English names continues
to convey a sense of Anglocentric whiteness’s divine right and entitlement to Australia”
(2011a: 86).
New South Wales surveyor general, Thomas Mitchell took charge of the land by
recording it on a map. By naming geographical features Mitchell “placed a symbolic British
flag on each of them. The land was charted, ordered and labelled, becoming a colonial
possession” (Birch 1997: 24). In 1836, north of the Murray River, Mitchell witnessed his men
chase and kill a group of Aboriginal people. This moment of brutality was memorialised and
mapped by Mitchell who named the massacre site “Mt. Dispersion”59 (Birch 1997: 25). Burney
claims that the Australian landscape “is scarred with signposts of horror” and she questions
“what this has done to the collective psyche of mainstream Australia” (2000: 74).
“Poisoned Waterholes Creek” and “Massacre Island” are in Wiradjuri country (central
New South Wales), local Narrandera Elders describe them as “literary tombstones” (National
Indigenous Times 10 July 2013: 5). These place names stand in testimony to the violence of
colonisation. Oral tradition states that Aboriginal people were deliberately poisoned,
… they wandered sick along the water’s edge … they died all along the creek bed, and
so it became known as Poisoned Waterhole Creek … Some of them got away … They
drove them into this island, trapped them there, and murdered them (Kabaila 1995: 93).

‘Gin’s Leap’ is an escarpment south of Narrabri in northwest NSW. It is a popular roadside
stop, yet conjecture exists about its name. White history mythologies ‘Gin’s Leap’ as having
been named after a young Aboriginal couple who were forbidden to marry. White myth claims

‘Dispersal’ is a euphemism commonly used to describe the massacre of Aboriginal people, “‘[D]ispersals’ have
been part of the European cultural lexicon in Australia since 1788 … ‘dispersal’ included killings on a very large
scale and over a long period of time” (Owen 2016: 145).
59
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that as they were being chased by their families, so the ‘star-crossed lovers’ leapt to their deaths.
The Aboriginal version of history states that ‘Gin’s Leap’ is a massacre site, “where 43 women
and children were herded to the top and forced to jump” (Graham 2013: 12). Local Aboriginal
woman Jody Sevil notes,
[T]he name is awful. It’s very derogatory.60 I’ve had people say to me, ‘Oh but it’s
history’. Well I’m sorry some people feel so comfortable in history, but I think people
get too relaxed with their own racism … We don’t have Redneck Hill, but we’ve got
Gin’s Leap. It’s just crazy (qtd. in Graham 2013: 12).
Sevil claims that to return to the traditional Gomeroi name of ‘Cooloobindi’ would enrich the
whole town and might provoke a national movement to be rid of the racist place names which
litter the landscape. Moreton-Robinson points out that Indigenous resistance is “produced
through the continued practice of naming the landscape, which in turn affirms Indigenous
ownership” (2011a: 86).
In contrast to the names associated with atrocities committed stand the names of British
royalty. When Cook seared royal names into the Australian landscape he started a tradition
which continues to this day. Thirty kilometres north of Adelaide lies the suburb of Elizabeth.
After the Queen’s 1954 tour of Australia, the South Australian government sought her
permission to name a suburb in her honour. In 1963 the Queen returned to Australia and visited
her namesake. She unveiled a fountain outside the “Elizabeth Civic Centre” and some 17,000
children came to celebrate. Half a century later, the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge (Prince
William, second in line to the throne, and his wife Kate) visited the suburb of Elizabeth. They
unveiled a plaque and ‘renamed’ the area “Prince George Plaza” in honour of their 9 month
old baby, who is third in line to the British throne, “[W]hen the royal couple appeared … the
14,000 crowd, mainly women and holidaying schoolchildren, went wild” (Murphy 2014: 3).
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The royal couple also visited Taronga Zoo, Sydney where the bilby enclosure has been renamed
“the Prince George Bilby Exhibit” (Dumas 2014: 7).
In Coraki, north-east NSW, a proposal to incorporate street signs with the local
Aboriginal language was rejected after Richmond Valley Council “took the view that it was a
divisive issue” (Koori Mail 7 October 2015: 16). The proposed names included Bundjalung
words for six local animals, which Coraki primary school students had been taught by local
Elders. Letters requesting feedback about the dual-naming project were distributed to all Coraki
residents. Over 90% of the responses were negative. The council’s general manager was
surprised “at the vehemence and violence of the negative response, which included threats to
staff members and use of firearms” (Koori Mail 7 October 2015: 16). Bundjalung Elder,
Russell Kapeen, identifies the need to educate the wider population, “[W]e weren’t going to
take away the name of Queen Elizabeth Drive, just hang another sign underneath, with the
Bundjalung name and telling people what the names mean” (qtd. in Koori Mail 7 October 2015:
16). Resistance to change, as demonstrated by the non-Aboriginal residents of Coraki, reveals
that white Australia’s insecurities are reflected by a determination to own and endorse colonial
symbols in all their formations.
Nationalism and Monuments and Buildings
Colonial monuments and buildings are visual signifiers of British power and authority.
In England, the trend for these symbolic markers was forged during the Victorian era (Victoria
was born 24 May 1819 and died 22 January 1901). From 1908 – 1947 a statue of Queen Victoria
stood outside the Irish Parliament in Dublin, Ireland. Political unrest instigated the statue’s
removal and it was placed into storage. Forty years later, in 1987, the unwanted statue of Queen
Victoria was gifted to the city of Sydney, New South Wales, and placed on a stone pedestal
outside the “Queen Victoria Building”. Ride argues that the history Australia has selected to
remember is curious. Queen Victoria oversaw the British Empire which facilitated, “the
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transport of thousands of convicts to Australia, millions of her own people working themselves
into early graves and the suppression of Indigenous cultures from Australia to Africa” (Ride
2007: 91). The buildings and monuments which colonise the landscape have also been
bolstered by the invention of public ceremonies. For example, to celebrate the late Queen
Victoria’s birthday ‘Empire Day’ (24 May) was introduced to Australia in 1905. Kwan (2006)
argues that this is an example of Australian society struggling to come to terms with its identity.
In 1901, Federation had encouraged Australians to imagine themselves as a distinct and
emerging nation. The promotion of ‘Empire Day’ contradicted this stance.
The colonial past can be re-invented with surprising ease. In 2005 a statue dedicated to
the founder of Townsville, Robert Towns was installed in the city which angered some of the
locals who argue that the effigy “honours the memory of a man who was heavily involved in
the brutal system of indentured labour that established Queensland’s sugar, maritime and
pastoral industries” (Wilson 2013: 9). Hector Holthouse notes that Towns introduced the
system of indentured labour which in turn led to the widespread exploitation of South Sea
Islanders,
[I]n the four and a half years that followed Towns’ introduction of the original sixtyseven kanakas61 in 1863, a total of twenty-two voyages to the South Seas brought to
Queensland 2,107 natives, mainly from the islands of Mare, Efate and Tanna (1969:
38).

Wilson (2013) states that under the indentured labour system some 55,000 South Sea Islanders
were bought to Australia on 62,000 contracts. 95 per cent were male. Thousands died, and
many never returned to the islands of their birth, “Towns, who died in 1873, gave his name to
Townsville, but visited the city only once after it was founded in 1866” (Wilson 2013: 9).
Protestors, many of whom are descendants of the indentured labourers, want the statue of
Towns removed as they consider him “a blackbirder and slave trader” (Wilson 2013: 9).
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Kanakas: A Melanesian word meaning “man” (Holthouse 1969: 3).
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In 2010, an iron statue four metres tall, was unveiled in the Northern Territory town
centre of Mparntwe (Alice Springs). The statue of explorer John Stuart was commissioned by
the Freemasons to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Scottish-freemason’s arrival in
the area. The traditional owners of Mparntwe have called on the council to have it removed. In
a joint statement Elders, traditional owners and concerned residents articulate several concerns,
[S]o why have they put up a huge statue of a man with a gun? What message does this
send to the children? This man murdered our people… The statue is also a symbol of
the warfare that took place over many years as this country was stolen from us. It brings
up so many bad memories of our great grandfathers and grandmothers that were
killed… The statue is also a symbol of the attitude that white people can rule over
Aboriginal people. We are still being dominated by men with guns – the police who
harass and discriminate (Koori Mail, 10 September 2014: 8).
Tony Birch argues that historical distortion is “a form of radial conservatism: the history is not
unknown, but is repressed by building monuments to murderers” (1997: 27). Trauma and
brutality are bypassed, smothered by effigies which glorify colonial masculinity and conquest.
From these examples it is evident that the statues of Australian colonisation do not hail from a
bygone Victorian era. Statues of conquest are being re-born, a twenty first century colonial
project which visually transmits the violence of the past into the present.62 The presence of
colonial symbols and names as cultural representations of the Australian nation have the
capacity to evoke trauma and anger. They can provide a distressing reminder of past atrocities,
as Gary Foley confirms.
Foley writes of his time at Melbourne University, “I …found myself disturbed every
day by having to enter buildings that were named after people who I knew I didn’t like” (2012:
24). Foley refers to the “Baldwin Spencer” and “Richard Berry” buildings. Spencer was an
anthropologist who became the first special commissioner and chief ‘protector’ of Aboriginal
people in 1912. Foley argues that Spencer was complicit in developing the relationship between
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99

Australian anthropology and the state policies of genocide. Berry, Professor of Anatomy at
Melbourne University from 1903 – 1929, was an influential campaigner of eugenics. He was
also an avid ‘collector’ of Aboriginal skulls and body parts. Foley notes that over the years
various groups of Aboriginal students and academics have called for the Richard Berry building
to be re-named.63
Bronwyn Fredericks testifies that symbols of place and space are politically charged.
She notes that buildings named after prominent political, religious or academic figures can
become, “social texts that convey messages of belonging and welcome or exclusion and
domination, and produce and reproduce power and control relations” (2015: 82). Buildings,
place names and associated symbols bolster the hegemonic narratives of nation. They are the
statements of ownership – tangible structures which attempt to bypass Indigenous sovereignty.
Raymond Firth argues that symbols have been invented by people who “acquire them by
learning, adapt them, [and] use them for their own purposes” (1975: 427). This hypothesis
helps to explain how Australian colonial symbols continue to serve the dominant interests. To
understand the function of symbols helps to explain the reticence for change: symbols
constitute a powerful mechanism for vested interests of a particular view of nation. Firth also
explains that symbols of power are most prominent in the public domain.
The Australian War Memorial (AWM) in Canberra is the national site of remembrance
that pays homage to the armed forces and those who fought and died in the ‘theatre’ of war.
The memorial is located on an elevated site and is in direct alignment with both old and new
Parliament House. Of the latter,
when all the doors from the cabinet room through to the Great Hall and out to the main
entrance are opened, the Australian War memorial can be seen, a reminder to MPs of
the consequences of their decisions (Peatling 2017: 7).
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In December 2016 the Richard Berry building was finally renamed. It is now known as the Peter Hall building
(The Melbourne Newsroom 2017).
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The AWM is an iconic building; it is a shrine, a museum, an exhibition hall and place of
research. According to Anderson, “[N]o more arresting emblems of the modern culture of
nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers… they are … saturated with
ghostly national imaginings” (1991: 9 emphasis in the original). Brendan Nelson, Director of
the AWM claims that the War Memorial is central to our understanding of history, it is “the
soul of the nation” (qtd in McQuire 2013: 8). Furthermore, Nelson asserts, “[A] people that
neither knows and nor, more importantly, understands its history, in my view, is dangerous”
(qtd. in McQuire 2013: 8). There are growing calls for the War Memorial to recognise the
Frontier Wars,64 “[T]he next step in being fair and equitable is acknowledging those brave men
and women who made the absolute sacrifice in defending their homes during the frontier wars”
(Waters 2017: 24). Nelson claims that the Frontier Wars have no place at the AWM. The
memorial, he argues, “is about Australians going overseas in peace operations and in war in
our name as Australians” (qtd. in McQuire 2013: 8). The Australian War Memorial Act 1980
states its official role is to develop a memorial for Australians who have died:
1. On or as a result of active service.
2. As a result of any war or warlike operations in which Australians have been on
active service. (Oakley 2014: 22).
In the lead up to the centenary of the First World War, and to enhance the nation’s
understanding of the experience, $32 million was committed to upgrade the War Memorial’s
First World War galleries. Paul Daley questions why memorial officials continue with an
Anzac-centric focus and “stubbornly exclude the fierce battles for sovereignty between
Aboriginal Australians and pastoral settlers across the frontier, which are at the dark heart of
Australia’s nationhood” (2013: 18). Foley (2014a) states that the failure by Nelson and the
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AWM to acknowledge the Frontier Wars is indicative of the broader national discomfort. As
Maddison attests, “[W]hite Australia was settled on a land that did not belong to us. Deep in
our hearts every Australian knows this to be true” (2011: 3). Maddison also claims that the
Australian nation, both collectively and inter-generationally, has failed to respond to the
wrongs of our past; dissenting voices are dismissed and calls for change are not considered as
being in the ‘national interest’. Resulting tensions and unresolved issues continue to shape
Indigenous – non-Indigenous relationships. Maddison argues that new ways of thinking and
speaking about the past are vital for “a more just Australia and a more confident Australian
national identity” (2011: 7).
As stated, Nelson claims that it is dangerous for a people not to know or understand its
history, yet he refuses to include the Frontier Wars into the “soul of the nation”. This
contradiction reveals how dominant ways of thinking can infiltrate, distort and continue to
claim authority over the (re)production of national history, knowledge, and identity. In his
discussion into the politicisation of Australia’s historical memory, Foley (2014a) notes that
Nelson and the Commonwealth War Graves Commissioner, Mike Rann, are former politicians.
Both play a key role in the memorialisation landscape, therefore, as Foley argues, “it is little
wonder politics dominates discussion about what we should be remembering and
commemorating” (2014a: 19).
The official failure to recognise the Frontier Wars at the War Memorial is replicated in
Anzac Parade, Canberra’s ceremonial thoroughfare. Opened on 25 April 1965 to commemorate
the 50th Anniversary of the Anzac landing in Gallipoli, Anzac Parade is adorned with statues.
There is, however, no memorial to honour the war service of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander service men and women, who defended a country that did not include them in the
census until 1967,
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[they] left these shores, truly their Country, to fight for an Australia that did not
recognise them as citizens and on their return denied them soldier settlement blocks and
all of what was offered to their non-Indigenous mates (Bagnall 2014d: 5).

The War Memorial’s Indigenous Liaison Officer, Gary Oakley, calls the neglect a “crime”. He
wants an Indigenous Memorial to also be included “in the sightline between the War Memorial
and Parliament House … There needs to be some national focus point, some point where all
Indigenous Australians can say this is where we’re honoured” (qtd. in Bagnall 2014d: 5).
Where calls for a national memorial for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander service
men and women have gone unheeded, and colonial violence is deemed as conflict not war, the
Australian nation reveres and remembers the ill-fated campaign of Gallipoli. At 4.28am on 25
April 2015, a life-size bronze statue of Lieutenant Duncan Chapman was due to be unveiled in
Queens Park, Maryborough, in Queensland when one hundred years ago to the minute it is
thought that Chapman was the first Anzac to set foot on the beach at Gallipoli. Stones and sand
from Gallipoli have been incorporated into this memorial. (Monument Australia 2015).
Ethnocentric history-making perpetuates biased national imaginings as Behrendt argues, “[A]
distorted history creates a distorted national image and romanticising history to promote a
fictitious national image helps no one” (2003: 75).
Nationalism and the Printed Word
When nationalism and literature combined, an inseparable partnership was formed that
“created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology
set the stage for the modern nation” (Anderson 1991: 46). The rise of the modern nation was
accompanied by the emergence of the novel as a popular genre. Nations were represented in
particular ways according primarily to those whose works were published. Australian colonial
literary output became organised around a set of white masculinist principles that both
constructed and validated the nation through ideologies of colonial struggle, geographical
location, and male work and leisure practices. White colonial women were represented in early
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literature as adjuncts to a burgeoning white male national culture. The novel joined the
newspaper as the major vehicle of the national print media and as a result, language was
standardised and literacy flourished. People were now able to imagine themselves part of a
special community, “[R]ead in isolation, the novel was nevertheless a mass ceremony; one
could read alone with the conviction that millions of others were doing the same, at the same
time” (Brennan 1990: 52). In Australia House, London, Bernd Lohse reports,
[Y]ou feel you can see the fingers of the exiled Australians tremble as they unfold the
Sydney Morning Herald or the Melbourne Argus… Like folded flags the front pages
are clasped to their bosoms and the scrawny, tanned Queenslanders, the easy-going
Western Australians, the correct “British” citizens of Melbourne, and the more lively
cosmopolitans from Sydney are as one (1959: 2).

Since the early nineteenth century the Australian print media have employed language
and images to reproduce dominant ideologies and to categorise Aboriginal people, these
representations have been reinforced over time to become entrenched in the Australian psyche.
Charles ‘Chicka’ Dixon argues the media encourages the stereotyping of Aboriginal peoples,
“they zoom in on the negative side whenever they put up Aboriginal stories … They never
show the positive side you notice?” (qtd. in Plater 1994: 124). Amy McQuire (2014) also draws
attention to the historic role of the Australian media in reducing Aboriginal people to the types
of stereotyping which would be unacceptable in other countries, including post-apartheid South
Africa. McLachlan argues that the press is “the single most powerful engine of nationalism”
(1989: 300). Billig contends that “the deixis of homeland is embedded in the very fabric of the
newspapers” (2013: 94). Shyamla Eswaran (2014) states that Australian media ownership is
among the most concentrated in the world. She claims that Rupert Murdoch’s News
Corporation is hostile to Aboriginal rights and John Fairfax Holdings, which owns eleven out
of the twelve major Australian newspapers, is ambivalent.
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Nationalism and the Sydney Gazette
Australia’s first newspaper was the Sydney Gazette (1803 – 1842). The paper was
tailored to suit colonial interests and all articles were vetted by the government prior to
publication. The Gazette’s readership comprised of a small elite, Anglican clergy, landholders,
lawyers, and merchants; these were the early power-brokers of Australia who were quickly
able to highlight difference and substantiate their claims of white male prerogative. Aboriginal
people were not afforded a voice. Journalism researchers, Meenakshi Ganjoo and Karla Fritis
note “the paper almost denied their existence except when they resisted forcible colonisation
or became sad by-products of it” (qtd. in Plater 1994: 50). In 1806 there were just three reports
mentioning ‘Aborigines’ [sic], and each focused on conflict and aggressive behaviour. Ganjoo
and Fritis claim, Aboriginal people “were portrayed as “barbarians”, “savages”, “hostile
natives”, “banditti” and “criminals”, a theme that continued until the paper closed down in
1842” (qtd. in Plater 1994: 50). Frankenberg (1997) asserts that the naming of ‘others’ was part
of the self-justification process of colonisation. Stereotypical practices were further bolstered
by race related literature and theories of science which permitted notions of white superiority
to work in conjunction with the production of Australian nationalism.
The Sydney Gazette depicted the white settlers as civilised adventurers, while reports
concerning Aboriginal hostility and resistance served to both warn and justify. On one hand
white settlers needed to be warned about what the ‘Aborigines’ [sic] were capable of, and on
the other, their brutal retaliation was to be justified. Ganjoo and Fritis argue, “[T]he
dispossession, destruction and despair suffered by the Aborigines was either completely
overlooked or trivialised” (qtd. in Plater 1994: 53). Over time as the newspaper industry and
freedom of the press expanded, “[J]ournalism had a new and strident tone, often rude and
vulgar, and not at all respectful of authority” (Miller qtd. in Plater 1994: 57). The Bulletin,
published each week from 1880 – 2008 was Australia’s longest running magazine.
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Nationalism and the Bulletin
The Bulletin was conceived in response to an Australia where the squatterdom,65
bolstered by British sentiment sought to rule New South Wales, where the under-dog had no
influence in government and the shadow of convict shame hung over the community,
“Australia was in the hands of a distinct plutocracy” (Hopkins 1929: 228). An atmosphere of
inferiority presided as the founding editor of the Bulletin, J. F. Archibald ascertains,
[T]here was no health in the public spirit socially and politically; all was a mean
subservience to a spirit of snobbery and dependency … Sydney socially limped in apish
imitation after London ideas, habits, and manners. Politically and industrially it was the
same. And over all brooded in law courts, press, and Parliament the desolating cruelty
inherited from ‘The System.’ Sydney invited revolt from existing conditions, and the
Bulletin was the organ of that revolt (qtd. in Hopkins 1929: 82).

From the outset the Bulletin combined the poet, the artist and the thinker, “[W]hat they
proclaimed from the housetops in a spirit of daring and self-sacrifice became the opinions of
the street and the workshop” (Hopkins 1929: 229). The Bulletin became a “mental necessity to
numbers of people, and its red cover was as familiar in the professional man’s club as in the
shearer’s hut” (Palmer 1968: 115). Embedded and perpetuated via the medium of print, Bulletin
ideals were transmitted through the generations and throughout the land. In fact the Bulletin
was known throughout the English speaking world, and, Dorothy Hopkins (1929) claims, the
magazine reflected the Australian national spirit and Australian characteristics like no other.
The Bulletin was a paper written by its readers, the wheat-grower, the ornithologist, the
bullock-driver; from all over the continent Archibald encouraged men to express themselves.
Out of the Bulletin a style of literature grew which is credited as being the first
imaginative response to life in Australia. Archibald discovered Henry Lawson and Banjo
Patterson. Patterson’s “‘Man from Snowy River’ became a national figure, as definite as if his
features had been struck out from the marble with a chisel” (Palmer 1968: 119). Enid Heddle
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explains, “[T]he Australian character was fixed in print for us by the stories of Henry Lawson
… and the poetry of … Banjo Patterson” (1949: 18-19). The Bulletin was pivotal in
transmitting an Australian identity that linked it to the ‘outback’ and to the ‘bush’. A feature of
the paper was its “Aboriginalities” page. This was the metaphoric ‘campfire’ around which
readers gathered to swap stories and experiences. The tenor of the paper was “tough and
masculine, leaning to the macabre in humour, the sardonic in general treatment of a theme”
(Palmer 1968: 117-118). The Bulletin campaigned against the monopolies of wealth, power
and privilege as it engaged in extreme chauvinism and racism. Marguerite Mahood states that
the positioning of others as ‘cheap European paupers’, ‘chows’, and ‘Oriental niggers,’
was the dark underside of the Bulletin as it was of the Australian character and the
period. It echoed the careless talk of the contemporary man in the street whose
experiences were invited as contributions, to be transformed by editorial skill into vivid
paragraphs (1973: 179).

As a method to capture and reproduce public opinion this invitation, “to capture the careless
talk of the contemporary man” allowed negative stereotyping based on race and gender to
flourish. The Bulletin set about, “creating the image of what it believed was the essence of
Australianness and denigrated everything and everyone that did not sit within its nationalistic
image” (Sager 2014: 13).
As noted, white Australians could not lay claim to antiquity, tradition or revolution.
They were part of “a society that lacked history, other than the original purpose of harbouring
a lawless rabble of humanity expelled from their homeland” (Sager 2014: 13). For generations
of Australians, born from convict stock, survival became a primary and unifying signifier of
identity, “[T]he rugged, resourceful men who had tamed the wild interior were offered as
examples that described what it was to be Australian” (Sager 2014: 13). Triumph over adversity
was an agenda which the governments fostered; they needed the land to be tamed, cultivated
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and populated. It was through the romanticisation of the ‘outback’ that new settlers were
tempted to buy land, and thus much needed funds flowed into the treasury.
The writers of the Bulletin shaped the nation with their ideas and opinions, yet it was
the artists who, “set the whole continent laughing” (Palmer 1968: 116). Livingston Hopkins,
or Hop as he was known, came from America and joined the Bulletin in 1883. Hop became the
most famous and popular comic artist. He produced over 19,000 works in a career spanning
thirty years. Mahood (1973) states that political cartoons provide information which relate to
the thinking of the day and they offer historical evidence that documents human reactions to
daily events. Dorothy Hopkins, Hop’s daughter, asserts “[G]ood cartoons may be regarded as
the milestones on the road of national events. Historically they are instructive …” (1929: 103).
Hopkins also claims that Hop helped to ‘create’ history and “will be remembered by thinkers
and scholars as much as by the cockies and the shearing-shed hands” (1929: 239).
The early years of the Bulletin were turbulent, “[W]ith the birth of a national spirit all
sorts of problems asserted themselves” (Hopkins 1929: 104). Hage claims that Australia was
“peculiarly … timid for a nation about to ‘gain’ its independence” (2003: 52). The reasons for
this are varied. New South Wales developed an aversion to its convict past and a growing
resentment developed towards the Imperial Government. The super-aristocratic airs assumed
by some of the early governors were galling and contempt for all things Australian by the
Briton ‘at home’ was a further humiliation. Location was also a factor. The new Australian
nation was a British colony set in the Asia-Pacific. Not only was it was geographically distant
from Britain but it also envisaged a very real threat of an ‘Asian invasion’. These insecurities,
Hage argues, are reflected in the White Australia Policy which sought to protect and privilege
white identity. Following Hobsbawm, the modern Australian nation is an example of a nation
that relied “for its self-definition … on its enemies, external and internal” (2005b: 279 emphasis
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in the original). Hopkins claims that during these times, Hop’s cartoons were brilliant even
though he sought not to differentiate
between the admission of Chinese and Kanakas as indentured labour. Out of this
turmoil grew a definite White Australia policy, and no editor would now dare to suggest
the opening of any part of this island continent to dark races even under the most
restrictive conditions (1929: 104).

White Australian nationalism “encoded many meanings, and worked as a unifying ideology
for otherwise disparate and conflicting interests” (Moran 2005: 171). The Bulletin worked in a
similar way. It united a diverse masculine population, all the while promoting its patriarchal
ideology via its masthead, which from 1908 to 1961 shouted: “Australia for the White Man”.
The White Australia Policy, introduced in 1901, was accompanied by the first public
display of the new ‘national’ flag. These two introductions to nationalist discourse would shape
the way Australia projected itself as a nation throughout the twentieth century. Despite the
Bulletin’s masculinist orientation and its overt support of nationalism, its nationalist leanings
were of a particular type more oriented towards a republic. The Bulletin saw the new flag as an
ill-equipped symbol, an emblem of infantilism that failed to show autonomy,
the future emblem of the Commonwealth is vulgar and ill-fitting, – a staled re´chauffe´
of the British flag, with no artistic virtue, no national significance … Australia is still
Britain’s little boy. What more natural than that he should accept his father’s cut-down
garments, – lacking the power to protest, and only dimly realising his will. That bastard
flag is a true symbol of the bastard state of Australian opinion, still in large part biassed
by British tradition, British customs … (Bulletin 28 September 1901 qtd. in Crowley
1973: 19).
The new flag, the Bulletin, states is indicative of a nationalism which clings to Britain in order
to define itself. It is a nationalism of subservience, and it held little meaning to the republicans
who imagined a truly independent Australian nation. This debate is a continuing source of
frustration, “Australia can never define itself on its own terms while it defers to an inherited
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monarchy of a nation locked in our past and dictating our future” (Sydney Morning Herald 2
January 2016: 2). The Bulletin also identifies the Australian public as being apathetic,
[P]robably seven in ten of Australians or British-Australians are conscious of no
offence in the monstrosity that has been foisted upon them for a symbol… they cannot
see for themselves … The flag represents the old generation, the old leaven (Bulletin
28 September 1901 qtd. in Crowley 1973: 19).
The Bulletin forecasts that new generations will bring with them a “new spirit” to politics, art
and literature and, “[W]ith the New Leaders will come a New Flag” (qtd. in Crowley 1973:
19). The “New flag” remains a long-held aspiration.
Nationalism and Colonial Literature
Despite the Bulletin’s vision for the following generations to be charged with a “new
spirit”, Australia continued to be dominated by its ties to Britain which resulted in “a curious
sense of inferiority” compounded by the fact that, “little Australian writing was thought worth
publishing without the promise of sales in England” (Pike 1970: 227). Douglas Pike states the
pioneer writers of Australian literature told a simple story. They detailed the various qualities
of the early Governors and glorified the ‘superhuman’ explorers. They wrote about the
squatters, the land and the gold rush. This was a national story which “omits more than it tells”
(Pike 1970: 224; see also Heddle 1949). This was a ‘his’ story, which Pilger argues was devoid
of “blacks, women and other complicating factors” (1990: 31). As Foucault observes, the
writing of history, “is one way in which a society recognizes and develops a mass of
documentation with which it is inextricably linked” (1997: 7). Similarly, what is omitted – the
“complicating factors” – contribute in their silence to the oeuvre of ‘knowledge’ that constitutes
a nation’s history.
In response to a 1931 London exhibition of Australian books, the Times Literary
Supplement notes that A.W. Jose calls for Australian literature to be “to the great stream of
English literature a new in-running river, not what Australians call an ana-branch, a river that
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has diverged higher up and merely rejoins the parent” (qtd. in Miller 1940: 13). Morris Miller,
Vice-Chancellor of the University of Tasmania responds,
we cannot dispossess ourselves of our literary heritage. We speak the English tongue
and write in the English language. Again, we remain in a British Commonwealth; we
may claim sovereignty, but are not an imperium. And although we aspire to a measure
of independence as a nation, we do so as a unit within a larger whole under the allpervading Crown. Literature is susceptible to political influences, and is not wholly
separable from the tradition of race … we are not in the position to set up an
independent household (1940:14 emphasis in the original).

Miller’s reply draws attention to the overarching reach of British influence and notes its
corresponding effect on the development of Australian literature. He suggests that Australian
writers who live far from the old and cloistered British world must, “strike out for themselves,
to battle for positions which are usually of their own making, to knock about in all kinds of
jobs, to make a living as they go” (1940: 16). In recognising the fighting spirit of Australian
writers, Miller urges them not to lose sight of where they come from,
[H]owever strongly we may assert nationalism, whether in literature or politics, – and
we must present a united front to the world as Australians, – yet nationalism is not
inconsistent with pride of locality, be it city, country, or State, within the
Commonwealth (1940: 6).

Miller makes two important points: first, he highlights the interconnectedness of politics,
literature and the creation of nationalism. Second, he articulates the need for a form of
nationalism which presents a “united Australia” to the world, yet harnesses regional
individualities. In other words, Australian nationalism is a diverse concept which can be
fostered through literary prowess and drawn from a range of sources. From the bush to the
beach, from the country to the cities, the Australian nation was being forged by ‘battling’
Australian writers. Perhaps the most significant of these was Henry Lawson, and although he
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died in poverty in 1922, he was (and remains) recognised as a national symbol and received a
state funeral.
Henry Lawson
Henry Lawson was born into abject poverty on the goldfields of central west NSW in
1867. Lawson’s mother, Louisa Lawson, was, “[C]onsumed with bitterness at the degradation
and harshness of the bush” she left Lawson’s father in 1883 to “eke out a life as a seamstress”
(Luck 1992: 127). Louisa Lawson became an influential leader of the women’s movement and
publisher of Dawn, Australia’s first successful women’s magazine. Lawson was shaped by his
mother who encouraged a love of literature, and influenced him with her progressive and
republican ideals. Lawson’s first poems, including ‘Song of the Republic’, were published in
the Bulletin in 1887 where his struggles were highlighted: Lawson has “an imperfect education
and is earning his living under some difficulties as a housepainter, a youth whose poetic genius
here speaks eloquently for itself” (Barnard 2000: 93). In 1888 Lawson’s first short story, ‘My
Father’s Mate’ was published in the Bulletin. Lawson was saluted as a “talented bush balladeer”
whose work “is full of humour and compassion” (Barnard 2000: 97). The 1890s was a time of
political unrest, economic recession, and strikes. In 1892, Archibald sent Lawson into the
‘bush’ where he spent 9 months ‘tramping’. The memories and experiences of this time would
sustain Lawson for the rest of his career. Meanwhile, a writer who called himself ‘The Banjo’,
was also capturing the public imagination.
Banjo Paterson
Andrew Paterson was the son of a station owner from Orange, New South Wales. He
was born in 1864 and as a child encountered many characters of the bush: bullockies, drovers,
bush horsemen and rouseabouts. He was also an accomplished equestrian (Semmler in Paterson
1986). When he was eleven, Paterson was sent to a Sydney private school where he excelled
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in both sport and study. Paterson became a solicitor in 1886. When the Bulletin made its debut
in 1880, it renounced “the genteel and patronising English-ism that had reigned in Australian
literary circles. It stood firmly against Imperialism in an era when the British Empire was
reaching its zenith” (Paterson & Baglin 1988: 22). Archibald was tenacious in his quest to
publish Australian writers. From 1885, and under the pseudonym ‘The Banjo’, 66 Paterson
began to make regular contributions. In 1889, and to great acclaim, the Bulletin published
‘Clancy of the Overflow’. Paterson’s identity however, was not revealed until 1895 when
Angus and Robinson published The Man From Snowy River and Other Verses. This body of
work was described by the London Literary Yearbook as, “without parallel in colonial literary
annals”, and gave Paterson a public audience greater than any other living writer, apart from
Rudyard Kipling (Magoffin 1987: 20). Paterson was an overnight sensation, “[I]t was a nineday wonder in the colony that this tall, quiet and handsome young solicitor, already well known
in Sydney’s social and sporting circles, was “The Banjo”” (Semmler in Paterson 1986: 5).
Nationalism and the Bulletin Debate
Despite their differing circumstances and views, Lawson and Paterson were to form a
partnership which pitted their literary prowess, rivalry and humour against the other. Theirs
was “a happy conspiracy between the two to inveigle a few extra pounds from Mr Archibald
of the Bulletin” (Magoffin 1987: 22). In 1892 Lawson suggested that they competed against
each other. The ensuing literary ‘feud’, known as the Bulletin Debate, captivated the nation.67
As a result, the bards firmly established the bush, into the national psyche. For Lawson the
bush was unending struggle and loneliness. For Paterson, the bush was a place to be revered,
where the men were brave and physical. The Bulletin Debate was real-life-Australian-legend-
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making literature, to which the Australian public was party, it was a battle that went on for
some time, as Paterson explains,
… so we slam-banged away at each other for weeks and weeks, not until they stopped
us, but until we ran out of material. I think that Lawson put his case better than I did,
but I had the better case, so that honours (or dishonours) were fairly equal (qtd. in
Magoffin 1987: 23-24).

Lawson labelled Paterson a ‘City Bushman’ and Paterson called Lawson ‘a poet of the tomb’.
The two were in fact friends, and Paterson acted as Lawson’s solicitor in his financial
negotiations with Archibald (Magoffin 1987). Paterson died in 1941. His 1894 ballad
‘Waltzing Matilda’ is known throughout Australia and many parts of the world reifying
Richard Magoffin’s claim that Paterson’s legacy “will live forever because many of his lines
are as fresh today as they were when they came from his pen” (1987: 25).
It was around this time that Miller was claiming that the mythologies and romance of
the old-world were insufficient sources of literary inspiration for Australians and he argues,
[T]he beginnings of human enterprise in this new land of the south are wrought into our poetry
and prose” in a variety of ways which demonstrate, “the novelty and spontaneity of life as lived
far away from the routine and set of the old world” (1940: 15-16). The Bulletin Debate supports
Miller’s claim; it was both spontaneous and novel, an event which stood in sharp contrast to
the constricting standards of British literature. This was the brilliance of the Bulletin, in many
ways a ground-breaking and empowering journal that managed to thrive in a climate that was
dictated to by Britain. That being said, Miller contends that Australia remains unable to create
its own national philosophy due to the nature of its acquiescent relationship with Britain. He
states his aspirations,
just as we have advanced beyond political subservience and entered upon an era of cooperative independence, our literature will consolidate itself on similar lines, and it will
certainly grow in strength corresponding with our standing as a nation (1940: 15).
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Thirty years later and Pike notes how Australia remains confined by British norms, “some
British training is considered essential for Australian scholars and leaders, while each visiting
Englishman is assumed to have more knowledge than local experts” (1970: 226). Despite the
Bulletin’s role in shaping Australian nationalism, and Miller’s aspirations for Australia to have
autonomy, the process of extrication has been convoluted by the trend of adhering to British
interests. And, in spite of the Bulletin’s vitriol, the British flag remained central to white
Australia, evidenced by the fact that until 1977 Australian citizens were being reassured by the
government that they could still fly the British national flag if they chose (Kwan 2006). The
British component of the Australian national flag remains both prominent and honoured. I will
elaborate on this in the following chapter.
Conclusion
This chapter extends some of the ways that the Australian nation has been, and
continues to be maintained and reproduced. Australian nationalism and its associated traditions
have been constructed and endorsed to maintain colonial power which marks and re-imagines
the landscape as a white possession. From the rhetoric of public figures to history making, from
place names to monuments, the nation abounds with narratives, cultural artefacts and practices
which typically present themselves as innocuous signifiers of ‘Australia’. The banal acceptance
of what Australia ‘is’ has also been heightened through the embedding of everyday nationalism
into official histories by political and literary agents, most notably the Bulletin. This chapter
has shown that in modern Australia, ‘nation’, ‘whiteness’ and ‘nationalism’ form an intricate
web of relations that continue to reproduce the nation through a vast array of signifiers, the
most strident of these is the nation’s flag. Through the materiality of the national flag the
signifiers of nation amalgamate and disperse with uncanny ease.
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CHAPTER FIVE: High Flying Mirrors – Low Lying Heralds
Soldiers in real battles and sportspeople in fake ones utilize the flag as the symbol of their unity
and purpose. When they are spiritually wrapped in the flag, engendering a modern mystery of
transubstantiation, its threads become the nation.
(Bosworth 2007: 26).

Introduction
For many Australians, the flag is a spiritual appendage. Through this national signifier,
highly charged emotions condense and cohere as the flag transforms to become a sacred
symbol: the embodiment of nation. The focus of this chapter is to engage with various aspects
of vexillology in order to develop a deeper understanding of flags and their pedagogical
influence. I begin with an investigation into the history of flags. I then explore some of the
myths, confusions and conflicts that surround the Australian national flag and its associated
family, all of which fly in a hierarchy under the shadow of the British monarchy. I note that
Australia remains ‘haunted’ by a ‘three flag crisis’, and I broaden the investigation with some
international perspectives. This chapter also draws attention to some modern day applications
of the Australian national flag which indicate that this symbol is invested multifariously with
hegemonic understandings of Australian nationalism. Finally I investigate the need for a more
thorough understanding about how flags have the capability to transmit messages of trauma,
racial discrimination and oppression.
The History of Flags: An Overview
For several centuries flags have held significance as symbols of political and emotional
power. Smith claims that flags enable individuals “to express one’s own views to others in a
concise but dramatic form. In a word the flag is a powerful instrument for social participation
and communication” (1975: 36). The people of China, who first made cloth from silk, are
credited with being the first to make and utilise flags. The oldest iconographic information
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relating to the shapes and purposes of flags in China is dated circa 1500 BC, however the
literature indicates that the mythological Yellow Emperor, who lived over a thousand years
earlier, had utilised a flag. Chinese society was ordered through a wide variety of these devices.
Flags were used by the emperor, nobility, imperial armies, and regional governors. They were
laterally attached to bamboo poles and adorned with numerous narrow ribbons on the outer
edge to signify status: flags of the Emperor were adorned with twelve ribbons. The number of
ribbons decreased according to rank (Znamierowski 1999).
In Europe, at the end of the fifth century, Greek writers mention a purple flag68 which
was used to identify the admiral’s ship in the Athenian navy. Alfred Znamierowski (1999)
notes that the National Museum in Naples houses the oldest known European illustrations of
flags which depict a Persian standard dating from 330BC. The Persian standard features a piece
of cloth which hangs from a crossbar and is fastened on the underside of a lance. The cloth is
fastened in this way to ensure that it looks draped at all times. As a mode of identification, the
standard was also used by the Romans and named vexillum (Smith 1975; Crampton 1989a;
Znamierowski 1999). The word “vexillum” has its roots in the Latin vehere: to carry; thus the
flag was always intended to be held aloft, raised, carried as a banner to be seen by others as a
marker of identification. The vexillum, or cavalry flag, was the only cloth flag carried by the
Romans. Throughout the Roman Empire vexilloids (objects which function as a flag, but differ
in appearance, for example, a staff with an emblematic animal), became “portable deities”
which “formed a link to the divinity of the emperor and the sacred devotions performed in his
name” (Smith 1975: 37). The vexilloids of Rome were sophisticated, ornate and highly revered.
In 104 BC, Consul Gaius Marius deemed that the eagle become the sole standard of the Roman
legions (Smith 1975). Symbolically, as the eagle ruled the skies, so the Romans ruled the earth
(Maitland 2015). Vexilloids and vexillum developed and fostered deep and tangible feelings
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of belonging, loyalty and duty. The presence of, and popular attachment to symbols such as the
Roman vexilloids and vexillum was also found in many other parts of the world.
During the Crusades (1095-1291), mediaeval European helmets were designed to cover
the whole face as a means of protection. With faces concealed it became necessary to establish
a method of identification. Gordon Maitland (2015) notes that initially marks were painted on
riders’ shields and crests adorned the tops of their helmets. Garments (surcoats) were later worn
over the armour which displayed a symbol of identity and became known as “coats of arms”.
From this a strict code of rules evolved and as a result, the use of symbols became a highly
regulated practice known as “heraldry”. The word heraldry is derived from the associated
duties a herald had to perform for his lord and this included being skilled in all aspects of
armoury,
[H]eraldry was the name given to laws governing the display, meaning and knowledge
of the signs and emblems used to decorate the shield, helmet and banner, for purpose
of identification in peacetime, at a tournament, on ceremonial occasions or in battle
(Puttock 1988: 2).

Heraldry was a powerful form of identification. Richard II (1377-99) ordered that the Cross of
St George was to be worn both front and back on the clothing and armour of all his soldiers,
“all who were found without this cross were liable to be killed by any of his men” (Maitland
2015: 26). Smith (1975) explains that with the development of heraldry, large numbers of
people were coerced into allegiance. It is evident, therefore, that for many centuries symbols
have been used not only as a method of identification, but also as a means of coercion.
The incorporation of symbols onto clothing is an age-old practice. In the National
Library of Scotland, manuscripts dated 1293 and 1306 depict two kings of Scotland, John
Balliol and Robert Bruce, holding lion standards. Standing alongside each respective king is
his wife whose dress is an intricate and striking creation, beautifully embroidered with coats of
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arms (Hallam 2002). This ancient form of symbolism was sacrosanct. For example, to insult a
shield was to insult its owner; to hang a coat of arms upside down was an affront comparable
to modern day flag burning (Hallam 2002). Heraldry was an effective form of identification
and by the middle of the fourteenth century the practice had moved beyond that of shields and
coats-of-arms. Manuscripts, castles, churches and tombs were littered with heraldic insignia.
Heraldry had considerable impact on flags and personal flags proliferated as identifiers of
kinship, origins, rank and place. Of the many symbolic applications of heraldry, it was the flag
which transcended them all. Not only was the flag a means of promoting and reinforcing a
social hierarchy, it was also a symbol of honour and triumph, and as Smith notes, “was
recognized as the formal means of transferring title to land or to some privilege” (1975: 44).
Following the Crusades, the nobility formally transformed their coats of arms into a
hierarchical system of inherited and elite privilege. During the sixteenth century, numerous
flags were developed for use on land and sea and while heraldic trends were waning, the
influence of heraldry on modern day flag design and usage lingers. Smith notes the principles
found in the earliest heraldic arms form the core of effective flag design, “flags are generally
more effective when they are simple, employ distinctive designs and colors, remain relatively
fixed over time, and are unlike other flags in design” (1975: 45). These fundamental elements
of flag design are at odds with the Australian flag (and its derivatives), which carries the flag
of another country and whose design, as discussed in the previous chapter, generated
consternation and debate from the outset.
Heraldic flags distinguished friends from enemies and spoke of allegiance and place.
By contrast, national flags “signify the metaphoric kin group of the nation rather than other
groups” (Eriksen 2007: 3). Smith asserts, “[F]ar and away the most significant innovation of
the eighteenth century was the national flag” (1975: 52). It evolved out of political struggle and
notions of democracy and egalitarianism. The acquisition of a national flag was a gradual
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process which was influenced by the Dutch revolutionary Prinsenvlag69 and the midseventeenth civil wars in England (Smith 1975). The Dutch flag was the first modern flag to
abandon heraldic devices in favour of simple stripes, a format replicated in the flags created
after the revolutions in America and France. Znamierowski notes that “with the abolition of
monarchy, the heraldic system of identification was also rejected. The colours and designs
acquired symbolic meanings and flags began to carry ideological and political messages”
(1999: 18). Gabriella Elgenius states that European national flags are “intimately linked to the
formation of nations and states” and are “used to legitimise sovereignty and to illustrate
distinctiveness” (2007: 26). These flags reflect their origins and are symbols of revolution,
independence, state-reconstitution or warfare. The flag of England for example is a symbol of
warfare, and the Union Jack, which represents the United Kingdom, is a signifier of statereconstitution. Elgenius notes that European national flags “continue to reflect the political
realities of nations and are introduced and promulgated during, or after, significant national
events” (2007: 27). Ultimately she claims “national flags constitute ‘national narratives’”
(2007: 28). National flags are thus notorious carriers of belief systems, political ideologies and
national symbolism, and their uses and applications are widely studied in the field of
vexillology.
Vexillology
Vexillology is the “scientific study of the history, symbolism, and usage of flags”
(Smith 1975: 30). The term ‘vexillology’ is derived from the Latin word ‘vexillum’ meaning
flag, and the suffix ‘-ology’, meaning the study of a particular field of knowledge. Whitney
Smith coined the term ‘vexillology’ in 1957 (Guenter 2013). Don Carleton, Director of the
Texas University Briscoe Center for American History, states that Smith, “can rightfully claim
The derivation of the Prince’s Flag, or Prinsenvlag comes from the livery colours associated with Prince
William of Orange who led the struggle for independence from Spain in the 16 th century. Followers adopted his
colours of orange, white and blue for their flag. Around 1630, the orange band of the tricolour was replaced with
a red stripe. The Dutch tricolour, of red, white and blue has gone on to inspire many other flags (Crampton 1989a).
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120

to have founded a field of study, and shepherded it through to maturity as a community of
scholars, publications and enthusiasts” (Briscoe Center 2014: 52). The purpose of vexillology
was to move away from the traditional flag taxonomies, origins and histories, and to engage
with the social sciences in order to “understand more accurately and more completely the
nature of human society” (Smith qtd. in Guenter 2013). The Flag Bulletin has been published
since 1961 and in 1962 Smith and Gerhard Grahl co-founded the Flag Research Center in
Massachusetts, USA, which was the first professional vexillological institute in the world. The
first International Congress of Vexillology (ICV) was held in 1965. This biennial event has
been staged around the world ever since. In 2015 the 26th congress (ICV26) was held in Sydney.
Hosted by Flags Australia delegates from 25 different countries attended. In 2013, the Flag
Research Center Collection, known as the Smith Collection “took a crew of twelve people four
days to pack into two 53-foot trailers” (Briscoe Center 2014: 51). The Smith Collection was
transferred to the Briscoe Center for American History at the University of Texas where it will
become available for academic research.
Vexillology is an emerging discipline with an interdisciplinary focus. Flag research
seeks to integrate and expand on other research done in various fields such as history,
sociology, psychology, anthropology and political science (Guenter 2013). Smith states that
for “the general public the significance of a [flag] design is … in the affirmation it makes about
the propriety of the dominant ethos” (1975: 42). Smith encourages scholars to go beyond the
superficial understandings of flags and examine their multiplicity of meanings and uses as well
as their emotional and practical significations. Vexillology as a scholarly method facilitates a
way of understanding the symbolic components and applications of national flags. It seeks to
draw attention to the practical engagement with flags and their use as both private and public
symbols of belonging and exclusion.
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Smith argues that one of the tenets of vexillology is that “symbolic truth generally takes
precedence over historical reality” (1975: 42). In Australia the Anglo-centric histories and
dominant discourses of nation have been underpinned by a national flag which mirrors the
British-Australian story as it deflects the Indigenous-Australian narrative of sovereign
dispossession. Smith adds, “[P]opular traditions of flag symbolism are not arbitrary; they are
promoted and reinforced (if not actually invented) by governments, their rulers finding
advantage in one interpretation over another” (1975 42). Smith draws on Rousseau’s claim
that, “[T]he strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms
strength into right, and obedience into duty” (1975: 42). He states that “right” and “duty” have
been endorsed via three key sources of authority: “tradition”, “religion” and “ideology”. It is
in these realms that flags have been employed and manipulated to “justify the division of
society into groups whose power decreases proportionately to the number of the individuals in
the group” (Smith 1975: 43).
For many people flags are seemingly unimportant forms of patriotic decoration and
“[T]o display a flag is to participate in a group or a philosophy that spans time and distances”
(Smith 1975: 36). However, as Smith affirms, flags “constitute factors affecting that world [the
world of real events] directly as they manipulate and are manipulated by groups of people”
(36). From the swastika flag of Nazi Germany, to the black flag of Daesh,70 from national flags
to sporting emblems, flags are manipulated by groups of people to suit their interests which,
following Smith, “express the unity and identity of one group as against all others” and are a
way “of asserting the bonds which link people despite differences in their wealth, social
standing, power or age” (1975: 37). Smith’s work on vexillology brings into view the use of
flags as shields of nation, specifically as the concept of nation is theorised by many of the
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In the eighth century, members of the Arab world used triangular flags that were plain black or white. Over
time they increased the range of colours and the flags carried religious inscriptions and geometric ornaments as
there was a religious injunction against representational art (Znamierowski 1999).
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writers discussed in Chapter Three. Vexillology brings the flag into view not simply as a
symbol but a material artefact of national consciousness.
Vexillology is a platform from which to garner a better understanding of the social
processes relating to the enculturation of national belonging, inclusion and identity.
Vexillology enables us,
to push further and deeper with inquiry into usage, into not only what flags look like,
but how and why they affect people the way they do. Ultimately, vexillology should
tell us not only about flags but about people – about the social groups that use them or
have used them in the past (Guenter 2011: 3).

In the context of the construction of the Australian nation, vexillology brings to light ways of
‘knowing’ the flag which might not have been previously considered. To exemplify, I return
to the work of Carol Foley. At the launch of her 1996 book, The Australian Flag: Colonial
Relic or Contemporary Icon? Foley claims an effective and successful national flag should
demonstrate
the three “I”s: Identity; ideals; and information. It should give an indication of our
heritage, our cultural background, our religion, and perhaps even our location in the
world. In short, our flag has to represent us as a nation. To do this, it has to focus on
our significant similarities as a people, rather than on our insignificant differences. For
example: I am of Irish descent; others of us may be of Malaysian descent, or Greek
descent, or Aboriginal descent, and so on. Whatever our descent, these are all
insignificant differences when we look at our nation as a whole (1996b: 105 emphasis
in the original).

Foley’s thinking harks to the discourse of assimilation, where “insignificant differences” such
as culture, law / lore, traditions, languages and knowledge systems must be dispersed to
maintain ideals of whiteness. Her standpoint reflects the notion that Aboriginal experiences can
be seamlessly collapsed into the corpus of nation for the purpose of extolling the appearance
of national unity. This is a common strategy in nation-building, as Gillian Cowlishaw
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comments, “[R]acism can flourish as a hidden discourse because it is hidden behind the
assertion of equality which assumes similarity” (1997: 178). Contrary to Foley’s view, I would
argue that cultural and racial differences are far from “insignificant”, and in fact difference is
a necessary component for establishing a national identity which stands apart from ‘others’ and
thus makes the illusion of a singular, cohesive identity possible.
Foley claims,
[O]ur flag should represent us all as Australians, not only as we were at the time our current
flag was designed in 1901, but now. Consequently, our flag must not only be internally
representative, it must also be of contemporary relevance (1996b: 105).

This is a broad and nebulous claim that invokes a unifying ‘call to arms’ as it were that refutes
scrutiny or investigation. Such claims function according to overarching statements such as
that made in the previous quote: “[W]hatever our descent”. In other words, once difference is
collapsed, unifying interpellation is made possible. Foley puts forward three arguments which
state the case for the removal of the Union Jack:
1. The Union Jack undermines Australian national identity as it reduces the nation “to the
level of a colonial cipher”.
2. The Union Jack is only representative of the Anglo-Celtic population.
3. “For Aborigines, the Union Jack is the “butcher’s apron” and represents the spilled
blood of the Aboriginal people, the European invasion of Australia and their subsequent
dispossession” (1996b: 106).
Despite these claims, Foley states that her main issue with the Union Jack is that it compromises
her identity as an Australian, “[T]here is, unfortunately, no doubt that our present flag wrongly
suggests to many people that we are British. This is undesirable” (1996b: 108). Given this is
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one of few texts written about the Australian flag which makes reference to Indigenous
perspectives, I take liberty to quote extensively here,
[I]t is an immutable historical fact that Australia was colonised by Great Britain. Not
by Holland, not by France, not by Japan, but by Great Britain.
Our whole present way of life is based on the British ethic. But I am not here to uphold
colonialism. My point is that our British beginnings put into place a legal system, a
judicial system, an education system and a democratic way of life that still
fundamentally represents who we are today, irrespective of our early colonial
relationship with Great Britain; and, irrespective of our genealogical descent.
Our democratic way of life, which we owe to Great Britain, is the reason why refugees
and immigrants come to Australia. It is the reason why the Aboriginal people are able
to articulate their grievances and have some chance of redress in cases such as Mabo.
In short, our democratic way of life is one of the very significant similarities that we all
have in common as Australians. It is a way of life that we were, and are, willing to fight
and die for. The Union Jack also stands for that. So am I changing your minds? Or, do
you still want to rip it off? (Foley 1996b: 107-108).

Foley’s use of Aboriginal people to support an argument for a fair judicial system is
extraordinary and her reference to Aboriginal “grievances” having “some chance of redress”
under white Australian law are clearly at odds with reality. Successive governments have failed
to act, or indeed engage with Aboriginal “grievances”.71 Foley’s claim also assumes that pre-

Dodson claims that for most Aboriginal people, Australia’s judicial system is a “feared and despised processing
plant” that propels the most vulnerable and disadvantaged towards a “broken, bleak future” (qtd. in Gordon 2016:
8). Twenty-five years after Australia’s Royal Commission into black deaths in custody Indigenous children as
young as 10 and 11 are being held in detention and are 24 times more likely to be incarcerated than non-Indigenous
children (Power 2016). Furthermore the continuing health disparities experienced by many Indigenous peoples
goes beyond medical causes, Pascoe & AIATSIS (2012) state that education, employment, income and socioeconomic status are all factors which affect the health and well-being of Indigenous people. In other words it is
the legacies of colonisation, dispossession and the continued racist political agendas which keep health disparities
alive. Sol Bellear, Chairman of the Aboriginal Medical Service, Redfern notes that in the United States and Canada
dozens of treaties have been signed, First Nations communities are afforded “varying degrees of genuine selfdetermination, from controlling their own schooling to giving them a real capacity to generate an economic base
… [I]n New Zealand, Maori have seven seats which sit over the entire nation, in which only Maori can vote”
(2013: 18-19). What these nations do not have, Bellear states is “trachoma, a third world disease that has been
eradicated in most nations. They don’t have the world’s highest recorded rates of rheumatic heart disease, another
third world condition linked to overcrowded housing. They don’t have jailing rates of Indigenous people up to
eight times greater than the jailing rates of black males in Apartheid South Africa. They don’t have world beating
rates of suicide and self-harm. They don’t have life expectancy gaps between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
populations in the double digits. And they don’t have third world infant mortality rates” (Bellear 2013: 19).
71
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colonial Australia was ‘undemocratic’. Texts such as this are made possible because terms like
“irrespective”, “democratic way of life” and indeed the overarching signifier “Australians” are
contextually deployed to provide the illusion of coherence and to refute tendencies towards
scrutiny. In considering Foley’s arguments, I am drawn again to a point I made previously
about the extent of trauma effected by the privileging discourse of whiteness, where things are
simply stated as if fact and where the lived realities for those ‘outside’ of the mantra of
sameness is simply absented from view. As Jackie Huggins notes,
[T]here is no engagement, there is no respect and I agree with Patrick [Dodson] and
Noel [Pearson] that we are in deep crisis. Sometimes I don’t feel part of this society
because it breaks my heart to see the conditions my people are continually left in
without any leadership from the top (qtd. in Gordon and Hunter 2016: 11).

Iver Neumann claims that a flag “may mean different things to different people in different
contexts, but it still carries with it the basic function it had on the battlefield, namely separating
‘us’ from ‘them’” (2007: 174). The Union Jack is a symbol of the battlefield, both physically
and metaphorically. The Union Jack heralds battles and wars and has been neatly transposed
onto Australia’s national insignia, representing yet another British conquest where the Frontier
Wars and the continuity of colonial violence to the present day are subsumed by its prominence.
The Union Jack
Analysis of the Australian national flag needs to be juxtaposed with the British flag
given the Union Jack is a symbol upon which the construction of the Australian nation remains
heavily dependent. The Union Jack was centuries in the making and behind every stage “were
primitive superstitions, the perceived need for saintly blessings, and the consequent adoption
of patron saints” (Maitland 2015: 209). St George was an officer in the Roman Army. He
rejected the gods, healed the sick and converted to Christianity. As a result he was tortured to
death and on 23 April 290 he died a martyr. The cult of St George spread throughout Europe,
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where he “has long been regarded as one of the greatest of warrior saints” (Campbell & Evans
1974: 13). During the crusades, St George was the patron saint of Aragon, Portugal, and
England. Every English soldier wore the badge of St George in the fourteenth century. Their
war-cry was that of “St. George!” and the flag of St George was the “flag of battle” on both
land and sea (Gordon 1915: 47-50). Set upon a white background a vertical blood-red cross
represents the crucifixion of St George.
St Andrew also died a martyr. Crucified upside down on a decussate cross, a saltire, he
died on 30 November 70AD. Some centuries later, on the eve of a battle against the Vikings,
Angus, King of the Picts had a dream in which St Andrew appeared. The following morning
“a silver saltire shone in a bright blue sky” (Maitland 2015: 211). As a consequence the Picts
declared St Andrew to be their patron guide. Upon victory the vanquishers adopted the diagonal
white cross on a field of blue as their national banner. This became the flag of Scotland in 843
(Maitland 2015). In recognition of the union between England and Scotland, King James I
called upon his heralds to join together the crosses of St George and St Andrew. The Royal
proclamation of 12 April 1606 resulted in, “the birth certificate of what soon became the bestknown flag in the world” (Znamierowski 1999: 107). This was known as the Union flag which
both Cook and Phillip employed to assert British ownership over vast tracts of the Australian
continent.72
The Union flag was altered in 1801 to incorporate the cross of St Patrick thus marking
the union between Great Britain and Ireland. William Gordon argues, “St. Patrick had no right
to a cross, as he was neither crucified nor martyred”, the rules of “tradition and custom” were

In 1967 “[T]he Council of the City of Sydney erected a flag mast to commemorate the first saluting of the
British flag on 26th January 1788. A plate bears the following words: … This flag mast was erected to
commemorate the location at which the first ceremony of saluting the flag by Captain Arthur Philipp [sic].R.N.
and his company took place to mark the foundation of Australia on 26th January 1788 … The flag which flies is
the former Union Flag without the Irish St Patrick cross” (Lupant 2001 emphasis in the original).
72
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defied, for “he was not even a saint, for he was never canonised, and his sainthood, like his
cross, is due to popular error” (1915: 60). Under the auspices of “popular error”, Gordon draws
attention to the manipulation of both tradition and symbols (see Smith 1975; Renan 1990;
Bhabha 1994; Hobsbawm 2005; White 2005; Bosworth 2007; Billig 2013). Rulers old and new
have promoted, invented and tailored symbols to suit their advantage. Symbols such as flags
enable the powerbrokers to effectively flaunt their dominion, garner public support and, when
combined discursively with historical and “popular error”, the nation is built.
The Union Jack, a flag commensurate with mythology is transubstantiated with
symbolic Christian crosses,
[T]he cross of St. George dominates the cross of St. Andrew, which in turn supplants
the cross of St. Patrick. This design of the Union Jack remains a constant reminder to
the ‘defeated’ nations of the superiority of the English nation (Hocking 2002: 24).

Gordon Campbell and Idrisyn Evans note the difficulties with flags of war carrying crosses,
but they argue that the cross is a Christian emblem of peace and “throughout history peaceloving men have had to fight in self-defence and to protect their ideals from savage enemies
who aimed at destroying them” (1974: 13). The cross was specifically employed, “it was the
Christian emblem. They [the forefathers] aimed at making their flags symbolize the ideals for
which they fought” (Campbell and Evans 1974: 13). The Union Jack symbolises a specific
ideology and is an embalmed marker of Christianity.
Crosses on flags matter. The Australian flag is replete with both saintly and celestial
formations. White Australia’s attachment to the Southern Cross was criticised by Gordon who
argues the constellation, “is a very small one” and “has a curious attractiveness for people south
of the equator, and is rather embarrassing in its popularity from a flag point of view” (1915:
107). Not content with this, Gordon complains, “how freely they [the stars] have to be treated
to get them into the shape of a cross as they appear on the Australian flag” (108). Campbell
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and Evans provide a different perspective arguing that the first explorers “rejoiced” in seeing
a cross in the sky, “… the emblem of their religion, a group of stars in the form of a cross … a
sign from Heaven that they could not travel beyond the Divine care” (1974: 100).73 The cross
as the embodiment of Christianity has been employed to endemically shape both the fabric of
the Australian nation and its flag.
The Australian National Flag
The British Union Jack was Australia’s national flag until 14 February 1954 (Kwan
2006). The transition from Australian blue ensign to current national flag took fifty three years.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, as the colonies moved to federate, momentum
gathered to find a new flag for the new nation. Public interest was such that the 1901
Commonwealth government flag competition received 32,823 entries from around the world,
all of which were publicly displayed yet subsequently destroyed by the Department of External
Affairs (Cayley 1966). The competition rules stipulated that each competitor was required to
submit two coloured flag sketches, one for merchant ships and one for naval and official
vessels. Maritime flags are known as ensigns, whereas flags on land are known simply as flags.
The winning flag “was only intended for use at sea. The Australian national flag on land was
expected to continue to be the Union Jack” (Kelly 1994: 53). It took the panel of five judges
less than a week to decide on the winning design. Five almost identical entries were judged
equal first. The Union Jack sat as point of honour and the Federation Star was positioned to
point to the centre of the blood-red cross of St George. An examination of the judging criteria
reveals that the Union Jack, Federation star and Southern Cross were prerequisites. The judges,

Film director and cinematographer Warwick Thornton’s documentary, We Don’t Need a Map (2017) explores
the astronomical, mythological, symbolic and spiritual meanings of the Southern Cross. We Don’t Need a Map
provides Indigenous perspectives which relate to the Southern Cross and also investigates the appropriation of the
Southern Cross by white Australia. This documentary includes various discussions about nationalism, discourse
and symbols. The film opened the Sydney Film Festival in June 2017 and was first broadcast on National
Indigenous Television [NITV] 23 July 2017.
73
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all British naval officers, deemed “an Imperial Union Ensign of the British Empire” (Hocking
2002: 30), should comprise of:





The Union Jack on a blue or red ground.
A six-pointed “star,” representing the six federated States of Australia,
immediately under the Union Jack and pointing direct to the centre of St
George’s Cross, and of a size to occupy the major portion of one quarter of the
flag.
The “Southern Cross” in the flag as being indicative of sentiment of the
Australian nation (Cayley 1966: 104).

On 3 September 1901, Prime Minister Barton announced the winning design and the
blue ensign, which had been pre-made, was flown for the first time. The final decision however,
rested with Britain. On 20 February 1903, Australia was advised that King Edward VII had
approved the design. The red field was for civil use and the blue for government use. At this
time the Federation or Commonwealth Star had six points, one for each federated state. In 1905
Australia acquired the British colony of New Guinea. An extra point was added to the
Federation Star in 1908 to represent Australia’s new territory. Papua New Guinea gained
independence from Australia in 1975 but the flag remained unaltered; the seven pointed star
duly represents all the Commonwealth Territories.74
Flags of the States and the Northern Territory
In Australia the influence of the Union Jack is matched by the British blue ensign.
Whether on land or sea, British flags shape the Australian nation, past and present. The British
blue ensign forms the basis of every Australian state flag. The British blue ensign is also the
template for the Australian national flag. In the context of this work, any findings pertaining to
the Australian national flag must also be transposed to the state flags. Use of the British blue
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The Australian Capital Territory (1911), the Northern Territory (1911), Norfolk Island (1913), Jervis Bay
Territory (1915), Australian Antarctic Territory (1933), Ashmore and Cartier Islands (1933), Heard and
McDonald Islands (1958) and the Coral Sea Islands (1969) (Foley 1996a: 82).

130

ensign was increased by the Colonial Naval Defence Act 1865, which stated all vessels
belonging to the colonies were required to use the British blue ensign with the badge of the
colony displayed in the fly, “[T]his Act made possible the enormous future growth in the
number of flags with the Union Jack in the canton” (Znamierowski 1999: 108). Each colonial
badge was vetted by the British Admiralty before approval and during the nineteenth century,
over one hundred colonial ensigns were in use. The proliferation of this ensign was a statement
to the world that proclaimed the global presence of the British Empire.
The six Australian state flags are embellished with colonial iconography and all carry
the Union Jack as official point of honour. The flag of Victoria is the only state flag not to carry
a badge. In 1870, the Victorian state flag depicted the Southern Cross with five white stars in
the fly. An imperial crown was added to this in 1877. This was changed to the Tudor crown in
1901 and then the crown of St Edward in 1953. When the Australian blue ensign was judged
as the winning design in 1901, it was to the consternation of many who considered the
Australian blue ensign to be an appropriation of the Victorian state flag. The state flag of New
South Wales was adopted 11 July 1876. The badge which adorns this flag is blazoned with the
gold lion of England surmounted on the centre of the red cross of St George. This emblem is
set on a white roundel and on each arm of the cross sits a gold star representing the Southern
Cross.
Originally Queensland wanted a profile of Queen Victoria’s head as its state emblem.
This was considered too complicated and so a new badge was sent to London for approval. A
blue Maltese cross on a white roundel, surmounted by a Royal Crown was officially adopted
on 29 November 1876. The crown was altered in 1963 in accordance with Queen Elizabeth’s
preferred design. The colony of Western Australia was also known as the ‘Swan River Colony’.
The flag of Western Australia was adopted on 27 November 1875 and its badge featured a
black swan on a yellow roundel. Originally the swan faced away from the flagpole and swam
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towards the fly. This was considered sinister in heraldic expression. Reversed in 1953, the swan
now faces the staff and appears to the left of the viewer. The Tasmanian state flag was adopted
on 25 September 1876. Its badge features a white roundel with a red heraldic lion, one paw
raised, in the centre. From 1878 – 1904 the South Australian flag carried a badge in which
Britannia is engaged in conversation with an Aboriginal man.75 The current South Australian
flag was proclaimed on 13 January 1904. Its badge displays an Australian piping shrike (a
white-backed magpie) on the branch of a gum tree set against a golden rising sun.
The Northern Territory is not a recognised state. The Northern Territory flag along with
the Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander, Australian Capital Territory, Norfolk and Christmas
Island flags are described by Foley as “radical” (1996a: 189-195). According to Foley the
radical “purists” reject the national flag and associated colonial colours and “adopt a totally
different and radical design” (1996a:182). The Northern Territory flag was adopted on 1 July
1978, when self-government was proclaimed. It was the first flag to break away from the rigors
of colonial subjugation. The Territory flag features the official colours of Northern Territory:
black, white and red ochre. A black panel on the left features the Southern Cross in white stars.
Opposite this is a white Sturt’s desert rose with a black seven-pointed star in the centre to
symbolise the Commonwealth Star surmounted on a red-ochre panel (for comprehensive
details on the above State and Territory flags see: Cayley 1966; Foley 1996a; Znamierowski
1999; Commonwealth of Australia 2000, 2010; Kelly 2007; Tayleur 2013). The Northern
Territory aspires to statehood by 1 July 2018; there is supposition that this might lead to a name
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The brutal and oppressive nature of colonial practice in the early settlement of Australia was of concern to the
Colonial Office in London (Reynolds 1987). When the Province of South Australia was created officials
demanded it be a more humane process. Under the instructions of the Letters Patent 19 February 1836, London
insisted that Aboriginal people had property rights which were to be respected. A Protector was appointed to “to
protect the Aborigines in the undisturbed enjoyment of the lands over which they may possess proprietary rights,
and of which they are not disposed to make a voluntary transfer” (Klaassen 2016). Reynolds argues that statements
from London were virtually impossible to implement, “Australian society already had a history of its own.
Attitudes, interests and expectations were entrenched” (1987: 102). Subsequently and contrary to official
directions, land rights for the Aboriginal people of South Australia were dismissed.
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change or even a modification of the Australian flag. Former Prime Minister Abbott, noted for
his support of the current national flag, stated that if the Northern Territory were to become a
state, and if, “the Commonwealth star [on the national flag] was to be a seven-pointer star rather
than a six-pointer star, that’s hardly a massive change”, he continued, “I would say that is an
evolution rather than a revolution” (qtd.in Whyte 2015: 4). As stated, the Commonwealth star
on the national flag has been a “seven-pointer” since 1908. “Evolution rather than revolution”
however requires consideration. Abbott’s comment frames the flag as a steady signifier of
nation, which could indeed accommodate a slight change. In contrast to this lies the inference
that any “radical” change to the flag is tantamount to a “revolution”.
In 1962, the Queen gave her approval for the design of a flag which incorporated the
symbols of each Australian state. The Queen’s personal flag for Australia flies to “acknowledge
her role of as Queen of Australia” (Commonwealth of Australia 2010: 34). Surmounting the
symbols of each Australian state is a large seven-pointed gold Commonwealth star. Within the
star sits the Queen’s personal device, a blue roundel charged with the letter ‘E’ set beneath a
Royal Crown within a chaplet of roses. The Royal flag links the British monarchy to each of
the Australian states and vice-versa; the over-arching symbolism of the state flags is that of the
British monarchy. When the Queen visits Australia her personal flag takes precedence over the
Australian national flag (Smout 1976)
As noted, the state flags were mostly endorsed before the 1903 Royal Seal of approval
was given to the Australian blue and red ensigns. Public reaction to the ‘new’ Australian
ensign(s) was unenthusiastic, the new flag “failed to stir the general public, and was not widely
flown” (Maitland 2015:220). In 1904, Prime Minister John Watson argued the blue ensign,
“does not adequately symbolize our national life and is not sufficiently indicative of Australian
unity” (qtd. in Cayley 1966: 115). Watson’s alternative, a white flag with the Union Jack in the
centre resting on six vertical red stripes, was vehemently rejected by his peers who demanded
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a flag without the Union Jack, “[S]o the whole question of the flag became a sorry muddle, for
which politicians of all parties were to blame. But no new design was substituted” (Cayley
1966: 115). This “sorry muddle” became an ongoing crisis. In fact confusion has surrounded
the Australian flags since their inception.
A Three Flag Crisis76
In order to demonstrate how national identity has been both procured and affected by
the flags of Australia, it is important to consider the confusion wrought by them as public
emblems. Post-federation, I can identify three instances of a “three flag crisis”. First, the British
Union Jack was the national flag of Australia until 14 February 1954. Prior to this time, and
somewhat unconventionally, both the red and blue Australian maritime ensigns were adopted
for use on land. Alongside the Union Jack, the ensigns vied for and were given space and
attention in the public sphere, as the photograph below demonstrates. This naturally resulted in
practical, emotional confusion and conflict around flag usage. Which flag was appropriate for
which occasion and what place?

Some of this work comes from my paper “Flagging Australia: Claims and Identity”, to be published as part of
the Proceedings of the 26th International Congress of Vexillology.
76
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Figure 3:In 1938 and to celebrate 150 years of white ‘settlement’ Martin Place, Sydney was decorated with an
array of British Union Jacks and Australian red and blue ensigns (Ziegler 1938: Chapter 11: 9).

This conundrum lasted for decades. As recently as 1981 the Australian national flag was
described in the First Schedule to the Flags Act 1953-1973 as, “the British blue ensign...
differenced by a large white star... and five white stars, representing the Southern Cross” (Foley
1996a: 1).
As the Union Jack, the red and blue Australian ensigns competed for attention; views
were polarised around allegiance to Britain and the desire for a distinctive national identity.
Loyalties were tested and patriotic duty questioned. Russell Kennedy notes the uncertainty
created by Australia’s flags, “[T]his clumsy sequence of events must be partly to blame for the
stumbling development of our national identity” (1998: 17). Acknowledging the specificity of
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the time gives credence to Kennedy’s argument. In Chapter Four I noted that Empire Day was
established in 1905 to mark late Queen Victoria’s birthday. At this time, educational
propaganda advocated that children who were “good Britishers” would become “good
Australians” (Kwan 2006: 47). Within five years however, children were being fed the reverse
message, they were told by that “by being ‘good Australians’ they would become ‘good
Britishers’” (Kwan 2006: 47). By way of further example, Kwan notes that during the First
World War there were struggles with identity as Australians entered the war with two flags to
represent their ‘dual’ nationality, “[C]ould loyalty to Australia mean disloyalty to Britain?”
could “an Australian flag … serve as the national flag without being a disloyal symbol” (2006:
55).
During the 1920s the Union Jack continued to preside over the Australian ensigns. By
1924 the blue ensign could be used on public buildings, however, private businesses and
individuals were expected to use the red ensign. Confusion and notions of individual flag
superiority were propelled into World War II. Coffins of Australian servicemen, overseas and
at home, were draped with the Union Jack in deference to tradition, yet if grieving families
wished to incorporate the Australian flag as well, or instead of, this was permissible but only
on request (Kwan 2006). Confusion as to who Australians ‘were’ was compounded by the fact
that Australians were officially subjects of the British Crown until 1948. Confusion was also
buttressed by the rhetoric of the then Prime Minister Robert Menzies who declared in his 1951
commemoration of the first fifty years of federation that Australia was a “well-knit nation”
claiming that, “[I]n our fifty years there has never been argument about whether we are British
or not. We are British” (qtd. in Kwan 2006: 102). Menzies rhetoric was mirrored in the flags,
“[S]ome thought they could fly whichever flag they pleased, merely selecting one to suit their
mood or colour scheme” (Cayley 1966: 117). For many Australians the Union Jack remained
their flag of choice. Menzies sought to remedy the confusion and had the Australian national
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flag officially defined in the Flags Act 1953. In order to help Australians transition to the new
official symbol, Menzies waited for a young Queen Elizabeth II to visit Australia and proclaim
her assent. Royal approval was granted on 14 February 1954. Finally the Australian blue ensign
took precedence over the Union Jack, but this was no panacea; on-going misunderstandings
about which flag to fly did not abate. As recently as 1977 Australians were being reassured by
the Government that they could still fly the Union Jack.
In The Flag Book Arthur Smout (1976), cites numerous frustrations. On the one hand,
he endorses Cook’s use of the Union Jack as “another example of the flag being used as the
symbol of national authority” (1976: 7). Conversely he asserts that the continued use of the
Union Jack by Australians equates to national disloyalty. Smout argues while every Australian
citizen has the right to fly the Union Jack, it must be “in conjunction with” the Australian
national flag, not “instead of” (1976: 14). He questions “why the Union Jack is flown above
the State Government Houses? Since Elizabeth is Queen of Australia, why is not the Australian
National Flag flown by her representatives?” (1976: 16). Smout blames the Commonwealth
Government and calls on it to take steps to end the anachronism which sees Australian national
authority symbolically usurped by the Union Jack. To highlight the ambiguity produced by
flags, Smout draws attention to a Brisbane Australia Day naturalisation ceremony. At this event
the Union Jack and Australian national flag were both present on the stage, which, Smout
argues, transmits a message of confusion. In his quest to be free of the dominating force of the
Union Jack, he demands an end to “this ancient custom of displaying the Union Jack and
Australian National Flag on the platform – a relic of the bygone days of Empire” (1976: 60).
The second “three flag crisis” is identified by Smout in a chapter titled: “Is it really
necessary to have three flags?” (1976: 64). Smout notes the idiosyncratic situation in which
Australia finds itself as it employs three ensigns on the water, “…why three flags? Could not
one National Flag serve all purposes? The U.S.A. appears to get along very well with one
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national flag, as do most other nations in the world” (Smout 1976: 64). Smout claims that the
blue ensign is for use by customs and government vessels; the red specifies nationality but has
no authority while the white ensign belongs specifically to the Royal Australian Navy; this is
“a hang-over from the days of Empire dependency and that Australia has continued this
anachronism, simply following U.K. tradition” (Smout 1976: 65).
The Australian white ensign was not adopted until 1967. Prior to this the British white
ensign was used by the Australian navy. The British white ensign, similar to its blue
counterpart, worked in conjunction with the Union Jack. Agar states the British white ensign
is a symbol of security that represents “Britain’s influence and good name [which] stood for
everything that was fair, just and honourable”, Agar continues, when “our” colonies “asked”
they “received the protection of the White Ensign afloat and the Union Jack on shore, in the
days when their lands would otherwise have been in a state of tribal confusion” (1962: 27).
The significance of the British white ensign and its adoption by Australia further deepens this
investigation. The omnipresence of British symbolism is manifest at every stratum of
Australian cultural life.
The third “three flag crisis” I draw attention to through the flying of multiple flags,
indicates that resultant issues of confusion and conflict which surround Australian identity have
been propelled into the twenty first century. According to Eriksen multiple flag use infers that
“the multivocality of a single flag cannot do justice to all the moral obligations and levels of
belonging” (2007: 6). Australia fits well with Eriksen’s claim. Currently in Australia, the
national flag and the Aboriginal flag and Torres Strait Islander flag are frequently flown in
unison, a multi-fold gesture of inclusion that sits in opposition to the on-going realities
previously cited.
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Figure 4: The Australian, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags flying in Brisbane (Image: ABC 2010).77

The Australian flag, with its colonial iconography, colours, heritage and off-spring,78 serves as
an ongoing reminder of the theft of Indigenous peoples’ sovereign ownership of the land and
the violence, that continues to have real social and cultural effects on health and well-being.
Some International Opinions
Foley states it is “undeniably incongruous” that in 1981 the Australian national flag could
still be officially described in terms of the British flag (1996a: 1). This form of reference lingers
with somewhat extraordinary perceptions in popular culture. For example, American actor,
Jerry Seinfeld said, “I love the Australian Flag; Britain at night” (qtd. in Scruby 2009: 46). In
response, Harold Scruby, executive director of Ausflag (see below), argues that is “how the
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When flags fly in unison strict rules of precedence apply and the national flag must reside in the position of
honour. For example, with a line of flagpoles the Australian flag must be flown at the far left of the person who
faces them. If the flagpoles vary in height then protocol dictates that the Australian flag must fly from tallest
flagpole.
78
Further examples include the Royal Australian Air Force ensign. Adopted in 1948, the Union Jack sits in the
canton on a light blue field, a red kangaroo was added in 1982. The New South Wales Ambulance Service flag
also has the Union Jack in the canton, the service badge is in the fly and it was adopted in 1984. See also the flags
of each State Governor.
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rest of the world sees us. Not as a proud, mature, fiercely independent, sovereign nation, but as
a colony, still desperately clutching child-like at the bosom of a bygone empire” (2009: 46).
The Australian flag, according to Scruby, represents genocide, invasion and oppression to
Indigenous people and its symbols of exclusion fly in the face of ‘Reconciliation’ (2001).
Reflecting Billig’s thesis of “banal nationalism”, Scruby claims the Australian flag,
“subliminally proclaims that if you’re of British descent, you’re superior to all other citizens
of this country” (2001).
Returning to popular culture, for some British sports fans the Australian flag is a source of
ridicule. The “English Barmy Army” was founded by three friends during cricket’s England
1994 / 95 Ashes tour of Australia. The “Barmy Army” now has a membership of over 3,000
and has produced a specialised songbook of taunts, tailor-made for the Australian ‘enemy’, a
sample of which I cite here:
The Aussies love the English
The Aussies love the English, you might find it quite strange
'Cos we sent them all down under, with only balls and chains
And when they see the English, they always shout and scream
But when they had the chance to vote they voted for the Queen!
God save your gracious Queen
Long live your noble Queen
God save your Queen (you're a convict)
Send her victorious
Happy and glorious
Long to reign over you
God save your Queen
(England’s Barmy Army n.d.).

140

Adam Collins notes that over the years this ‘song’ has been accompanied with a chant, a
deliberate and patronising statement of British superiority that demands Australia to “[G]et
your shit stars off our flag” (2014: 32). Collins, a member of the Australian Republican
Movement, calls for the public to support the nation in the same way that they do the cricket,
he argues that a republic will leave, “no confusion about where we stand as a nation” (2014:
32). Collins finds the ridicule galling: the Barmy Army, he says “are laughing at us, and well
may they snigger. The person who holds the highest office for our proud and vast land lives in
a palace several thousand kilometres away” (2014: 32).
In 1988 and 2015, Professor of American Studies and vexillologist Scot Guenter,79
conducted two quantitative studies. The purpose of these studies was to extend understandings
of flags by going beyond the taxonomies of history, design and usage. Guenter’s methodology
focused on Sperber’s theoretical process of interpretation which employs two concepts,
“focalisation” and “evocation”. This approach enabled Guenter to examine “recognition” of a
flag, through focalisation that explores “meanings” of a flag through evocation. In both studies
200 American college students were presented with a sample of ten national flags, including
the Australian flag. Question #1 asked the student to identify the flag. Question #2 invited the
respondent to think and to try and summarise how and where they had learnt the information
used to answer question #1. From this stage of focalisation, the survey moves to evocation.
Question #3 asked the student to think about their response to question #1 and to, “list the
‘connection’ your mind makes from that flag to what images, thoughts, or concerns follow as
you free associate. List the images and thoughts that come to mind” (Guenter 2015: 10).
Guenter’s research spans 27 years and extends my thesis by providing an approach from which
international interpretations of the Australian flag can be garnered. Guenter’s most recent
findings indicate that Britain “remains a very powerful and dominant element within the
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Guenter’s paper will be published as part of the Sydney ICV26 Proceedings 2015. See also (Guenter 1988).
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integrated meaning conveyed by the national flag of Australia to American college students”
(2015:13). A comparative analysis between the 1988 and 2015 studies reveals that the 2015
data produced a “harsher interpretation” of British imperialism (2015: 13). Guenter’s findings
also indicate that 21st century American responses to the Australian flag are entwined with
“some possible uneasiness with race” (2015: 14).
Flag Organisations of Australia
Smout (1976) brings to light many of the problems and ambiguities which surrounded
the flags of Australia and were in play during the 1970s. In the early 1980s the official status
of the Australian flag was that of a defaced British blue ensign. 80 At this time, and in the lead
up to the 1988 bicentenary of British occupation, there were increasing calls for a new
Australian flag. Against this backdrop, three flag groups formed. In 1981, Ausflag was
established. Scruby, co-founder and executive director states, Ausflag’s purpose is to source
and advocate for a “flag which clearly and unequivocally proclaims our identity to other nations
… and a flag which unites the Australian nation in all its diversity” (qtd. in Kwan 2006: 121).
Ausflag calls for a distinct Australian national flag, however notions of ‘unity’ are somewhat
problematic. Reflective of Anderson’s “imagined community” ‘unity’ is a utopian fantasy;
notions of ‘inclusion’ for a national symbol, however, are more tangible, as White attests,
the function of a national symbol lies not in its capacity to convey particular shared
meanings, but in its power to spark recognition in a population in which shared
understanding of what the nation stands for is impossible. Its role is thus to identify and
map, to imagine the community without imagining it united (2005:130).

Ausflag “describes itself as a voluntary, non-political, non-republican, non-anti-monarchist
organisation that is not anti-British, but rather pro-Australian” (Foley 1996a: 91). Ausflag has

In vexillology ‘deface’ is a technical term used when a device, such as a badge or a constellation has been
added to an existing flag.
80
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launched several flag design competitions and maintains its presence in the debate for a new
Australian flag. In contrast sits the Australian National Flag Association.
In 1983 and in response to Ausflag and an increasing political push by Labor to change
both the national flag and the national anthem, former President of the Returned and Services
League81 (RSL), Sir Colin Hines, formed a steering committee and invited John Vaughn to join
the association (Kwan 2006). The primary focus of the ANFA is to protect and promote the
national flag, the Australian blue ensign, in its current form. As Ausflag sought to dispense
with the Union Jack, the ANFA fought to retain it. According to Vaughn the symbols of the
national flag represent, “‘a unique Australian history and national identity’. Once Australians
understood those symbols, Vaughn argued, they would not want to change their flag. It was a
matter of education” (Kwan 1994b: 304). The discursive framing which privileges the national
flag is powerful and harks back to the era of the White Australia Policy where white supremacy,
entitlement and privilege are understood as being the inherent and unquestionable facets of
Australian identity. Or to put this another way, “[T]he invisibility of privilege strengthens the
power it creates and maintains. The invisible cannot be combated, and as a result privilege is
allowed to perpetuate, regenerate, and re-create itself” (Wildman and Davis 2002: 89).
The current Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, was a Director of Ausflag for six years.
However, in 2004, Turnbull accepted an invitation to join the ANFA. Turnbull announced “it
is a long time since I canvassed the desirability of changing our flag and despite allegations to
the contrary I am a convinced supporter of our national flag” (qtd. in Steketee 2004). Vaughn’s

The Returned & Services League of Australia was formed in 1916 as the ‘Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial
League of Australia’. It was adapted in 1940 to incorporate the air force and became known the ‘Returned Services
League of Australia’ in 1965. In 1990 it changed to its current name to include existing as well as former members
of the Australian Defence Forces. The patron of the RSL is Queen Elizabeth II. The badge of the RSL bears the
British Crown which signifies its allegiance to Queen and country.
81
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triumph was palpable. The “long term director and contributor of Ausflag”, Malcolm Turnbull,
had defected,
Dear Mr Scruby … [Turnbull’s] support for the traditional Australian National Flag of
“Stars and Crosses” is most significant. Mr Turnbull is, I believe, well attuned to the
views of the Australian community. The Australian flag, now 103 years old, is our
permanent, chief national symbol by law, custom and tradition … I call upon you to
acknowledge reality and immediately close-down the Ausflag website and end all other
activities of Ausflag Limited. You may care to consider donating any surplus funds to
the worthy, non-profit school educational undertakings of the Australian National Flag
Association … Like Mr Turnbull, you may wish to become a member of ANFA …
Yours sincerely John Vaughn.

Scruby responded:
Dear John (please call me Harold) It seems like the only exercise you’ve been getting
lately is jumping to conclusions … do you really believe that when we become a
Republic, we will be celebrating … under a Union Jack flag which screams out to the
rest of the world that we remain subordinate to Great Britain? PS: And would you please
stop referring to the Australian flag as the “flag of stars and crosses”. Its correct
definition is the British Blue Ensign defaced by the southern cross and Federation star
– or simply “Britain at Night”. Regards Harold. (Ausflag 2016).

The different standpoints of Ausflag and the ANFA are countered by the neutrality of Flags
Australia. Founded in 1983 Flags Australia has published the vexillological journal, Crux
Australis, every quarter since 1984 and is the leading Australian authority on flag design, usage
and history. Flags Australia is “an advisory and research association concerned with all aspects
of flag design, symbolism and protocol” (Burton 2006a: 151). There is much to be learned from
Australian vexillogical organisations. In light of this work, each has been considered according
to its approach, analysis, standpoint and vested interest.
Applications of the Australian National Flag
Ideologically the national flag is the metaphor of nation. Yet in Australia, as Vaughn
articulates, the flag represents a particular version of history and identity that is dispersed
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through “education” and various applications. Therefore, as White claims the Australian
national flag is a symbol which is partisan for some, yet for others, it represents a “naturalness
through familiarity” (2005: 118). It is precisely this “naturalness” that impels examination and
produces questions regarding the meanings, potential for meaning and prevailing colonial
symbolism that are enshrined in the private and public display of the national flag. Gordon
Maitland’s work, The Story of Australia’s Flags (2015) is a reference book that traces the
origins of Australia’s flags. Maitland notes,
… while the Royal Australian Navy has its ensign and the Royal Australian Air Force has
its own flag, the Australian Army does not have a flag of its own; the Army’s flag is the
Australian National Flag. The reason for this dates back to the 17th century formation of the
British Army, and to the concept that the army and the people are one. In the Australian
context … the Australian National Flag represents all Australians and is apolitical (2015:
19).

The claim that the national flag is “apolitical”, and that it represents all Australians is akin to
arguing that the nation itself is not a political entity. Such claims well serve the discourse of
nation-building; if the flag is not a political symbol, it is further rendered “banal” (drawing on
Billig), and can be seamlessly ‘draped’ across bodies and inscribed onto cultural artefacts as a
seemingly ‘innocent’ image. Paulo Kolstø draws attention to the need for national identity to
be learnt, and argues “in the school of national identity construction … national symbols –
flags, coats of arms, national anthems – play … a crucial role in nation-building and nationmaintenance” (2006: 676 emphasis in the original). Not only are Australians invited to watch
their flag from afar, they are invited to “carry it in their hands, participate in flag parades, and
flag hoisting ceremonies” (Kolstø 2006: 676). Maitland concurs, stating that his attachment to
the flag was inculcated as a child, “I am of that generation which, at school, recited: I honour
my God; I serve my King; I salute my Flag” (2015: 5).
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Emotional Applications
In the early 1980s, as possibilities for new flag were mooted, the RSL became a strident
protagonist in defence of the national flag. This was a battle which went to the core of their
allegiance to both Great Britain and Australia, “…the RSL does not wish to see the flag under
which Australian servicemen fought in two major wars … change to some new, and
presumably less ‘loyal’ design” (Edwards 1985:3). At the time many RSL members held
positions of authority in the nation’s public and private spheres. The RSL was, and remains a
powerful voice concerning issues of nationalism and thus mobilised to distribute, “[K]eep this
our flag forever” car stickers, gave backing to the ANFA, was forthright as it lobbied politicians
and, “intense ‘consciousness-raising’ among the public – most of whom, if left alone, would
probably remain fairly apathetic” (Edwards 1985: 3). Ex-serviceman Geoff Baker delivered a
personal protest. Having lost his left eye he used his empty eye-socket as a billboard to display
the national flag on a glass eye-ball, “I, and a lot of other blokes, fought under that flag and we
are very proud of it” (Baker qtd. in Van Oudtshoorn 1984: 8).
The emotions embroiled in flags and war run deep, and the emotional responses elicited
by the RSL are frequently contextualised as a normative reaction to the horrors of war. Military
forces wear national colours and keep the flag ‘alive’ through remembrances of loss. In war,
as an emblem of the homeland, the flag acts as a reminder of the nationalist inculcations that
indoctrinate the right and duty to defend the nation. Flags become a tangible link to ‘home’, to
what it represents, and to the justification of military violence in all its manifestations. It is the
national insignia that fortifies the resolve to ‘win’, to combat and defeat the Other, regardless
of the cost,
[T]he primordial rag dipped in the blood of a conquered enemy and lifted high on a
stick – that wordless shout of victory and dominion – is a motif repeated millions of
times in human existence (Smith 1975: 7).
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In victory, flags become the embodiment of conquest, tangible signals from which the authority
of a nation and its associated principles are represented.
Maitland cites Robin Northover’s poem “Our Flag”. Northover claims the Australian
flag is the flag of “our laws and our language” and the Union Jack represents “[T]he rogues
and schemers, the doers and dreamers” who “gave modern Australia birth” (qtd. in Maitland
2015: 313). The cost of this birthing, by the “rogues” and the “dreamers” was and is at the
perpetual expense of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, whose languages, laws,
lives and lands were both disregarded and disrespected. The poem concludes:
But there are thousands who’ve died for its honour,
And shed of their blood for OUR FLAG
(qtd. in Maitland 2015: 314 emphasis in the original).

Smith (2003) states that it is the belief in the principles and meanings of a flag over which
people fight, die and kill. The flag transubstantiates into an external force under which are
carried, “the fears and hopes, the myths, and the magic of those who carry it” (Smith 1975: 37).
Flags are endowed with values and emotion that work, sometimes overtly but often effortlessly,
to connect the individual to their ‘imagined’ collective. For the RSL, the emotional leverage of
the flag enables this organisation to mobilise a force of public visibly and vocality whose raison
d’etre is to daily inscribe the nation through the remembrance of battles fought, won or lost.
The RSL demonstrates how symbols can evoke “powerful psychological responses that, when
occurring simultaneously in multiple individuals or entire groups, leave a strong imprint on a
community” (Butz 2009: 799).
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Political Applications
Canberra’s Trademark
Political applications of the 1954 Australian national flag commenced with Menzies
who was the first Prime Minister to authorise the flying of the flag, both day and night over
Canberra (Cayley 1966). This tradition has been both maintained and fortified. The focal point
of Australia’s new Parliament House is the flag and its flagpole. The flag is conceptualised as
“the unifying symbol of the nation” (Joint House Department 1989: 7) and flies atop the flag
mast, which at 81 metres tall, towers above the Parliament and is visible from most parts of the
city, “establishing the Parliament’s presence and symbolically announcing the centre of
Government in Australia” (Joint House Department 1989: 7). This imposing configuration is
one of the largest stainless steel structures in the world and the statement it makes is completed
by the flying of “a monster flag the size of a double decker bus” (Sydney Morning Herald 10
April 2013: 5).
In 2013, the Department of Parliamentary Services issued a tender for the manufacture
and supply of a new batch of flags for Parliament House. Officials refused to reveal the
expected costs although “in 1997 the cost was reported to be $2000 per flag” (Sydney Morning
Herald 10 April 2013: 5). Each flag weighs around 25 kilograms. A set of ten flags are used
on a rotational basis and changed on the first Wednesday of every month (Flag Fact Sheet:
Parliament House, September 2015). The structure built to house the flag cost over $4.4 million
and weighs 220 tonnes, when the flag was unfurled for the first time, Senator McClelland
declared “the flag would become “Canberra’s trademark”. The flag, measuring 6.4 metres by
12.8 metres, will fly 24 hours a day and be floodlight at night” (Bartlett 1987: 6).
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Flagging the Flag
According to Smith national flags typically symbolise the events from which a nation
is founded, but they may well fly in the face of historical accuracy,
[T]he flag thus expresses a “civil religion” that political groups in the country try to
control. This encourages people to support their view of the past, the future, the
government and economic system, and relations between different groups of people
(2003: 5).

Here Smith establishes that the national flag carries with it potent levels of power to which the
eyes of the nation look in order to realise their imaginings of legitimacy, values and identity.
In Australia during the 1990s both Prime Minister John Howard and One Nation82 leader,
Pauline Hanson, made routine and effective use of the national flag for political gain. Avowed
monarchist Prime Minister, John Howard was Australia’s 25th and second longest serving
Prime Minister (1996-2007). Ian Ward (2012) credits Howard as being the first Prime Minister
to adopt the routine ‘flagging’ of the national flag at his media conferences, as a result, “the
flag’s fortunes have risen dramatically under the Prime Minister’s tutelage ... At once it is
reassuring consistent and strong. And the flag has repaid Howard many times over” (Parker
qtd. in Ward 2012: 75).
In 1995 Howard aired his support for the current design of the national flag. He noted
there was no community desire to change the flag and argued that there were “more substantive
issues of greater practical importance to the Australian people” (qtd. in Foley 1996a: 111).83 In
1996 Howard articulated that the focus of his Government was to form a cohesive national
community, to re-enforce Australian values and to create trust between Government and the

Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party represents a conservative form of nationalism that is grounded in
Protectionism and the White Australia Policy.
83
Foley concurs, “[T]his is, of course, undeniably true” and she hopes that Prime Minister Howard will not include
the “matter of the national flag” at the next elections (1996a: 111).
82
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people. An essential part of Howard’s vision was to protect and respect Australia’s national
symbols and this included the introduction of a National Flag Day. 84 Held on 3 September
National Flag Day commemorates the 1901 first public flying of the flag. On that day, as the
flag was being raised in Melbourne, schools throughout Australia were contacted via telegraph,
and instructed to simultaneously raise their Australian flags during a special assembly (Kwan
2006). Proclaiming 3 September as National Flag Day Howard claimed “[O]ur national flag is
a unifying force. It is a familiar and powerful image, and a focus for national pride” (qtd. in
ANFA 2012b).85
On Anzac Day 1996 Howard stated that legislation would be introduced which would
further protect the national flag. The Flags Amendment Bill 1996 decreed that the design of
the flag could only be changed through a referendum or plebiscite. If a poll were to take place
then the current national flag must be included with any alternative designs (which is what
happened in New Zealand, see Chapter One). This legislation became law in 1998 and the
Flags Act 1953 was amended accordingly. Howard stated,
[T]his ensures that the people are consulted about their National Flag which is our
oldest national symbol … All Australians can now be assured that the design of the
National Flag – their Flag – is a matter for them and not for politicians or pressure
groups (qtd. in ANFA 2012b).

Howard’s argument is persuasive and reassuring in its intent. His rhetoric firmly places the
responsibility of the national flag in the hands of the people as it simultaneously satisfies his
colonial affections. Graeme Orr explains that the 1998 amendment of the Flags Act was both
political and symbolic, yet it lacks legal efficacy as the amendment can be repealed by a future
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This day has been celebrated by the ANFA since 1984. In 1996 the Governor-General of Australia, William
Deane, officially proclaimed 3 September as Australian National Flag Day. At ICV26 Michel Lupant, President
of the Federation Internationale des Associations Vexillologiques (FIAV), noted that Australia is one of the few
countries to dedicate a day to its national flag (3 September 2015).
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See Appendix D for the Australian National Flag Prayer.
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Parliament. Orr claims that Howard’s “was an act of political theatre, a dare to ‘stand up and
be counted’ for the current flag’s design” (2012: 517). Anna Clark (2006) also draws attention
to Howard’s relationship with the national flag and argues that the flag was explicit in the
(re)engineering of Australian national identity. In 2004, a $31 billion federal education package
was announced by Prime Minister Howard and the former Minister for Education, Brendan
Nelson.86 The grant made funds available depending upon certain criteria being met which
included the prominent display of the Government’s values framework and the installation of
a functioning flag pole to fly the Australian flag. Funding was not allocated for additional
flagpoles to fly the Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander flags, the provision of which was
deemed to be the responsibility of individual schools.
School remains a potent site for the learning of nationalism, as Hanson comments,
“[M]y pride and patriotism were instilled in me from an early age when I watched the
Australian flag raised every morning at school and sang the national anthem” (qtd. in Martino,
Hanrahan & Crossley 2016). When Hanson delivered her first parliamentary address in 1996,
she demanded for equality for all Australians, criticised the preferential treatment given to
Aboriginal people, and reignited in the public consciousness a discourse of white supremacy,
[I]f politicians continue to promote separatism in Australia, they should not continue to
hold their seats in this parliament. They are not truly representing all Australians, and I
call on the people to throw them out. To survive in peace and harmony, united and
strong, we must have one people, one nation, one flag87 (One Nation 2014).
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Director of the AWM (2012 - ).
This slogan has successfully navigated both time and space. Versions of the refrain, have been employed to
perpetuate as well as facilitate the endorsement of white colonial ideals, allowing them to (re)surface and be
(re)invented. In 1891, a decade before the 1901 Federation of Australia, politician Henry Parkes addressed a
Sydney Federal Convention advocating for the six separate British colonies unite. Parkes states, “the time has
come when Australian people shall be one, henceforth and forever … one people [to] inherit one destiny” (The
Henry Parkes Foundation n.d). In 1898 the Australasian Federation League of New South Wales added the words
“one flag” to Parkes’ slogan. Federation, a ubiquitous white, patriarchal vision, was thus framed by the slogan
“one people, one destiny, one flag”.
87
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Hanson officially launched her One Nation party in 1997. The Australian flag was omnipresent
throughout. Orr (2010) argues that the Australian national flag was in fact fundamental to
Hanson’s One Nation party. Numerous images can be found online of Hanson draped in the
national flag. At the height of One Nation’s success, the party secured nearly 23 per cent of the
Queensland 1998 state election and won 11 seats on National Party preferences (Law 2013:
22). In the 2016 federal election One Nation under the leadership of Hanson secured four seats
in the Senate. Hanson continues to endorse “the one flag”,
[W]e as Australians have never been asked in a referendum whether we endorse or
recognise the Aboriginal flag … But it is flown everywhere, especially above
government buildings. Flying two Australian flags is extremely divisive … we should
be united under the one flag, the Australian flag (Hanson qtd. in Davies 2016).

Michael Anderson argues that flying the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags on
government buildings signifies that Australia recognises Indigenous sovereignty. Therefore
Hanson’s rejection of the Aboriginal flag is understood by Anderson as an “unease” which
“stems from this recognition of our sovereignty” (Mandybur 2016). Fundamental to Hansonite
ideology is the premise that social division results from the “special treatment” afforded to a
particular group. This principle, as the above quote demonstrates, evidently extends to the
public display of the Aboriginal flag.
Perceived threats to Australia’s sovereignty are used to spruik political interests.
Former Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, took national flag usage to a new level. In November
2104, leaders of the twenty most economically developed countries in the world, known as the
G20, gathered in Brisbane. For this two-day event, 282 flags, 19 of which were Australian,
were purchased and taxpayers were charged over $100,000 (Gartrell 2015: 11). Highlighting
both the cost and importance of flags, Adam Gartrell (2015), draws attention to Australia’s
Federal MPs and senators who, in the latter half of 2014, spent more than $500,000 on
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Australian flags. Of interest is the ratio, which indicates both the pragmatic and ideological
nature of flags and their value when used as a party political prop. The Liberal Government
spent $330,000 compared to the Labor Party who spent $130,000. Abbott’s penchant for using
Australian flags at press conferences was seen to reflect the discourse of ‘national security’
which he frequently touted. Tony Wright (2015) claims that Abbott’s national emergency alert
system could be understood by the number of flags he employed. For example, when he
delivered his national security statement he stood in front of six Australian flags. On another
occasion, Charles Waterstreet remarks, Abbott “outflagged the enemy when he announced his
national security speech … The killer surprise was to use 10 Australian flags … researchers
have noticed that the more flags behind Abbott, the less he speaks” (2015: 34). When employed
as ‘visual megaphones’, flags can ‘speak’ louder than words.
So what is the purpose behind the multiplicity of flags? Is it an assertion of political
credibility or just one of political fear-mongering? On one hand Eriksen argues the
“[O]mnipresence of flags” demonstrates a need by the state, “to give material evidence for a
postulated imagined community” (2007: 9). In this light, the flags employed by Abbott form a
backdrop of discursive affirmation, a statement to demonstrate Australia’s legitimacy, power
and authority. On the other hand, Billig notes that, for established nations, as the ‘imagined
community’ becomes ‘inhabited’, as the poets are replaced by politicians and the epic ballads
are replaced by government reports, the ‘community’ and its place in the world “are not so
much imagined, but their absence becomes unimaginable” (2013: 77). What Billig alludes to
is the potential for the ‘nation’ and all it stands for, to be rendered inconceivable. When the
nation and the existence of its members is threatened, the public display of tangible national
iconography provides redress for the nation’s fears, “[W]hen threats arise, national
identification may increase, which may in turn lead to symbolic manifestations of heightened
national identity” (Butz 2009: 783). From this standpoint, the rhetoric of ‘national emergency’,
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so frequently used during Abbott’s term as Prime Minister, inscribes in the flag an emotional
appeal to nationalism through threat of the loss of freedom and sovereignty.
The current Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull asserts that the Australian flag will
never change and furthermore he states that Australians, in particular younger Australians,
“don’t deconstruct the Australian flag and … say, ‘well, there’s a Union Jack, that’s the flag of
another country,’ they look at it as one Australian symbol” (Baxendale 2018). Turnbull thus
‘flags’ the national flag as a signifier of Australian nationalism that is banally accepted by the
populace. If he is correct, then borrowing from Vaughn, it is indeed a “matter of education”,
for if, as Turnbull asserts, Australians “don’t deconstruct” their flag, then a deconstruction of
the flag though education is in order. For example, how would Australians react if they knew
that the British Union Jack is the official point of honour on their national flag? Guenter
provides evidence that demonstrates students in America associate British colonialism with
Australia’s flag. If a similar study was undertaken in Australia what would be revealed?
Turnbull’s comments were a strategic attempt to deflect attention from the flag, but in reality
they highlight the need for new debates which move away from banal acceptance and a lack of
‘deconstruction’, towards a more focused and contemporary understanding of the nation’s flag
and its symbolism.
Social Applications
Cronulla 2005
Cronulla Beach is located in the Sutherland Shire. As mentioned in Chapter One it was
here that Forby Sutherland was buried. The Sutherland Shire lays claim to being the ‘Birthplace
of Modern Australia’:
Australia’s most historic place, where the two great captains, Cook and Phillip, first
landed, first encountered Aborigines, first raised the flag, first observed a bush
landscape utterly strange to them, and first took steps to explore … It is beyond
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comprehension that the ‘Birthplace of Modern Australia’ has been allowed to slip into
relative obscurity … it has been ignored and mistreated throughout our nation’s entire
history. In any country but Australia, Kurnell would be a shrine! (Salt 2000: 7-9).

“Australia’s most historic place” is the site of the original onslaught of violence and injustices
forced upon Aboriginal peoples. Suvendrini Perera identifies the Sutherland shire as a Christian
enclave of Anglo-Celtic whiteness, “a white sanctuary” which is threatened and constricted by
“the great Middle Eastern melting pots of Sydney” (Perera 2007: 4). The racialised sociospatial-ness of ‘the shire’ reflects the racial hierarchies which underpin every level, place and
space of the white Australian nation. Perera argues “invisiblised ‘white sovereign violence’
continues to produce and patrol the limits of the nation in the form of the unquestioned and
unquestionable law of the land” (2007: 5). Maria Giannacopoulos contends that Australian law
has been forged out of violence yet “disguises its status as such by circulating a series of
knowledges about itself which operate to deny its relation to violence” (2006). She asserts that
white sovereignty has been established through the repudiation of colonial violence in all its
formations. Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll claim that the threat of violence is inherent to
patriarchal white sovereignty and is ‘legitimised’ through the “disavowal of white race
privilege”, which they say, “works to negate its relationship to racial oppression and mask its
possessiveness” (2006: 155). They assert that the actions of white males in 2005, which has
entered the Australian lexicon as the “Cronulla Riots”, was in fact a protest in that it was a form
of organised violence, driven by the inherent white patriarchal right of ‘possession’. The beach
is territory to be defended, a site “where collective national ownership and identity are on public
display: a place of pleasure, leisure and pride” (Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll 2006: 149).
Against this backdrop outrage boiled over when it was reported that two surf lifesavers
had been in an ‘unprovoked’ attack by a large group of men of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’
(El-Khouri 2012). On 11 December 2005, under the apparent threat of a non-white bodied
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invasion and roused by an SMS call to arms, a crowd some 5000 strong of mostly young, white,
frequently shirtless, Anglo-Celtic Australian males gathered to reclaim their beach. The
preferred weapon of choice was the Australian national flag which vicariously adorned the
‘soldiers’ as they marched into battle. Defiantly armed with the Australian flag, fuelled by
alcohol and racist chants, the ‘troops’ rallied, they “chased, attacked, beat and bashed any
person in their sight of Middle Eastern appearance” (El-Khouri 2012: xiii). Giannacopoulos
(2006) states that it is through the act of naming ‘others’ that the Australian nation is reproduced
as a white possession. She cites a media report in which the riotous white youth are exempted
from racial descriptors. The un-raced youth are positioned as if beyond identity, they are
‘legitimate’ and ‘local’; in contrast are the men of “Middle Eastern appearance”.
Giannacopoulos argues, the proper capitalisation of “Middle Eastern” effectively delegates
“ethnicity to the non-belonging youths” (2006 emphasis in the original).88 This is a discursive
endemic, a phenomenon which has shaped the formation of a white Australian identity since
first contact, “as long as law-breakers are mainstream, that is white and from an English
speaking background, their ethnic group is protected by the absence of reference to it” (Sykes
1989:16). Racial referencing is thus a strategy which is both explicit and implicit in that it
constructs a standpoint which enforces nationalistic ideals through the marked identification of
minority groups. The metonymic image of the Cronulla Riots was the white, young male
swathed in the Australian flag. The flag, “emerged as a rallying point and signal proclamation
of a ‘genuine’ Australian ethos” (Burton 2006b: 9).
As the battle for Cronulla went into the night Australian citizens, Hadi Khawaja and
Ali Ammar sought revenge. They broke into the Brighton-le-Sands RSL club in South Sydney,
stole the national flag and proceeded to burn it in front of a crowd of 150 people. In Australia
it is not a criminal offence to burn the national flag, “burning or otherwise wilfully desecrating
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See also Hage in Thornton (2017).
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national flags as a form of protest against the established order is extraordinarily common,
because symbolically a national flag is the nation-state” (Foley 1996a: 150 emphasis in the
original). The flag burning protest was broadcast on television. For Giannacopoulos this media
event conjured
colonial images of violence supported by the flag of empire … It was the British flag
that Cook had forced into the earth upon invasion and it was in such manoeuvres that
white sovereignty began to be violently asserted (2006).

Eighteenth century colonial violence committed under the colours of the Union Jack transcends
time to re-emerge in Sutherland’s shire of the twenty first century. Giannacopoulos
conceptualises the forceful impalement of the land by the “flag of empire” as the beginning
point from which the potent assertion of white sovereignty continues through the on-going
assailment of Indigenous people and theft of sovereign land.
Khawaja was sentenced to three months jail for breaking into the RSL and burning the
flag (Wallace 2006) and Ammar, 16 at the time, served seven months (Olding 2015). Both men
publicly apologised and Ammar also walked the Kokoda Track89 as part of his ‘rehabilitation’.
The magistrate, Paul Falzon argued that if a window had been broken, or a trophy stolen, the
significance of the crime would have been less, “[T]he emotional injury in this case is
somewhat amplified” and because of the context, Falzon deemed, “[I]t’s vandalism of a
particular kind. It’s extreme vandalism” (qtd. in Wallace 2006). According to Butz (2009)
people who possess deep psychological attachments to their flag may feel a heightened sense
of threat by its desecration. This assertion goes some way to explain both Falzon’s comments
and the punishment meted out to Khawaja and Ammar. At Cronulla the Australian flag was
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In 1942 Australian soldiers fought their most significant battle of the Second World War. On a 96 kilometre
narrow and rugged jungle pass in Papua New Guinea, known as the Kokoda track, Australian soldiers defended
Port Moresby from Japanese soldiers who planned to capture and use it as a base from which to bomb and
potentially invade Northern Queensland.
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employed as a territorial signifier; a status symbol of segregation denoting who ‘grew here’
and who ‘flew here’. Australian ‘values’ were made incarnate through the flag which was,
inscribed on bodies in, multiple forms: blazoned on bikinis and backpacks, tattooed on
to arms and torsos, painted on faces like war paint, wrapped around shoulders like a
trophy: a performance of native-ised territoriality (Perera 2006).

In their analysis of the aftermath of the Cronulla Riots Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll
state that ‘race-blind’ responses were delivered, “[T]aking race and racism out of the equation
enabled patriarchal white sovereignty to produce a colour blind and power evasive discourse”
(Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll 2006: 155). Giannacopoulos claims that white violence was
discursively endorsed and thus ‘legitimated’ by Prime Minister Howard who said, “I do not
accept that there is underlying racism in this country” (2006). Furthermore, in what can be read
as a tacit approval of the flag’s use as a weapon, Howard refused to criticise the Australian
flag-waving, flag-wearing whites of Cronulla, “I would never condemn people for being proud
of the Australian flag” (qtd. in Ireland 2015: 37). There certainly was no thought of punishment
for those who wielded the flag as an agent of terror,
[A]fter all, if they chant racist slogans whilst carrying the Australian flag their violence
comes to signify as something other than criminal ethnic violence. White violence at
Cronulla beach is subtly sanctioned by creating a discursive distinction between
legitimate violence and ethnic criminal violence (Giannacopoulos 2006 emphasis in the
original).

Twenty first century racial violence is thus symbolically dispensed through the Australian flag,
a continuation of the veneration of the Union Jack and the forced impalement of white
sovereignty that refuses interrogation.
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Post Cronulla
Six weeks after the Cronulla Riots, at the 2006 Australia Day “Big Day Out” music
festival, the Australian flag once more became a prevalent symbol of white supremacy. As a
result, the following year 2007 festival-goers were asked to refrain from wearing or carrying
the flag. Festival organiser, Ken West,90 described the display of nationalism and use of the
flag at the 2006 event, “as intolerable … The Australian flag was being used as gang colours.
It was racism disguised as patriotism” (qtd. in Mulvey 2007). West was immediately vilified
by Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd, the RSL and ANFA. Prime Minister John Howard was
outraged, calling the suggestion to ‘ban’ the Australian flag, “offensive … to millions of
Australians” before continuing, “[F]lags don’t have legs and arms, if anyone was breaking the
law at Cronulla … they should be dealt with by the authorities” (Mulvey 2007). Flags however
are mobilised through the “legs and arms” of the corporeal body, as the epigraph states, flags
can signify group unity and purpose. When bodies are wrapped in the flag, they are
metaphorically enveloped in the arms of the nation – the body transforms to become ‘the
nation’ and all it represents.
Foley was also critical about banning the flag. She argues that if “you’re intimidating
people, it does not matter really whether you’re doing it by waving a flag, or a tea towel, or a
photo of the Sydney Harbour Bridge” (qtd. in Huxley 2009). Foley’s comments effectively
trivialise the flag’s transformative capacity and are somewhat surprising given that she
previously acknowledges the national flag as being representative of the nation-state. To
profess that there is no differentiation between using the flag and a tea towel or a photograph
as a means of intimidation is extraordinary. By refusing to acknowledge the flag’s very real
power and influence she relegates it to that of a “banal” and seemingly innocuous everyday
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object. In this instance, far from being a banal signifier of national identity the flag, as this
photograph demonstrates, has the transformative capability to reconfigure and take on a ‘new’
life as an agent of racism, for which, unlike the discipline meted out against Khawaja and
Ammar, there is no punishment.

Figure 5: Australian protestors use the national flag to cover their faces (Image: Sydney Morning Herald 2009).

The white body en-masse, wrapped in the Australian flag, becomes the embodiment of the
White Australian Nation: a domestic body asserting sovereignty and ownership through the
fabric of the flag and acts of terror. Scruby argues that it is the Union Jack which emboldens
white Australians, the Union Jack “allowed our flag to be used as a racist symbol, allowing
those of Anglo descent to say, ‘I’m more Australian than you’” (qtd. in Huxley 2009).
National flags signal group membership as they simultaneously reflect the nation’s core
values and belief systems, thus “national symbols often play prominent roles in protests of
actions or events that are perceived as countering these beliefs” (Butz 2009: 787). Joanne Frare
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(2009) argues that the levels of flag-display behaviour seen at both Cronulla 2005 and Big Day
Out 2006, brought the issue of flag-usage into the public consciousness. With increasing levels
of flag-waving Frare identified the need for research and conducted a study from which to
better understand the social implications of Australian flag-display behaviour and large scale
intergroup relations. Frare’s findings “suggests that flags are able to express powerful, and even
sometimes hostile, expressions of national attachment and sentiment” (2009: 49). Butz asserts
that events such as Cronulla “suggest that national symbols may play a role in collective
nationalistic responses to outgroups” (2009: 788). Chris Sibley, William Hoverd and John
Duckitt note national flags “automatically activate normative values for ingroup members”
(2011: 494). From these findings it can be established that aggressive acts of flag-waving
behaviour, such as those seen at Cronulla, are synonymous with a form of nationalism that
permits the forceful promotion of national values to be conveyed through expressions of
hostility. As a result the flag may well impede notions of national inclusion for minority groups,
which in turn may impact psychological health and well-being (Butz 2009, see also Butz et al.
2007; Sibley et al. 2011). Since Cronulla, at every Australia Day there has been a mass
mobilisation of a cheap red, white and blue army. A vast array of products, a “menacing
display, in the everyday space” which possess a “two-faced ability simultaneously to
camouflage and to stage racist violence” (Perera 2007:12). Currently Australian ‘reclaimers’
continue to use the Australian flag as their trademark statement, donning it in a multitude of
fashions.
‘Reclaiming’ Australia
Like the knights of old sporting their coats of arms, the Australian flag draped around the
body of the citizen becomes a twenty first-century-marker of the corpus of nation. This modernday coat-of-arms represents colonial beliefs and core values and is used to deflect perceived
threats to nationalist discourse. For close to 250 years Australian national identity and
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membership into the nation has been regulated by norms from which white citizens have
benefited. National identity, values and symbols are closely aligned to concepts of whiteness
and are protectively guarded. Reclaim Australia is a far-right nationalist group which protests
against what it refers to as the “Islamisation of Australia” and is an example of another group
which has been mobilised through the national flag’s symbolism of ‘White Australia’. At a
Reclaim Australia rally an elderly white man, wearing a matching Australian flag cap and tshirt, holds a sign, adorned with Australian flags which states: “OUR COUNTRY OUR LAWS
NOT YOURS” (Howden 2015b: 5). At a similar rally, Roxley Foley, Aboriginal Tent Embassy
caretaker, stood close to a Reclaim Australia group and in a statement of Indigenous
sovereignty and resistance, held a sign which read, “not yours to reclaim” (Gorrey 2015).

Figure 6: Anti-Islam protesters in Martin Place armed with Australian flags and flag-decorated clothes (Image: Alcock 2015).
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“Symbols of that whiteness will always engender fear” (bell hooks 2009: 10).
Flags are imbued with beliefs and values which are in a constant state of renewal,
reinforcement and contestation. As noted it is in the political interest to take charge of the flag
given its associated and very real power. To put this another way, jurisdiction of the flag “can
control an important element in the battle over social relations within its territory” (Leib &
Webster 2007: 31). The flag is thus a vessel of socialisation which carries with it the potential
to signify dissent, dependent upon the individual / group’s subject position. In order to explore
this further I discuss the racial conflict and divisions which have been elicited through the
display and the endorsement of the Confederate battle flag of the American South.
For many Southern whites, the Confederate battle flag represents the battles fought by their
ancestors during the American Civil War. This flag proudly represents their heritage. For others
the battle flag is “a symbolic container which condenses all that it means to be a (white)
Southerner” (Leib & Webster 2007: 32). For some, both black and white, the flag is a broadly
associated as being a symbol of rebellion or defiance. For the majority of Southerners of
African-American descent, the flag is a symbol of racial discrimination, hatred and fear. bell
hooks states that
the face of terror will always be white. And symbols of that whiteness will always engender
fear. The confederate flag, for example, will never stand for heritage for black folks. It still
awakens fear in the minds and imaginations of elder black folks for whom it signaled [sic]
the support of white racist assault on blackness.
White folks who mask their denial of white supremacy by mouthing slogans like ‘heritage
not hate’ to support their continued allegiance to this flag fail to see that their refusal to
acknowledge what this ‘heritage’ means for black folks is itself an expression of white
racist power and privilege. For the confederate flag is a symbol of both heritage and hate.
The history of the confederacy will always evoke the memory of white oppression of black
folks with rebel flags, guns, fire, and the hanging noose – all symbols of hate (2009: 1011).
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hooks draws attention to a multitude of traumas which are evoked by the Confederate flag. She
identifies how white discourses work to position this symbol as an innocuous statement of
“heritage”. Furthermore, hooks argues that support of the Confederate battle flag is tantamount
to a refusal to engage with African-American perspectives, which in turn further cements the
white agenda.
The correlations that can be drawn to the Australian context are of interest. To claim that
the Australian flag represents ‘our’ heritage and democratic way of life mutes Indigenous
perspectives and experiences. The “continued allegiance” for the Australian flag, the “refusal
to acknowledge” what it represents to Indigenous peoples is, as hooks states, “an expression of
white racist power and privilege.” Echoing notions of the ‘haunted’ nation, hooks goes on to
argue that ongoing allegiance to white superiority constrains and deforms the psyche of both
blacks and whites. She contends that it is the responsibility of white people to unlearn and
contest normative systems of practice and thought.
The American Civil War was fought over the Southerners’ determination to defend its right
to own slaves. In defeat, the Confederacy re-established itself with racial vitriol and enforced
segregation, “[B]etween 1882 and 1968 almost 5000 lynchings took place with the express
purpose of subjugating African Americans with terror” (O’Malley 2015a: 15). As the black
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s took hold, the Confederate flag took on a new
life and became a symbol of opposition to the civil rights movement. On 17 June 2015, white
supremacist Dylann Roof, aged 21, murdered 9 black church-goers during a bible-study
meeting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal church in Charleston. Roof’s website sported
a manifesto of white supremacy and photographs of him with a Confederate flag.
The Confederate flag was first flown from the dome of the South Carolina state house in
1962. The Reverend Clementa Pinckney, civil rights activist and state senator who was shot
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dead by Roof, “was forced to walk by the living insult of that flag each day when he went to
work for his Charleston constituents” (O’Malley 2015a: 15). As a result of Roof’s race hate
crime, calls were made to remove the Confederate flag. The flag’s defenders however, evoked
the argument that the flag is part of South Carolina’s heritage. The flag represents “the sacrifice
of lives on the battlefield in the Confederate cause” and they claimed that if the flag came down
then, “calls to change street and place names honouring Confederate leaders” might well be
made (McLeod 2015: 15). In his tribute to Reverend Pinckney, Former President, Barack
Obama eulogised,
[F]or too long, we were blind to the pain that the Confederate flag stirred into many of our
citizens … we all have to acknowledge, the flag has always represented more than just
ancestral pride … Removing the flag from this state’s capital would not be an act of political
correctness. It would not an insult to the valour of Confederate soldiers. It would simply be
acknowledgment that the cause for which they fought, the cause of slavery, was wrong. It
would be one step in an honest accounting of America’s history, a modest but meaningful
balm for so many unhealed wounds (qtd. in O’Malley 2015b: 26).

Obama’s address leaves little room for dissent as he dispels the myths which discursively
connect the flag to battlefield valour and heritage. Obama argues that the Confederate flag,
woven out of racist practices and rhetoric, has no place in the current public sphere. The
Confederate flag was lowered on 10 July 2015, “and suddenly it seemed utterly preposterous
that the ugly banner had been tolerated there for so long”, a crowd of several thousand which
was as much “white as it was black” cheered and sang as the flag was finally lowered
(O’Malley 2015a: 15).
Conclusion
The symbolic and pedagogical power of flags can be understood through knowledge which
explores both their origins and applications. Work done in the field of vexillology that includes
a careful analysis of the manifold ways flags are deployed, reveals how flags can generate and
channel an array of social, political and emotional reactions. In Australia, flags elicit a range
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of responses that accrue around various connections and disconnections with nationalist
ideologies. In addition, as demonstrated, there is a long-standing confusion and ambivalence
associated with the flags of Australia. What emerges from this study is the extent to which flags
signify multifariously at this current juncture in the twenty first century. For some, they are
symbols of allegiance, representing national fervour, identification, and a sense of belonging.
For others, the national flag signifies exclusion. A sense of the depth and diversity of feelings
generated by the national flag and its colonial insignia is at the heart of this research, and while
much of this has been discussed above, a more thorough appraisal of the national flag will be
gleaned through an analysis of the responses of some Indigenous people in Chapter Seven. But
first, before Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander reactions to the national flag are considered,
I focus on the long-standing resistance to colonial rule. Understanding the struggle,
determination and resilience of Indigenous resistance underpins the final chapter as reactions
to the flag are not isolated events: they have been forged out of an era of resistance that began
in 1770.
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CHAPTER SIX: Acts of Resistance: Spanning Time and Distance
Grass roots reality was always the prime focus of Kevin’s work. Through his art, words and
actions, he sought to break through the code of silence that keeps the wider population ignorant
of the daily reality of ‘living Black’ in this land … Kevin’s life is only one example of the
thousands of Kooris, Murris, Yolgnu, Yapa, Palawar, Nungas, Nyoongahs and Gooris, earning
life’s breath on a daily basis, who inspire each other by acts of courage, bravery and
determination, resisting, persisting and surviving – hoping, eventually, for ‘the boat people to
grow up proper way’ for this land.91
(Gilbert & Williams 1996: 56-57).
Introduction
This chapter is about resistance. Since first contact Indigenous people in this country
have resisted and actively opposed the colonial imposition of the British Empire. A range of
responses to colonialism are discussed in this chapter which relate to the realities of “living
Black” in a nation which has long been subjected to the dominant discourses of white
supremacy through policy and practice. In order to understand how resistance by Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people has been, and continues to be expressed, I investigate a variety
of events and reactions. I begin the chapter with an exploration of art, which as a multi-layered
expression of Aboriginal Law, is both a primary mode of communication and an important site
of resistance. I discuss this through the life of Kwat-Kwat artist, Yakaduna, also known as
Tommy McCrae / McRae (c. 1835-1901). McCrae’s ink pen on paper drawing, Corroboree
depicts a number of flags and presents the viewer with a variety of hypotheses in relation to
how the work produces meaning. I will provide a reading of this work produced by the great
grandfather of Burnum Burnum92 (Swain 1988), who planted the Aboriginal flag at Dover,
England in 1988. Chapter Six takes a chronological path examining events and people who
form links in a long and interconnected chain of resistance, and who, as the epigraph suggests,
refuse to be silent. I conclude the chapter by discussing a significant act of colonial resistance.
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Kevin Gilbert was an activist, poet, playwright and artist. His ashes were buried at the Aboriginal Tent
Embassy in 1993 (Jopson 2012: 12).
92
Burnum Burnum was an activist, author and educator.
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Two hundred years after Cook made his land claim for the British Crown, Eddie Koiki Mabo,
a member of the Torres Strait Meriam nation, pursued a lengthy High Court battle against the
State of Queensland which resulted in a ruling that established the Meriam people as the
sovereign owners of their land and extinguished the colonial doctrine of terra nullius.93
Art as Communication
Aboriginal art is a long-standing practice that has been grounded in over 60,000 years
of knowledge and tradition (Boulter 1991). According to Wally Caruana “[A]rt is central to
Aboriginal life. Whether it is made for political, social, utilitarian or didactic purposes – and
these functions constantly overlap – art is inherently connected to the spiritual domain” (2012:
7). Aboriginal art is an ancient mode of communication that centres on the spiritual life of
Aboriginal people called “the Dreaming” by Europeans. The term “Dreaming” is derived from
the Dreamtime, an expression coined by the anthropologist Baldwin Spencer. In 1926, Spencer
claimed that the Arrernte word altyerre meant both ‘time of creation’ and ‘dream’ (Elkin 1966;
Arthur and Morphy 2005). In this context “the Dreaming” refers to the creator ancestors and
supernatural beings which traversed the continent and formulated laws regarding social and
religious behaviour that constituted the foundational premise for Aboriginal Law. Caruana
suggests that “the Dreaming” formulates “the ideological framework by which human society
retains a harmonious equilibrium with the universe – a charter and mandate that has been
sanctified over time” (2012:10). Before colonisation, Aboriginal Law was understood and
expressed in a variety of ways such as song, dance, storytelling and art. Aboriginal Law
constitutes,
the highest law, no-one can ever sign it away … The law transcends all things … The
law is who we are, we are also the law. We carry it in our lives. The law is everywhere,
we breathe it, we eat it, we sing it, we live it (Watson qtd. in Gilbert & Williams 1996:
43).
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See the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) website www.nativetitle25.gov.au
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Aboriginal Law, is thus a set of practices that regulates all facets of existence and finds
expression in all manner of artistic expression. Unlike Western law Aboriginal Law is not an
evolving entity; rather, it is an established foundation upon which life is understood. The Law
is inclusive of all living and non-living things and sees these as interrelated. The Law is both a
set of instructions and a mode of storytelling that finds a prominent place in art-works.
Aboriginal people customarily attained status through the acquisition of knowledge.
Art as a manifestation of knowledge asserts varying levels of authority dependent upon the
cultural status of both artist and viewer. According to Kevin Gilbert, “art communicates more
directly [and] has more significance to us than the written language. … We have presented our
oral tradition and reinforced it with our artworks” (Gilbert & Williams 1996: 28). Precolonisation, Aboriginal artistic expression was based on protocol and was both personal and
collaborative; art was the affirmation of a complex web of inter-relations (Mundine 2006).
Aboriginal art is therefore a multi-layered, powerful and complex form of cultural expression
that encompasses ethical responsibility and social organisation.
Galarrwuy Yunupingu observes that,
[W]hen we paint – whether it is on our bodies for ceremony or on bark or canvas for
the market – we are not painting for fun or profit. We are painting as we have always
done to demonstrate our continuing link with our country and the rights and
responsibilities we have to it. Furthermore, we paint to show the rest of the world that
we own this country, and that the land owns us (qtd. in Boulter 1991: 23).

Aboriginal art is understood here to be a cultural responsibility, a conduit which links the land
to its people and the people to their land. Yunupingu claims that many colonial artworks depict
acts of possession authenticated by images which feature the Union Jack. Colonial artworks
formulate a visual narrative of (dis)possession that continues to both inform and substantiate
the discursive framing of whiteness in relation to official narratives of Australian history.
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Traditional artistic expression includes motifs which encompass a range of meanings
specific to individual groups and nations. Significance is reflected in the patterns that mark the
bodies of individuals and the shields of the numerous clans. The importance of this cultural
form of identification is explored by Dennis O’Brien. The Kaurna shield is a symbol of his
clan, the Kaurna Miyurna people of South Australia,
[T]he shield is Kaurna, it’s our identity. The shield is important and the markings are
significant for us. It is one of the symbols that represent us, who we are and what we’re
about, where we’re from. Nations around the world have different flags and banners
that represent who they are. The shield is our flag (O’Brien qtd. in Osborne & Simpkin
2015: 89).

Caruana is interested in how religious images and designs make meaning. He notes that when
motifs are applied to a shield or a body, for example, they are capable of producing a significant
change in perception and can “transform the nature of the thing from a mundane state to an
extraordinary one, from the profane to the sacred” (2012: 14). The Kaurna shield thus
represents an ancient cycle of continuity that is both practical and spiritual and encompasses a
complex belief system which unambiguously connects people to place and to one another.
The Gweagal shield was taken during Cook’s first encounter with Aboriginal people at
Kurnell in 1770 and was subsequently ‘gifted’ to the British Museum, London where it has
been held since. In 2015 the shield was ‘reloaned’ to Australia and was a central part of the
Encounters exhibition. The Gweagal shield holds special significance for Shayne Williams, a
Dharawal Elder. The shield symbolises Aboriginal resistance both past and present (Osbourne
and Simpkin 2015) and forms a tangible link with the past that signifies the resilience and
ongoing survival the oldest continuing living culture on earth. Elizabeth Coleman states that
Aboriginal art forms should be considered as forms of insignia and their status comparable to
the European coat of arms system (2005). While Coleman’s focus is concerned with protecting
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Aboriginal artwork from appropriation her analogy draws attention to the many Aboriginal
nations and the symbols which established group or clan membership and associated cultural
pride. Designs are encoded with meaning and thus, cultural symbols directly connect clans to
their land and provide a link for the maintenance of customs and ways of life. Cultural symbols,
such as those found on the Kaurna and Gweagal shields, also convey specific messages relating
to ownership, knowledge and identity which in turn uphold and strengthen social structures.
Yakaduna, also known as Tommy McCrae, was a talented artist whose work captured
the exact markings of his south-eastern Murray River tribe, and according to Khadija von
Zinnenburg Carroll are, “seductively detailed for those who are now attempting to reconstruct
the significance of these individual designs” (2014: 68). McCrae’s importance is noted by
Caruana who identifies him as a nineteenth century forerunner to the urban and rural artists of
today, who use art to
offer a variety of perspectives on a world with which much of its audience has generally
been unfamiliar. At the same time, by implicitly questioning and challenging
contemporary attitudes, they articulate the concerns and aspirations of Aboriginal
people in modern society (2012: 222).

The education of white Australia through Aboriginal art has been a long-standing practice.
McCrae’s illustrations attest to this. Through his artwork McCrae keeps his culture alive and
communicates the richness of his world, which had existed for millennia prior to colonisation.
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Tommy McCrae (c.1835-1901) and his artwork Corroboree. 94
Background
Tommy McCrae was a member of the Kwat-Kwat people who lived on the central
Murray River border between New South Wales and Victoria. McCrae illustrated both the
traditional and the contemporary through his use of paper and ink. Hetti Perkins describes
McCrae’s drawings as “incredibly lively”: “I feel that if I were to give the paper a jolt the
figures would all start up and continue what they were doing” (2010: 176). The significance of
McCrae’s work is noted elsewhere, “McCrae tells his stories as an ancient animator might,
compiling frame after frame of illustrations; chapters of Aboriginal daily life and the impacts
of colonisation in simple and uncoloured truth” (Koori Mail 18 November 2015: 57). Prior to
providing a reading of McCrae’s ink sketch Corroboree (c. 1890), I discuss events that
occurred during the early part of the nineteenth century which became a sustained focus of
McCrae’s artwork.
In 1835, at approximately the time of Tommy McCrae’s birth, Australian born colonist
John Batman secured vast tracts of land from the local Aboriginal people of Port Phillip.95
Agnes Bell notes, Batman, William Buckley,96 and a small party of “Batman’s aborigines”
bargained for some six hundred thousand acres of land, “…the Batman aborigines danced and
sang to show the local groups that they came as friends. To signify that they understood, the
local aborigines replied with a short corroboree” (1965: 5-6). Although a corroboree had been
94

The word corroboree refers to Aboriginal cultural ceremonies which use music, dance and song to depict
everyday life and events both traditional and contemporary. Corroboree themes “include the ways of birds,
animals and fish; the movements of the storm, the flood and the sea … and the Aborigines’ experience of, and
interest in, European and other non-native objects and pursuits …” (Elkin 1966: 289).
95
The Wathaurong people, who McCrae refers to as the “Melbourne tribe” (Carroll 2014: 248).
96
Buckley was a convict who was transported to Australia for life. He left England on the HMS Calcutta in 1803,
one of 307 convicts assigned with establishing a settlement at Port Phillip (Levell 2008). The settlement failed
and Buckley absconded. He was eventually found and adopted by the local Wathaurong people, ‘the Melbourne
tribe’. Buckley lived with them from 1803-1835 and was known as Murrangurk. He learnt and participated in the
local Aboriginal life and he had a wife (Morgan 1967; Sayers 1994; Maynard & Haskins 2016). In 1835 Buckley
re-entered white society as it sought to establish a settlement on the Yarra River. Buckley was then paid by the
British authorities to act as an interpreter and he accompanied John Wedge and Batman, the ‘pioneers’ of
Melbourne, to secure land from the Wathaurong tribe, for Batman’s new settlement. (Carroll 2014).
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performed in the spirit of friendship, this event, referred to as Batman’s treaty, was the
beginning of an era of betrayal. Batman’s treaty was deemed invalid by the British authorities
and had no legal substance, it was however “an important first step in this process [of white
settlement … and] is symbolic of European relations with the Kulin, in that self-interest and
deceit were central to colonisation” (Yarra City Council 2016).
Following Batman’s treaty the landscape was systematically alienated. Convicts were
recruited from Hobart and Sydney to build roads for the settlement and the first land sale
attracted over 200 hundred people. Land sales were marked by a bell-man, “a colourful figure
mounted on his old grey horse and carrying a red ‘Auction’ flag” (Bell 1965: 29). Demand for
land in and around Melbourne led to further sales. Williamstown97 became Melbourne’s first
suburb, and a flag was employed as a signpost, “[Y]ou enter the bush at a place marked with a
red flag which indicates where the track to Melbourne commences” (Bell 1965: 20). In the
early years of the settlement, Melbournians also gleaned important information from the high
ground of ‘Flagstaff Hill’. Here flags of different colours and shapes were hoisted up a tall mast
to identify the origins of visiting ships: “a flag shape denoted a ship from overseas while a
pennant was the signal for an interstate vessel” (Royal Historical Society of Victoria n.d.).
By the end of 1844 Melbourne had a population of over twenty thousand and was the
second largest town in “The Land of Promise” (Bell 1965: 41). Land possession enabled
manufacturers and pastoralists to further drive Aboriginal people off their country. In the 1850s
gold was discovered. Tens of thousands of people from around the world came to Victoria, via
Melbourne. As a result, trade, industry, and the population burgeoned,

97

Williamstown was named, “to honour the ruling King” (Bell 1965: 16), King William IV (1765-1837).
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over one hundred thousand people came from England, tens of thousands from Ireland,
Scotland and China; thousands from Wales, France, Germany and the United States of
America; hundreds from Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Bell
1965: 67).

The influx of people from other nations brought with it a plethora of flags proclaiming
distinction, ownership and affiliation. At the gold diggings, flags were used to signpost
government offices and stores. For example, in Ballarat, the doctor’s flag was yellow and
embellished with a mortar and pestle. Coffee shops, lemonade stalls and the barber all had their
own flags. The undertaker’s flag was black. Alongside these, and scattered over the landscape,
were the flags and banners of the international miners (Kieza 2014; see also Fox 1973). Flags
signified distinction from ‘others’, emblems of difference that heralded the new age and erased
the old. McCrae skilfully navigated this environment of rapid change which sought to relegate
Aboriginal people to the margins.
In the early 1860s, McCrae established himself and his extended family on an eight
acre unsupervised reservation at Lake Moodemere. The family generated an income by selling
Murray River cod, local produce, and decorative artefacts (Sayers 1994; Carroll 2014). It was
at Lake Moodemere that McCrae made most of his drawings. McCrae was commissioned to
draw by white settlers and he produced prolific amounts of work. By white standards, McCrae
was a symbol of assimilatory success; he was a hard worker and a teetotaller who owned a
horse and cart (Sayers 1994; Carroll 2014). Despite achieving a level of economic
independence, McCrae could not escape the exigencies of official race policies. In 1885 the
Victorian Board for the Protection of Aborigines refused a request from McCrae and two other
men who asked for tents or a house that could be used as shelter from the cold winter (Sayers
1994), and in subsequent years regulations stipulated the forced removal of Aboriginal children
from parents who were deemed unable to care for them. Over a period of six years, all four of
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McCrae’s children98 were forcibly taken and sent to various reserves in Victoria. This had a
devastating effect on McCrae and his final years were deeply troubled as he strove, yet failed
to reunite his family and reclaim his independence from colonial forces (Cooper and Urry
1981). It was during this time in his life that McCrae drew Corroboree.

Figure 7: Tommy McCrae (c1890) Corroboree, ink on paper (University of Melbourne Archives [UMA] 2016).

98

Alexander McCrae was Burnum Burnum’s maternal grandfather (Norst 1999).
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A Reading of McCrae’s Corroboree
Carroll argues that “McCrae’s artwork must be read within the contemporaneous
context of the racialized laws that were changing Aboriginal ways of life” (2014: 218). Caruana
asserts that the interpretation of Aboriginal images is “not a one-to-one equivalence. Rather,
like poetry with all its inherent complexities, multiple references and intended ambiguities,
each symbol or icon within a work may encapsulate a variety of meanings” (2012: 14).
Therefore, as with any textual reading, the symbolic infusion of Corroboree offers various
meanings to its audience, past and present, and will be understood according to their levels of
knowledge pertaining to Aboriginal culture and Australia’s colonial history. Following this,
my reading of Corroboree, which features the three quintessential symbols of colonisation –
the ship, the white man and the flag – is therefore influenced by the date of its production, the
historical backdrop and McCrae’s lived experience.
Adolphus Elkin states that the performance of European themed corroborees can be
understood as “a protest against, or an attitude of casualness towards, the people who usurped
their country” (1966: 289). During McCrae’s lifetime traditional dances and ceremonies such
as the corroboree were forbidden by white authorities.99 McCrae resisted, or following Elkin,
“protested against” this attack on his culture through his artwork and the corroboree became a
significant and recurring theme. Using ink and paper McCrae was able to record the cultural
rituals of his people, and in doing so, he captured many of the old customs, including the
patterns on the bodies of his corroboree dancers. He portrayed groups of corroboree dancers in
different ways. For example, the ‘Echuca tribe’ dancers carry either playing-sticks or short
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The extinguishment of Aboriginal traditions and cultural practices were played out at on both the local and
continental scale. Daisy Bates provides details of two dances “the Wanji-Wanji and the Molong-go” which “took
one or two generations to traverse the continent … these great traditional dances demand a large number of
performers and audience, and for lack of them, petered out” (1944: 125). Dispossession, genocide and enforced
re-location, when combined with the Christian principles of white governance are directly attributable to the
demise of these ancient, traditional ceremonies.

176

spears, whereas the Lachlan area dancers are featured with small feathered head-dresses. Of
particular interest McCrae always portrays the ‘Melbourne tribe’ carrying “small flag-like
decorated sticks” (Sayers 1994: 33; see also Morphy 2004; Carroll 2014). In Corroboree the
dancers carry flags atop sticks, which indicates that they are members of the ‘Melbourne tribe’
or the Wathaurong people, who had previously adopted William Buckley, and from whom
Batman, using Buckley as interpreter, stole vast tracts of land. This leads me to hypothesise
that the duplicity of Batman’s treaty was in fact heightened by the realisation that a corroboree
had been performed in the spirit of ‘friendship’, to which Buckley was privy.
Buckley is the white man featured in McCrae’s illustration, and like the corroboree, he
presents as a recurring subject for McCrae. The symbolic importance of Buckley can be
understood as multi-faceted. Buckley represents three seismic events which impacted McCrae
and his people. First, in 1803 Buckley was one of the first white men to land at Port Philip.
Second, through his rejection of white society Buckley became assimilated and welcomed into
the local Aboriginal clan.100 Third, in 1835 Buckley re-entered white society and acting as an
interpreter, played an active role and was present at the 1835 signing of Batman’s treaty.
Buckley is portrayed in McCrae’s image with little facial hair; his face and expression are
clearly visible. McCrae’s depiction of Buckley stands in sharp contrast to European accounts
which mythologised Buckley as the ‘wild white man’ who on his re-entry into British
civilisation, “was dressed in animal skins, his hair and beard spread ‘as large as a bushel’”
(Levell 2008: 227). McCrae also depicts Buckley as part of the clan, initiated and assimilated
into the rites and cultural practices of those who have adopted him, “a body fully painted with

On one occasion during his time with the Wathaurong people, Buckley states “I saw some natives coming
along, one of them carrying a flag over his shoulders” (qtd. in Morgan 1967: 79). Buckley recalls how the local
people had encountered an unmanned vessel in the bay and were attracted to the flag because of its colours. They
hauled it down and also took several other things which “would prove serviceable”, when the crew returned to
find their flag and other items missing, “they fired off their pieces, but they were at too great a distance to do any
injury to the natives” (qtd. in Morgan 1967: 79).
100
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clan designs and otherwise adorned in the manner appropriate for an Aboriginal corroboree,
the European hat heightens the dignity of Buckley and the ceremony” (Carroll 2014: 239). At
first glance the image suggests that flag-waving and friendship are a mutually satisfying
cultural experience. However, on closer scrutiny, while McCrae locates Buckley as part of the
dancers, there is clearly a disconnection. Buckley, the white man, is set apart from the main
group of dancers, whose legs converge in unison. McCrae’s perspective is powerful, he resists
colonial authority by reversing assimilation practices and ascribes power to Aboriginal people
and their cultural traditions, thereby nominating white ‘visitors’ as guests to be included, or
not, at the behest of local clans.
I cannot ascertain if the Corroboree ship is the Calcutta or the Rebecca. However, both
vessels are significant. The former transported Buckley to Port Phillip in 1803, and the latter
carried Batman to Port Phillip in 1835. There can be little doubt that the boat, as both the
transporter and supplier of white people to Aboriginal land is a symbol of irrevocable change.
Boats are a recurring and prominent feature of McCrae’s work. Carroll notes a century later
that it is the image of the boat which has warped the paper, “[H]e crosshatched them so heavily
that the ink soaked through and tore the paper” (Carroll 2014: 250). The significance of the
boat for McCrae is profound. Comparable, Carroll asserts “to the emphasis of a totemic animal
or place. The totemic animal in Aboriginal society was one with which each person was
associated … their whole life” (2014: 250). Seen in this light the boat in Corroboree can be
read as an on-going site of tension, a symbol which signifies life-long and cataclysmic change
for McCrae and his people.
Traditionally the corroboree dancers would have carried leek-leek or lyrebird feathers
(Carroll 2014), yet in Corroboree McCrae depicts the dancers holding flags that replicate the
flags seen on the ship. Carroll notes that here McCrae “is seen to camouflage the symbols of
national ceremony to suit both societies in which he operated” (2014: 240). In other words,
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while this image might satisfy a colonial audience, it may also transmit a less discernible
cypher. Elkin argues that in “songs of contact” (European themed corroborees) Aboriginal
people use “the contact situation and European articles for their own personal and social ends,
almost as though white men as such did not exist” (1966: 290). Following this I note how the
Corroboree flags are seamlessly absorbed into the text as if their integration diffuses their
representational force. Viewed in this way, Corroboree can be seen as a re-imagining of the
cultural scene where white Australia, through the re-appropriation of its insignia, is
‘assimilated’ into McCrae’s tribal world, just as Buckley had been for so many years.
However, if we consider Corroboree in the context of its production date, it becomes
evident that for McCrae c.1890, there could have been little doubt as to the violent and selfinterested objectives of the ‘boat people’ who stridently marked the landscape with a
performative insignia which ‘announced’, ‘claimed’ and ‘declared’ their intentions which were
underpinned by “sanctions such as legal frameworks and normative values” (Coleman 2005:
71). While the depiction can be read in multifarious ways it seems reasonable to assume that
the arrival of sailing ships and the insignia of pieces of cloth, – flags – which came to represent
the myth of terra nullius and the sovereign claim to Aboriginal land, played a significant role
in how McCrae told his stories through his artwork.
Corroboree: An Enduring Legacy
For the descendants of McCrae’s “Melbourne tribe”, the Wathaurong people, the
repercussions of past colonial practices resulted in an extensive, but not a total loss of language.
Certain words have survived; the Wathaurong language lives on,
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[P]re-school children can sing basic rhymes, adults wear the words on their chest and
walk down Moorabool Street with the pride that they alone of all the thousands who
walk it know what Moorabool means101 (Pascoe 2007: 191).

Likewise, Corroboree has survived. Since the 1960s Corroboree has been stored in the UMA.
Described as a living cultural memory, the artwork Corroboree “connects many lives, past and
present and by tracing objects through provenance new perspectives can be found and complex
narratives reinterpreted” (UMA 2016). Corroboree has been transformed, it has been fused
into the exterior of the University of Melbourne’s new Arts West building.102 From an “archival
object” Corroboree has become, “a monumental work of public art” inscribing “a powerful
indigenous perspective on Australian history into the building’s skin” (UMA 2016).
Corroboree is replete with contemporary relevance. Corroboree provokes questions which
speak of place and identity, of nation and belonging, of land and acquisition, and, in the twenty
first century, of the flags which continue to speak for, and represent the Australian nation.
Twentieth Century Resistance103
McCrae died in 1901, the year of federation, when the ‘modern’ Australian nation was
born and the Australian red and blue ensigns were officially endorsed. As noted, preparations
leading up to federation had taken ten years and were racially motivated as Aboriginal people
were systemically excluded from this nation-building project. During the early years of the
twentieth century African-American political activism gained momentum and Marcus Garvey
became a source of influence for many, including Malcolm X and Martin Luther King. Garvey

In Wathaurong language, “Moorabool” means mussel, for this and further examples, see Pascoe (2007: 259260).
102
See Arts West façade Reveal Video @ https://arts-west.arts.unimelb.edu.au/arts-west-exterior/arts-westfacade-competition (University of Melbourne 2016).
103
Some of this work comes from my paper, “Flagging Australia: Claims and Identity”, to be published as part of
the Proceedings of the 26th International Congress of Vexillology.
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was also an important figure for Aboriginal political activism during the twentieth century
(Maynard 2007) and he clearly understood the potency of national flags,
[T]hat we suffer so much today under whatsoever flag we live is proof positive that
constitutions and laws, when framed by the early advocates of human liberty, never
included and were never intended for us as a people (Garvey qtd. in AfricaTown/CD
2014).

In 1917 Garvey founded the United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). By the
mid-1920s the UNIA had established chapters in 41 countries, including Australia. In 1920 the
UNIA held its first international convention in New York’s Maddison Square Garden. Over
25,000 members attended, including a contingent from Australia (Maynard 2007; see also
Crampton 1989b). It was at this convention, 13 August 1920 that the Pan-African flag, a tricolour consisting of three equal horizontal bands of red, black and green was formally
adopted.104 The flag was created in response to an American popular song of ridicule written
in 1900 called, “Every Race has a Flag but the Coon” 105 (UNIA-ACL 2015). While this was
not the only racist song of its kind, it drew attention to an absence to which Garvey responded,
[S]how me the race or the nation without a flag, and I will show you a race of people
without any pride. Aye! In song and mimicry they have said, “Every race has a flag but
the coon” How true! Aye! But that was said of us four years ago. They can’t say it now
(qtd. in UNIA-ACL 2015).

The colours of the Pan African flag denote: red for the blood that unites all people of Black
African ancestry and is shed for liberation, black for the people whose existence as a nation,
though not a nation-state, is affirmed by the existence of the flag, and green for the abundant
natural wealth of Africa (UNIA-ACL 2015).

104

The Pan-African Flag is also known as the UNIA Flag, the Marcus Garvey Flag, the Universal African Flag,
the International African Flag, the Black Liberation Flag, the Black Nationalist, African Nationalist, or the New
Afrikan Liberation Flag (UNIA-ACL 2015).
105
See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiMTYG4woUk (Roseborough 2011).
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In Australia Fred Maynard became increasingly aware of international Black
organisations and philosophies while working on the Sydney waterfront. In 1924, as Aboriginal
political activism intensified, Maynard and fellow activist Tom Lacy founded the Australian
Aboriginal Progressive Association (AAPA). Faith Bandler and Len Fox note, “[N]ow they
began to fight in a new way, using the white man’s weapons of organisation, of protest, of
pressure, of politics” (1983: 48). John Maynard states that many people consider the 1960s as
marking the beginnings of Black political consciousness in Australia. However, he argues, the
AAPA is, “rightfully recognised as the precursor of the Aboriginal political movement” (2007:
2; see also Plater 1994). The AAPA ceased in 1928, but was re-established by 26 January 1938
with Jack Patten as spokesperson. The AAPA formed a coalition with the Australian Aboriginal
League (AAL), under William Cooper and the Aboriginal Progressive Association (APA), led
by William Ferguson and Pearl Gibbs, to protest about the white sesquicentenary celebrations
and organise a Day of Mourning which read in part,
this being the 150th Anniversary of the whiteman’s seizure of our country [we] hereby
make protest against the callous treatment of our people by the whiteman during the
past 150 years, and we appeal to the Australian Nation of today to make new laws for
the education and care of Aborigines, and we ask for a new policy which will raise our
people to full Citizenship status and equality within the community (qtd. in Hocking
2007: 189).106

As the 1938 calls for equality and citizenship rights were officially ignored, Aboriginal people
were being discursively marked as a “dying race” (Ziegler 1938: Chapter 1:1). Ziegler writes,
[T]he present-day situation of this ancient race is forlorn indeed. According to the
observations of an eminent authority, it is on the highroad to extinction and is gradually
dying out from physical and psychological maladjustment to the changes brought about
by contact with us (1938: Chapter 1:16).

In contrast to this the Minister-in-Charge of Celebrations, John Dunningham declared the 150th Anniversary to
be a source of pride and achievement from which the “discoveries” of James Cook and, “the colonising genius of
the British race a new nation was able to come into existence” (Australia's 150th Anniversary Celebrations Council
1938: 1).
106
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In 1938, the Australian nation was underpinned by harsh assimilatory policies and practices,
yet momentum was gathering that would be felt in Aboriginal communities across the land,
“[W]hat Bill Ferguson and Bill Cooper and their comrades had started was something that
cannot be stopped” (Bandler and Fox 1983: 60).
As the American Black Panther movement ascended in the 1960s both Malcolm X and
Martin Luther King were assassinated. In Australia, Aboriginal activists made their call for
“Black Power”. This was “a policy of self-assertion, of self-identity… which is trying to
encourage black culture – the re-learning, the re-instating of black culture wherever it is
possible” (Coe 1975: 105). Black Power, “is where our people come together united, fighting
for survival” (Anderson 1975:19). Resistance to colonial rule during the 1960s was made
public through various protests. Precursors to the Black Power movement of the late 1960s and
early 1970s include the 1965 Freedom Ride and the 1966 Wave Hill walk-off. These events
laid the foundations for the emergence of more strident forms of political activism.
The Freedom Ride
In New South Wales a civil rights protest led by Charles Perkins highlighted racial
discrimination in the state’s western country towns. Perkins was born in the era of the
‘protection’ and subjected to the assimilatory practices of colonial rule. He challenged these
systems of power and through his responses became an influential voice of resistance, “[T]he
more the whites criticized Aborigines, the more I was determined to learn, and so fight them
and answer their irrational criticism” (Perkins 1975: 70). In 1966 he became the first
Indigenous male to graduate from university. Perkins entered bureaucratic life in 1969 and
worked for the Commonwealth Office of Aboriginal Affairs. In 1981 he became the first
Indigenous person to head the Department of Aboriginal Affairs. He went on to chair of

183

Arremte Council of Central Australia and was elected deputy chair of the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in 1993.
In 1965 Perkins led a group of Sydney University students on a political protest known
as the Freedom Ride. The Freedom Riders demanded equality for Aboriginal people and they
protested about the utility of public space by drawing attention to the systemic nature of racism
in regional New South Wales. The Freedom Riders travelled to Walgett, a town where racial
discrimination was endemic. For example, in 1964 two young Aboriginal boys, aged nine, were
incarcerated in a prison cell for two days and nights as punishment for taking two table tennis
bats, balls and some crayons from the Anglican Church. The Anglican minister showed no
compassion and laid all blame with members of the Aboriginal community (Curthoys 2011).
Others however were outraged, including several unions. The result was widespread publicity
and a written report which,
went far beyond the gaoling incident. It described the tin shanties, and reported firsthand accounts of the brutality and sadism of one particular policeman … the delegation
learnt of the exclusion from the RSL Club of returned Aboriginal Diggers (except
sometimes on Anzac Day) and the sign ‘Aboriginals by invertation [sic] only’ at the
Oasis Hotel-Motel (Curthoys 2011: 14).

Interviews and surveys conducted by the Freedom Riders found that Aboriginal people could
not purchase blocks of land, had to wait for the doctor to treat white patients before being seen,
and were excluded from the clothes shop, the cinema, and the Oasis lounge and RSL. Ann
Curthoys explains “wherever we went, the story of racial discrimination was the same” (2011:
17). The activists protested outside the Walgett RSL for seven hours, the ensuing
confrontations and debates had an indelible effect, not only on the township, but also upon
many of the young people present, Michael Anderson for example, witnessed the student
protest first-hand (see Perkins 1975: Chapter 8). The Freedom Riders went on to protest in
Moree as Aboriginal people were not allowed to enter Council chambers or use the toilets.
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Adults were refused entry into local swimming pool and Aboriginal children’s access was
strictly regulated (Perkins 1975). The Freedom Riders’ demonstration against racism in the
country towns of NSW was an effective strategy of resistance that attracted national and
international media attention. The publicity “shocked and embarrassed white Australia,
especially in the cities, and contributed to the overwhelming YES vote in the 1967 referendum”
(Parbury 2005: 117 emphasis in the original).
The Wave Hill Walk-Off
On 23 August 1966 Vincent Lingiari, a stockman and traditional owner, led 200
Gurindji stockmen, domestic workers and their families off the Wave Hill pastoral station.
According to Nici Cumpston this was, “an unprecedented act of resistance and selfdetermination”, a precursor which “marked the beginning of the national land rights
movement” (2017: 46). The Gurindji protest was a land claim that demanded better pay,
treatment, and working conditions from the owner of the pastoral station, an English aristocrat,
Lord Vestey. The strike lasted nine years. Initially the workers camped in the bed of the
Victoria River before moving on to their traditional lands at Daguragu or Wattie Creek in April
1967. Minoru Hokari argues that the Gurindji walk-off was an act of decolonisation that sought
to “physically leave European authority, to regain autonomy and sovereignty over their
country, to establish their own community, and to run the cattle station by and for themselves”
(2000: 113).
In 1967 the Governor-General, another British aristocrat, Lord Casey, refused to grant
a lease of 1300 square kilometres around Daguragu to the Gurindji. The Gurindji argued,
[O]ur people have lived here from time immemorial and our culture, myths, dreaming
and sacred places have evolved in this land. Many of our forefathers were killed in the
early days while trying to retain it. Therefore we feel that morally the land is ours and
should be returned to us (National Museum of Australia [NMA] 2014).
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In 1972 the Whitlam Labor government (1972-1975) came into power pledging to legislate for
Aboriginal land rights. The original Wave Hill lease was relinquished and two new leases were
issued, one to the Vesteys and one to the Gurindji. The Gurindji lease encompassed some 3300
square kilometres (NMA 2014). On 16 August 1975 Prime Minister Gough Whitlam went to
Daguragu and in a powerful and now renowned gesture, poured a handful of soil into Vincent
Lingiari's hand 107 stating,
Vincent Lingiari, I solemnly hand to you these deeds as proof in Australian law that
these lands belong to the Gurindji people, and I put into your hands part of the earth as
a sign that this land will be the possession of you and your children forever (NMA
2014).

Figure 8: Prime Minister Gough Whitlam ‘returns’ traditional lands to Vincent Lingiari (Image: Bishop 1975).

Nigel Parbury claims that “[T]his symbolic action was in imitation of the gesture by the Dutigalla [one of many
spellings of the Aboriginal word “tribe”] at Port Phillip in 1835 when they made the treaty with John Batman”
(2005: 116).
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This occasion marked the first time that the Commonwealth Government had recognised
Aboriginal Law or ceded land to the sovereign owners.
Concerted campaigns of protest and public awareness driven by Aboriginal activists
during the 1960s highlighted the need for change at every level of Australian society. On 27
May 1967 the Australian people were asked to accept a referendum, “to repeal the
discriminatory provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution by counting Aboriginal people
in the census and allowing the Commonwealth to pass laws for Aboriginal people” (Parbury
1999: 121). The referendum was supported by ninety-one per cent of the population and the
two discriminatory clauses which had adversely affected Aboriginal people since 1901 were
removed. Gordon Briscoe expected the referendum,
would wipe away the injustices of the past 200 years of coercion, suppression and
humiliation and establish a way of life for Aborigines that would bring the peace we
are entitled to as human beings (2014a: 172).

Despite the positive result of the referendum little change occurred. Behrendt claims that this
was due to the systemic failure of official structures and institutions to implement change or
any form of equality which would ease the harmful impacts of colonial policies and practice.
Behrendt also observes that the refusal to implement structural change is fortified by those
“who embrace the Australian identity only in its colonial manifestation” (2003: 4). The
rejection of an ‘exclusive’ colonial-Australian-identity by Indigenous people is an enduring
assertion of resistance which has been etched into the landscape since first contact. Tanya
Hosch states “[T]hese fearless leaders and dear friends … remind us we are all part of a
continuum of history, of struggle and reform, of small steps and big leaps” (2016: 26).
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Symbols of Identity and Resistance
Since first contact, each stage of opposition and political agitation came with demands
for change, recognition and social equity which bolstered and propelled the next, culminating
in two of the most significant Aboriginal symbols of identity and resistance. The first, discussed
in detail below, was the Aboriginal flag created in 1971whose colours of black, yellow and red
have since become central to Aboriginal identity.108 To show or wear the Aboriginal colours is
a performative act of resistance which is daily replicated through “the public display of the
Aboriginal flag and colours on Indigenous bodies and on buildings in cities, country towns and
remote communities” (Moreton-Robinson 2008b: 127). Flying the flag or wearing its colours
is an effective way of conveying solidarity, belonging, and pride. Jim Everett writes,
Red, black and yellow are the colours of our band,
Black is for the people of this Southern land.
Yellow is for the mighty sun life giver in the sky,
And red is for our people’s blood so onward we survive
(1988: 105).

The second symbol to assert Aboriginal sovereignty, land rights, culture and identity was the
Aboriginal Tent Embassy which was founded in 1972,
[W]ith its flags fluttering proudly in the breeze, the Aboriginal Embassy on the lawns
opposite the Federal Parliament has been one of the most successful press and
parliamentary lobbies in Australian political history (Newfong 2014: 139).

Archie Moore argues, “[T]he current Aboriginal Flag is a pan-Aboriginal flag. Aboriginal people may not feel
represented by this flag – given that it is a united Aboriginal nations flag” (2015: 122). This is a valid point but
the intention here is far from seeking to homogenise. My critique involves an exploration into the history of the
Aboriginal flag and its applications as a symbol of resistance, pride and identity.
108

188

The Aboriginal Tent Embassy
The Aboriginal Embassy began life as a beach umbrella, and has since become the
longest running protest site in Australia (Gilbert 2000). The Aboriginal Embassy was
established on the lawns opposite Parliament House, Canberra in 1972 in response to William
McMahon’s Prime Ministerial Australia Day address. McMahon stated that his Coalition
government would neither give, nor recognise land rights for Aboriginal people. He argued
that land rights would “threaten the security of tenure of every Australian” (qtd. in Parbury
2005: 119). McMahon’s comments spoke to the anxiety of the wider population and implied
that white Australians might lose ‘their’ land to Aboriginal people. The historical and ongoing
theft and control of Indigenous lands underpins the affluence of white Australia. Land is the
fundamental source of inherited wealth from which white Australians have reaped the benefits.
In a direct protest to McMahon’s address, a group of young Black Power activists109
left Sydney on 25 January 1972. They drove through the night and arrived in Canberra in the
early morning where they planted a beach umbrella on the lawns facing Parliament House.
Kathy Lothian argues that “the rejection of ‘whiteness’ as ‘rightness’ was the foundational
politics for many Black Power activists” (2007: 23). In an explicit rejection of McMahon’s
stance the activists put up a sign which identified the area as the “Aboriginal Embassy”. Scott
Robinson (1994) states that the Embassy was a multi-faceted display of symbolism. Canberra
is home to many embassies that exude wealth, privilege and diplomatic immunity. In contrast,
the Aboriginal Embassy signified the status of Aboriginal people as sovereign owners of the
land to whom wealth and legal recognition is denied, “[T]o some it represented traditional
Aboriginal life and to others the degraded town and station camps, and it directly expressed
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Michael Anderson, Billie Craigie, Bert Williams and Tony Coorey.
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solidarity with the Gurindji people camped at Wattie Creek”110 (Garner 2013: 250). The beach
umbrella Embassy soon transformed into a community of tents and was a site which also served
to reunite Aboriginal people. Colonial rule ensured the movements and daily practices of
Aboriginal people had been strictly regulated, “[U]nder the old pass-laws we didn’t have
opportunities to be visiting people in other reserves and other states. We really didn’t know
each other” (Sykes 1989: 94). The Aboriginal Tent Embassy became a physical site of
reconnection and unity, where political activism was expressed and enacted, “the camp
provided a unifying focus. A camp with a flag … was a challenge to white sovereignty” (Garner
2013: 248).

Figure 9: The Aboriginal Tent Embassy flying the Pan-African colours and the Tjuringa flag (Image: Foley n.d).
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And vice versa. On 22 February 1972, two representatives of the Gurindji, who had been campaigning for land
rights for six years, were invited to speak at a rally held at the Aboriginal Tent Embassy (Foley 2014b: 36).
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Initially two flags were raised at the Aboriginal Tent Embassy,
[T]he first flag that flew on the tents was a black, green and red pennant which was the
flag developed fifty years earlier by Marcus Garvey as the symbol of his international
black consciousness movement (Foley 2014b: 30).

This flag was hand stitched by Michael Anderson.111 In a show of international unity Anderson
replicated the colours of the Pan-African flag. The colours were inverted as “Anderson had
never seen the actual flag but was only remembering what … had [been] described to him”
(Maynard 2014b: 94). The first flag flown at the Aboriginal Tent Embassy was a strategic
signal that explicitly connected the Aboriginal struggle for justice to the broader international
civil rights movement. In April a second flag, known as the Tjuringa flag joined the first,
“comprising a spear laid across a red [ochre] and black background with four crescents looking
inward to symbolize the black rights struggle from the four corners of Australia” (Foley 2014b:
30).
Several months of peaceful protest passed as support for the Embassy grew both
throughout Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities. In July 1972, the situation changed
for two reasons. First, it was sometime during this month that the Aboriginal flag made its
arrival at the Embassy.
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As told to me in conversation with Michael Anderson, Lightning Ridge, Monday 2 December 2013. See also
Maynard (2014b).
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Figure 10: The Black Power salute and the Aboriginal flag [inverted] at the Aboriginal Embassy (goori2 2011).

Second, on 20 July, following the introduction of the Trespass on Commonwealth Lands
Ordinance (1972) 150 police entered the camp and tore down the Embassy tents. Violent
clashes ensued and eight protestors were arrested. On 23 July, 200 activists tried to re-establish
the Embassy. They were confronted by 360 police in what Foley describes as “one of the most
violent confrontations in the history of Canberra” (qtd. in Robinson 1994: 58). Finally, on 30
July, as busloads of supporters from across the continent arrived, the Tent Embassy was reassembled. 2000 people marched to Parliament House and in a remarkable show of resistance
and solidarity the peaceful protestors handed a note to police giving them permission to
dismantle the tent (Robinson 1994; Dow 2000). This was a strategic strike at colonial authority.
By granting permission for the tent’s removal, Aboriginal people reclaimed authority over a
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site that had been, according to the newly instituted ordinance, illegally occupied. Sykes recalls
this event,
[W]e stood back and watched while they removed the pegs and uprights, rolled the
canvas up and walked away. Quite a few of us were still there, and we whipped out
another sheet of canvas and held it aloft with our hands. The tent, we felt, was not what
was important, it was the symbolism of what it represented. A piece of ragged canvas
held high by many hands still has the power to evoke that symbol of our destitution and
living conditions, even today (1998: 192).

The presence of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy had been a constant source of
embarrassment for the McMahon government and even though authorities had physically
removed it, the spirit of resistance that the Embassy produced endured (Gilbert 2014). On its
twentieth anniversary, 26 January 1992, the Aboriginal Tent Embassy was permanently reestablished on the lawns opposite the now ‘old’ Parliament House. In 1995, the site was
registered by the Australian Heritage Commission (Dow 2000). Briscoe claims the Aboriginal
Tent Embassy became the “human face” of Aboriginal political consciousness which
“transformed any previous symbol into a national one that a series of flags personified. In my
view”, Briscoe asserts, “the flag was an emergent property that presented the lasting elements
of an Aboriginal response with its origin in 1901” (2014b: 53).
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The Aboriginal Flag

Figure 11: The Aboriginal Flag (Flags Australia 2016).

In 1971, Harold Thomas, a Luritja man from central Australia created the Aboriginal
flag. The flag is sometimes referred to as the Thomas flag, the Adelaide flag, (as it was designed
and first presented in Adelaide), or the Third flag, as it was the third flag to be flown at the
Embassy (Burton 2007). I can identify three events from 1970, which, when combined, resulted
in the production of the Aboriginal flag. In 1970 Thomas wrote to the then Prime Minister,
John Gorton, and enquired why no Aboriginal people were employed at the South Australian
Art Gallery or Museum. Shortly afterwards Thomas was offered a job as a survey artist at the
Museum. In 1970, Thomas also met with Gary Foley and together they discussed how to
“encourage their fellow Aboriginals to ‘join the cause’” (Thomas qtd. in ATSIC 1991: 8).
Furthermore, in 1970 at a Land Rights protest march in Adelaide, Thomas made a significant
discovery. He noted that, “white sympathisers at the back marched with their assorted flags
and banners while there was none of equal impact – indeed, none at all – to lead the Aboriginal
people in front” (Burton 2007: 39). Thomas asserts that “twenty people with a flag could seem
to outnumber a larger group of people without a flag” (qtd. in Kelly 2009: 37). Thomas and
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Foley decided that a flag would effectively express Aboriginal people’s demands for land rights
(ATSIC 1991).
Thomas worked to reduce several colours on the original design to just three: “black,
symbolising Aboriginal people; red, the mother earth, as well as ochre, which is used in
ceremonies; and the yellow sun, the constant giver and renewer of life” (ATSIC 1991: 8). In
order to represent Aboriginal people the colour black had to be used because, Thomas states,
“we were talking in terms of … black consciousness, black awareness, black power, be proud
of your blackness” (Harold Joseph Thomas v David George Brown & James Morrison Vallely
Tennant 1997: 8; see also Kwan 2006). In this post-referendum era, as a result of assimilatory
practices many people did not freely identify as Aboriginal. Thomas argued that a flag would
help unite Aboriginal people and provide as a symbol for cultural identity. Thomas stresses
that black was always intended to be on top of his flag, “the blacks under the red ground would
have symbolised their death. The black was on top to react against the common view, it had
shock value, it creates a tension” (Thomas qtd. in Kelly 2009: 44). Thomas regarded red and
black as colours of aggression that contrasted with the blue of the Australian flag. Thomas
created his flag to provide a unifying national symbol of identity for Aboriginal people (ATSIC
1991). The Aboriginal flag and its colours evolved to become a multi-faceted symbol of
political resistance, of survival, pride and the affirmation of cultural identity, “[T]he flag was
not a racist flag for Aborigines, but a flag for the Aboriginal people of Australia” (Thomas qtd.
in Kelly 2009: 37).
The Aboriginal flag was first flown at Victoria Square, Adelaide on National Aboriginal
Day 12 July 1971. A year later, Foley introduced the flag to the Tent Embassy in Canberra
where it was adopted on a national scale. The fate of the original Aboriginal flag remains
unknown. Described as, “one of our most powerful national symbols, the whereabouts of the
original – a national treasure if it still exists – remains a mystery” (Williams 2013). Thomas
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seeks to locate it and see it housed in the National Museum of Australia. During my research,
I came across a black and white photograph of an Aboriginal flag.

Figure 12: This photograph in The Advertiser, 14 July 1972, shows a square Aboriginal flag with a large central
disk and Colin MacDonald (Image: Gale and Brookman 1975: 112).

Figure 13: Photograph detail.

From the above photograph it is evident that this Aboriginal flag differs considerably from its
present version. Square in shape, it contrasts with European rectangular-shaped flags, which
became dominant as a result of colonialism (Neumann 2007; Knowlton 2017). The upper third
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of the flag is dark and the lower two thirds lighter. This is different to the flag of today which
is divided horizontally in two equal halves. The flag in the photograph carries a large central
disk. I note that on the tree there is an “ABORIGINAL EMBASSY” poster with an image of a
flag that appears also to feature similar proportions to that of the material flag. Shortly after
viewing the photograph I read an article by Tony Burton (2007) in the Journal of Flags
Australia, Crux Australis, titled: ‘Tjuringa Dreaming: Revolutionary Flags of the Australian
Aboriginals-Heralds of Change 1971-1997’. One section of the article is called: ‘An Adelaide
Mystery’.
Burton states that a piece of the Thomas flag had been deposited at the Museum of
South Australia in 1991. Prior to his visit to the museum to investigate the offcut in 1995,
Burton notes, vexillologists had presumed that the original Adelaide flag looked as it does
today: a flag equally divided into black and red halves with a central yellow disk. Burton claims
that the offcut, photographed below, is indicative of how the original flag actually looked.

Figure 14: Details of the offcut (Burton 2007: 36).
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When I compared the 1972 black and white photograph of the ‘square’ Aboriginal flag with
the photographs of the circular black and red offcut in Crux Australis I noted a striking
similarity. I forwarded a copy of the photograph to Burton (FSA) and he agreed that “the pattern
of the flag in North Adelaide seems to match the offcuts in the SA Museum” (2012 pers.
comm., 17 September). Burton furthered the investigation and contacted Thomas, who
identified the man in the photograph as Colin MacDonald and “confirmed that the flag near the
tents with its large disk was a second generation (that is, a copy) of the original that had been
displayed in Victoria Square the year before” (2012 pers. comm., 17 September). Burton then
provided a number of hypotheses relating to the offcut in South Australia’s Museum.
1. The Museum offcuts are from one of the replicas, not the original;
2. They are from the original which itself had the anomaly of unequal
segments of the circle;
3. That this was the original design and that replicas copied this anomaly
exactly (2012 pers. comm., 17 September emphasis in the original).
In January 2017 I met with Kristin Phillips, Principal Conservator of Textiles, Artlab Australia,
working for the South Australian Museum and I viewed the offcut. Phillips, who worked on
the Eureka flag restoration project, was interested in the 1972 photograph which she stated
gave her an idea as to why the proportions of the museum offcut were asymmetric. Phillips
noted a correlation between the photograph and the museum’s offcut and she commented that
the Tjuringa flag is also square, suggesting that perhaps its shape might have been influenced
by the shape of the square Aboriginal flag. (2017 pers. comm., 15 June).
Coral Dow’s chronology of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, formatted under three headings:
Milestones, Details and Source Documents, makes mention of the Adelaide Tent Embassy flag:
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Milestones: 13 July



Details: An embassy established in Adelaide (following a consulate in Perth). The
Adelaide embassy flew the red, black and yellow Aboriginal flag designed by Harold
Thomas and first flown in Adelaide in 1971



Source Documents: Adelaide Advertiser, 14 July 1972 (Dow 2000: 9).

Finally I note that mention was also made of this flag during a 1997 court case which was
triggered by the Aboriginal flag’s gazettal (see below). In 1995 the Aboriginal flag was
assimilated into Australia’s flag hierarchy through its gazettal, and it became an official flag of
the Australian nation. Following the proclamation Thomas sought to assert his ownership of
copyright as the flag’s designer. He was angry with the Commonwealth which, among other
things, he claimed sought to reproduce the flag without his permission in the 1995
Commonwealth of Australia book, Australian Flags (Thomas v Brown 1997: 3). During the
court hearing Justice Sheppard examined the offcut held by the South Australian Museum. He
noted “that the circle was divided between the black and the red sections of the material
unevenly. There was more red material than black material” (qtd. in Thomas v Brown 1997: 6).
Sheppard also drew attention to a photograph taken at a protest rally in March 1972,
I looked at the photograph said to be of the group taken after the Brutality March in
which Mr [Colin] MacDonald is holding the flag, I observed that the flag he was
holding seemed to have more material that was red than material which was black (qtd.
in Thomas v Brown 1997: 45).

Sheppard noted the similarities between the offcut and March 1972 photograph but did not
consider it appropriate to pursue the anomaly in court any further. On 9 April 1997 the Federal
Court concluded:
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1. It be declared that:
(a) Harold Joseph Thomas is the author of the artistic work being the design for the flag
described in Schedule 1 to the proclamation dated 27 June 1995 under s.5 of the Flags
Act 1953 and published in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S259 of 14 July
1995, such flag being known as “the Aboriginal flag” (“the artistic work”); and
(b) Harold Joseph Thomas is the owner of the copyright subsisting in the said artistic
work (Thomas v Brown 1997: 2).
The Aboriginal flag remains protected under the Copyright Act 1968 and can only be
reproduced with Thomas’ permission. The Adelaide “mystery” is not solved. Perhaps filmed
or photographic evidence in private collections may be in existence, which, if found, could
substantially enrich our understandings of the Aboriginal flag during the early stages of its life.
Further research indicates that the original flag was indeed different to the present flag,
in both shape and proportion. Thomas states that his original flag was “squared up” and that
“present day flags were too long” (qtd. in Burton 2007: 45; see also Thomas v Brown 1997: 8).
The exclusive manufacturers of the Aboriginal flag, Carroll and Richardson, were unable to
produce the flag in its original, shorter proportions and convinced Thomas that his flag would
look out of place if its specifications differed from those of the national flag (Kelly 2009).
Thomas and vexillologist Ralph Kelly agree that the original proportions of the Aboriginal flag,
“were more balanced and stronger than the current stretched proportions and the central disk
was better in its original larger size” (Kelly 2009: 40). Following this, it could be argued that
through its standardisation, the Aboriginal flag has been successfully regulated in that it now
defers to colonial specifications. Furthermore through its gazettal, the Aboriginal flag has also
been forced into compliance, yet in this instance colonial authority was imposed without
Thomas’ consent.
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On 14 July 1995 both the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags were gazetted by
the Federal Government as official flags of Australia. Thomas was critical of this. His flag was
meant to serve his people and was not intended to be, as he put it, “a flag of significance to the
Australian nation generally … [and] was not a reflection of white people’s flags” (Thomas qtd.
in Kelly 2009: 37). Thomas’s complaint was compounded by a lack of governmental
consultation,
[T]he Gazettal had no respect for the designer. It didn’t appreciate the integrity of the
flag. The Government didn’t understand the facts of the flag and its symbolism. The
Government wanted a symbol to show acceptance. It dismissed the struggle of the
people for whom the flag is still important (Thomas qtd. in Kelly 2009: 38).

Thomas argued that the representational force of his flag would be diffused if it became an
Australian flag (Kwan 2006). Not only was the symbolism of Thomas’ flag under siege but so
too was its status. According to the Flags Act 1953 proclaimed flags are subservient to the preeminence of the Australian flag.
Opposition Leader, John Howard, was opposed to giving the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander flags official recognition. He claimed the move “would rightly be seen by many
in the community not as an act of reconciliation but as a divisive gesture” and he feared it
would “diminish the status of the Australian flag” (qtd. in Kwan 2006: 134). Clark argues that
Howard’s vision for the nation, “rests on a construction of unified national identity premised
on division” (2006: 55). The status of the “unified” nation’s flag was being compromised and
the Opposition was anxious “that the red, black and yellow Aboriginal flag could be flown in
place of the Australian flag at official events” (Cole-Adams 1995). Labor Prime Minister at
that time, Paul Keating, argued that the official inclusion of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander flags was an “inclusive act” which meant, “[I]t will no longer be a breach of protocol
for a young athlete like Cathy Freeman [see below] to carry the Aboriginal flag with pride”
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(qtd. in Cole-Adams 1995). Through the premise of “inclusion”, or what Administrative
Services Minister, Frank Walker calls “a gesture of reconciliation to Australia’s indigenous
peoples” (Cole-Adams 1995), the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags were proclaimed
as official flags of Australia. The formal recognition of the Aboriginal flag was granted by the
Queen’s representative, Governor General, William Hayden. The Flags Act 1953 Proclamation
states that the flag is, “recognised as the flag of the Aboriginal peoples of Australia and a flag
of significance to the Australian nation generally” and is, “to be known as the Australian
Aboriginal flag” (Commonwealth of Australia 1995: 152). Thomas “bitterly resented the flag
being proclaimed in this way … the proclamation represented a usurpation of something which
properly belonged to the Aboriginal people” (Sheppard qtd. in Thomas v Brown 1997: 11).
Despite the flag’s forced assimilation into the Australian nation, the Aboriginal flag spans time
and distance and endures as a strident symbol of identity, pride and resistance. The following
section explores some of the ways the Aboriginal flag has been employed to reinforce and
reinstate Aboriginal identity.
Flagging Pride and Resistance
1988
On 26 January 1988, white Australia marked 200 years of ‘settlement’ and was in the
grip of a national celebration (Norst 1999). Andrew Lattas notes that national celebrations are
contrived by the state in order to produce nationalism which he defines as “one of the major
currencies the state trades upon for its existence” (1997: 223). In New South Wales alone more
than 32,000 Bicentennial events were planned (Jarman 1987). The Australian Bicentennial
Authority (ABA), formed by the federal government in 1980, and headed by the serving Prime
Minister of the day, was tasked to prepare a programme for the year-long 1988 celebration.
The ABA’s objectives were:
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To strengthen national pride.



Involve all Australians.



Provide useful and lasting souvenirs for future generations.



Offer educational and cultural programmes into Australia’s past, present and
future.



To have international involvement (White 2004: 31).

The original theme chosen by the ABA for the Bicentennial was ‘Living Together’ (Parbury
2005). The Bicentennial logo was designed by Don Goodwin in 1981. He originally used the
Commonwealth colours of blue and golden yellow, however in 1984, the colours were altered
to green and deep yellow to reflect the formal adoption of Australia’s national colours (Bartlett
2010).

Figure 15: The Australian Bicentennial Logo (Flags Australia 2014).

The “Australian Bicentennial symbol is a ribbon broadly representing the Australian landmass, and the differing stripes, harmoniously combined, visually express the Bicentennial
theme of ‘Living Together’” (Jarman 1987:12), although according to Flags Australia,
[T]he logo for the Bicentennial celebrations was a stylised map of Australia, consisting
of a ribbon with stripes of different widths. The ribbon alluded to the diagonal stripes
of the Union Jack and the seven golden stripes signified the six states and the territories
(2014).
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Lattas states that the production of symbolic capital such as flags allows the state to
profit “from its investment in the creation and circulation of a culture of nationalism” (1997:
223). ABA Chair, John Armstrong questioned the “Living Together” theme noting the
structural inequality of Australian society and the Bicentennial theme was subsequently
changed to: ‘Celebration of a Nation’ (Parbury 2005). Two hundred years of white Australia
was heralded as a year-long national celebration in the minds of its citizenry. The politics of
cultural investment work hard to connect the people to their mythologised version of history.
Through this investment “the fiction of a national identity and the mythic space of the nation”
is created and so “the state renews and establishes its authority as sovereign” (Lattas 1997:
223-224). The Bicentennial project was an intense campaign in which the story of white
Australia was authenticated through ephemera and events underpinned by the narrative of a
‘national celebration’. This narrative was represented by a logo into which the Union Jack, as
ever-present overseer, was surreptitiously woven.
Kevin Gilbert & Eleanor Williams state that 1987 was designated as a “Year of
Mourning” for Aboriginal people (1996: 59). Resistance to the official Bicentennial
celebrations commenced with a demonstration at the War Memorial, Canberra. It was here that
the Aboriginal flag, also known as the land rights flag, was laid, as if draping a coffin at the
base of the tomb of the Unknown Soldier which displays the sacrosanct words: “Lest We
Forget” (Gilbert & Williams 1996: 59 and 82). In Chapter Four I argued that the Australian
War Memorial has been eulogised as ‘the soul of the nation’ and I drew attention to the fact
that it is a space where Aboriginal people have long been kept on the periphery. The act of
draping the Aboriginal land rights flag at the base of the Unknown Soldier could be interpreted
as a symbolic gesture of mourning that marks the Unknown Solider as Aboriginal and also
draws attention to the battles fought on Aboriginal land during two hundred years of
dispossession, and to the on-going reality of exclusion. Smith notes that for military funerals
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the national flag becomes a ‘pall’ flag used to drape the casket (1975). In Australia the national
flag “may be used to cover the coffin of any deceased Australian citizen … The canton should
be draped over the ‘left shoulder’ of the coffin, representing the heart” (Commonwealth of
Australia 2010: 21). Even in death the body remains symbolically ‘British’ at heart. Draping
the Unknown Soldier with the Aboriginal flag can also be understood as a powerful act of
symbolic inversion that challenges the dominance of colonial discourse with a public
declaration of Aboriginal sovereignty.
Australian writer Patrick White was disenchanted with the 1988 celebrations. He
articulated his disdain by the flying both the Aboriginal and Eureka112 flags (Norst1999). These
flags are potent, grass-roots symbols of resistance, as a result, they have gained popularity in
their own right, “… they were people’s flags. In Australia this has been rare. Flags represent
official power” (Kennedy 1998: 20). Kennedy draws attention to the way in which the
Australian national flag, and its associates, state flags for example, have been authorised and
manipulated as symbols of colonial authority.
Burnum Burnum
In a personal statement of resistance to the Bicentenary, Tommy McCrae’s great
grandson, Burnum Burnum made a famous anti-colonial declaration. On 26 January 1988, he
planted the Aboriginal flag at Dover and took possession of England. Burnum Burnum was
proud to discover who his great-grandfather was “…for Tommy McRae was respected as a
notable Aboriginal artist in his own day and is valued even more today” (Norst 1999: 68). Like
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The Eureka flag, is also known as the flag of the Southern Cross. It was first flown over the Ballarat Eureka
goldfield on 29 November 1854. In response to increasing angst against the government and the exorbitant costs
associated with the monthly gold licence fee the diggers gathered around a pole some 24 metres tall from which
the giant, four by two and a half metres Eureka flag flew and the diggers swore their allegiance to a flag that was
not British. “We swear by the Southern Cross to stand truly by each other and fight to defend our rights and
liberties” (Kieza 2014: 136). The Eureka flag has a dark blue field and a white symmetric cross in the centre which
features five white, eight-pointed stars. Today the Eureka flag has been endorsed and appropriated to suit an array
of purposes. For some the Eureka flag is an icon which speaks of unity and popular struggle; for others it is a
symbol of right-wing patriotism and division.
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his predecessor Burnum Burnum wanted to send a message about the colonial history of
Australia. His protest was “[A] bit of theatre-of-the-absurd to show the absurdity of people on
the other side of the world claiming a whole continent for themselves” (Norst 1999: 131-132).
Burnum Burnum’s was “the Bicentennial event that was to crown them all” (Norst 1999: 130).

Figure 16: On 26 January 1988 Burnum Burnum used the Aboriginal flag to take possession of England (Image:
Kulture Consulting n.d).

Burnum Burnum chose the white cliffs of Dover to make his land claim because it evoked in
him a sense of terra nullius; the landscape here presented as ‘empty land’ and lay waiting to
be claimed. This was a moment captured in time, as noted by Norst “[T]he image of the
Aboriginal hero laying claim to English soil with the Aboriginal flag held proudly aloft
expressed ‘more than a thousand words’” (1999: 135). Burnum Burnum ‘invaded’ and took
‘possession’ of England with the Aboriginal flag. His was a “symbolic gesture of defiance
[which] played against the pomp and ceremony of the bicentennial celebrations” (Farnsworth
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1997). Burnum Burnum’s claim conveyed Aboriginal peoples’ convictions regarding the
unlawful occupation of their land. His “‘invasion’ was a publicity triumph. He appeared on
television all over the world” (Norst 1999: 132). As Burnum Burnum laid claim to England he
delivered an address (see Appendix E). Burnum Burnum’s Declaration and use of the
Aboriginal flag questioned the legitimacy of Australia’s claims. Burnum Burnum conveyed to
“white Australians and British people the realisation that this occupied land, Australia, was
claimed arbitrarily by an alien people without any consultation, let alone treaty or
compensation” (Coulter qtd. in Norst 1999: 136). Burnum Burnum’s was a strategic message
of resistance to the world. I now turn to some notable athletes who have also employed their
flags to send a powerful message of resistance.
Flags of Culture and Identity
Cathy Freeman
Cathy Freeman is an athlete of international renown. She was born in 1973 and became
an Olympian sprinter. Freeman is described by Leanne White as “an iconic sporting and
cultural ambassador for her country, [who] has helped influence the way Australians and the
rest of the world think about this country and its people” (2008:1). Freeman was shaped by
assimilationist policies which deeply affected her family and community. She states that “[A]ll
this pain inspires me. I want to be a freedom fighter. I want to break down the stereotype of
Aboriginal people as alcoholics and criminals” (Freeman 2003: 79). At the 1994
Commonwealth Games in Canada, Freeman aged 21, won her first gold medal. She ran a
victory lap draped in the Aboriginal flag, an image which was broadcast worldwide. Freeman
notes she
took the flag and draped it over my shoulders like a cape and trotted off. I wanted to
shout, ‘Look at me, look at my skin. I’m black and I’m the best!’ There was no more
shame (2003, 81).
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This was an act of agency and pride that resonated globally. Arthur Tunstall, Australian
Commonwealth Games chef de mission113 criticised Freeman’s use of the Aboriginal flag. He
stated the management “did not want any athlete acknowledging flags other than the Australian
flag” (McGregor 2000: 169). In 2012, Tunstall re-stated his case, “[W]e compete under one
flag, the Australian flag … They were the rules … I didn’t even know what the Aboriginal flag
bloody looked like!” (qtd. in Sygall 2012: 2). In 1994 the Aboriginal flag was 23 years old.
Freeman’s decision to carry the Aboriginal flag generated 5000 letters and faxes of
support. A 94 year old Aboriginal woman stated,
I’ve seen all these things happen with stolen children, being moved from our homes,
seen cruelty and sadness and when I saw you run around with that flag, for the first time
in my life I felt it was worth it all to be an Aborigine (qtd. in Freeman 2003: 87).

Thomas credits Freeman with altering the Aboriginal flag’s capacity for meaning-making,
“until Freeman’s triumphant laps in Canada, the flag had rarely been seen as a symbol of
victory. Freeman changed its image forever” (Thomas qtd. in Stephens 1994: 1). Six years
later, at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, Freeman won Australia’s 100th Olympic gold medal
which was the first individual gold medal won by an Indigenous athlete (White 2008). In a
similar symbolic gesture that would again generate significant local and global support
Freeman ran her victory lap sporting both the Aboriginal and Australian flags.

113

At an international sports event the person responsible for the national team is referred to as the chef de mission.
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Figure 17: The Aboriginal and Australian flags being carried by Cathy Freeman at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games (Image:
SBS 2015).

It was always a dream of mine to not only win an Olympic gold medal but to do the
victory lap with both flags ... I hold the Aboriginal community in such a high place in
my heart so I’m very proud of my Indigenous roots (Freeman qtd. in Marlow 2015).
Damien Hooper
Damien Hooper is a professional boxer who competed at the London 2012 Olympic
Games. Prior to his first match, Hooper sparked contention by wearing a T-Shirt which had the
Aboriginal flag printed on its front.
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Figure 18: Damien Hooper wearing an Aboriginal flag t-shirt at the London 2012 Olympic Games (Image: Barrett 2012).

International Olympic Committee (IOC) Rule 50 forbids the use of any paraphernalia which
may detract from the sporting focus of the Games. The Olympic charter also states athletes
who breach IOC Rule 50 should face disqualification. Following the charter, Hooper had
breached IOC rules and he was duly reprimanded. Australia’s chef de mission, Nick Green,
stated that Hooper was “very remorseful” and “extremely apologetic”, Green asserts Hooper
has “learnt his lesson and he won’t do that again” (Lane & Barrett 2012: 4). The infantilising
of Hooper as a ‘naughty child’ who has “learnt his lesson” is a well-worn colonial strategy used
to bring into line recalcitrant ‘others’. Hooper, clearly aware of the discursivities of national
sporting bodies, responds to the admonition by stating,
I am an Aboriginal, representing my culture and all my people, and I am very proud ...
I was thinking about my family and all that. It made my whole performance better (qtd.
in Barlow 2012).

210

In his response, Hooper undermines Green’s affirmations of his penitence for wrong doing by
foregrounding his people as the primary focus of his performance. There are no quotes of
remorse from Hooper himself. Hooper remained,
unfazed about a possible sanction from the IOC or the Australian Olympic Committee
(AOC). “I’m not saying that I don’t care,” Hooper said “I’m just saying that I’m very
proud of what I did” (qtd. in Barrett 2012)

Following Hooper’s treatment by the IOC debate was reignited which saw Indigenous leaders
from across the nation demand a new Australian flag. Gracelyn Smallwood asks,
when will all this madness end of the white man’s fear of Aboriginal elite athletes
wearing the colours with pride? … After 224 years of oppressing our people the white
man still wants to control what we can and cannot be proud of … We’ve got news for
the government and that is Aboriginal Australians, including our elite athletes, will
never disrespect our culture and the flag that we identify with no matter the occasion
(qtd. in Hagan 2102: 1).

Hooper questions both the validity and appropriateness of the Union Jack, “[W]e are two
cultures living in one nation … we’re not Pommies,114 why should our flag be another flag?”
(qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 22). Activist Phil Cleary called on the AOC to lobby for the Aboriginal
flag to be recognised at the Olympics, “out of respect and because [in contrast to the Australian
flag] it is not a symbol of conquest” (qtd. in Lane & Barrett 2012: 4). While recognition for the
Aboriginal flag remains an aspirational goal, changes in May 2015 to the AOC’s constitution
have been warmly received by many Indigenous Olympic athletes. The amended constitution
now reads: “To recognise the heritage, culture and contribution of our nation’s first people, and
to give practical support to indigenous reconciliation through sport” (AOC 2016). While the
amendment to the AOC’s constitution is a positive step forward, the Australian flag remains
the only one permitted to be flown at the Olympic Games. As the AOC notes, “International

114

A British immigrant / national.
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Olympic Committee mandate[s] that the only flag that can be flown is the flag of the territory
(in our case, Australia). Only one flag is approved per country” (2016: pers. Comm., 16 Nov).
Following this discussion two things are evident. First, for some Aboriginal people the
Australian national flag remains a colonial symbol of sovereignty which defies any imaginings
of ‘unity’. The national flag’s representational capability is thus ‘deficient’ and warrants
supplementation with the Aboriginal flag, as Freeman and Hooper both demonstrate. Second,
official reactions to the public display of the Aboriginal flag are, in some cases, as Smallwood
attests, indicative of a perceived threat; of “the white man’s fear”. Geoff Hocking states, “the
flag, as a symbol, has always been recognized as one of the most important tools for bringing
together peoples of like minds, or peoples of common experience” (2002: 44). Understanding
the flag in these terms we can see how the current Australian national flag has the capacity to
fail those whose collective experience stands in sharp contrast to the “common experience” of
white Australians.
Patty Mills
Patrick “Patty” Mills is an elite basketball player. His father is from Thursday Island in
the Torres Strait and his mother is a member of the Stolen Generations. Mills competed at the
2012 London Olympic Games where he and his teammates held a ‘semi-serious’ “flag raising,
with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island flags ceremoniously unpacked and then draped
over the balcony” (Wright 2013: 32).
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Figure 19: Patrick Mills with the Torres Strait Islander and Aboriginal flags (Image: Mills 2017).

As noted the IOC is stringent with its rules, including the use of political statements and nonapproved flags. In this instance Green resolved the issues which emerged from the display of
the unauthorised flags and they stayed up.
Mills states, “I have an Indigenous background and feel there’s a part of me that has to
represent and show where I’m from, and part of the culture, just like everyone else on the team”
(qtd. in Wright 2013: 32). From this comment Mills infers that while white Australians are
represented by the cultural symbolism of the Australian national flag, his Indigenous heritage
is overlooked. This assertion of a different mode of meaning-making from flags centralises the
notion that signification is culturally understood. Guenter explains, “[F]lags are visual symbols,
with both aesthetic and emotional draws based on the cultural stance of the person viewing
them” (2016: 3). Through Mills’ Indigenous lens the Australian flag is seen and understood as
an exclusive symbol of cultural identity. I now draw attention the Torres Strait Islands and their
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flag, which Mills acknowledges has deep significance, “[M]y heritage and my culture and
where I’m from mean the most to me, more than anything” (Mills qtd. in Witz 2014).
Torres Strait Islands, Mabo and the Torres Strait Islander Flag
The Torres Strait Islands consist of some 250 small islands situated in the waters of the
Torres Strait, between Cape York Peninsula and Papua New Guinea and are a designated part
of the State of Queensland. Among these islands is Bedanug, which in 1770 Cook both
‘claimed’ and ‘re-named’. Cook’s territorial acts linger, they signify a blatant disregard for
Indigenous people which continues to haunt the nation,
[O]ur people have been living here for thousands of years, hunting dugongs, fishing
and trading. We are a seafaring people. When we saw the foreign ship approaching, we
used smoke signals to warn each other. Our people did not agree to Cook’s declaration
of possession of our land. There was no treaty. There was no consent. … This is the
original grievance which Australia must now make right (Bourne & Bedford 2017: 25).

From the mid-1800s and on several fronts life for Torres Strait Islander people was irrevocably
altered by colonial forces. These included missionaries who repressed traditional beliefs and
sought to inculcate Islanders with Christianity. The pearling and bêche-de-mer (sea cucumber)
industries also exploited local people as cheap labour. Furthermore in 1898, the Cambridge
Anthropological Expedition accelerated cultural denigration by the collection and removal of
over twelve hundred culturally significant objects (Nakata 2001). Underpinning these
intrusions were the assimilationist government administrators. For example, during the first
half of the twentieth century, and under the guise of protection, the Queensland government
kept the Islanders segregated from mainland Australia controlling where and when they could
work and travel (Langton & Loos 2008).
Eddie “Koiki” Mabo of the Meriam nation, was born on one of the smallest and most
remote islands known as Mer, or Murray Island. At aged 15 Mabo was disciplined and sent to
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Thursday Island for twelve months. Pat Killoran, Protector of the Torres Strait Islands, forbade
Mabo from travelling south and ordered him to work on the local trochus (sea snail) luggers.
By the late 1950s Islanders were permitted to work on the Australian mainland where they
performed menial tasks. At Hughenden, in western Queensland, Mabo worked on the railways.
When in town, Mabo, his wife and small children were refused accommodation, so they slept
at the railway station. These practices were replicated for many Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people who lived in Queensland during the 1960s, as the State “intensified its
draconian racialist grip on their lives” (Langton & Loos 2008: 339).
In the 1970s Mabo was made aware that his home, Murray Island, was classified as
Crown land. Mabo refused to accept that the Crown owned all rights in relation to his land and
became determined to prove otherwise. (Reynolds 2000; Langton & Loos 2008). In June 1992,
after a protracted legal battle, and in the same year that the Torres Strait Islander flag was
created, the High Court’s Mabo decision was finally realised,
[H]is flaring imagination, intellect and courage finally enabled him to persist through
the ten years of the Meriam High Court challenge that acknowledged the native title
that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people had to their land ‘since time
immemorial’. He died of cancer on 21 January 1992, four months before the High Court
decision swept away the concept of terra nullius. This is now referred to as the Mabo
decision, or sometimes simply Mabo (Langton & Loos 2008: 333).

On the proviso that there was a demonstrable and continuous link with land and traditions, the
Mabo decision facilitated opportunities and possibilities for Aboriginal people on mainland
Australia. In reality though colonial law ensures that native title is difficult to prove. Given the
relationship between colonial power and land, it follows that the displacement of Aboriginal
people from their land was an essential weapon of colonisation. The result of this disruption
makes it often impossible to establish an unbroken link to country and culture. In other words,
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the very nature of colonial dispossession complicates and thwarts Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples’ claims for native title.
In the aftermath of Mabo and the disclosure of the myth of terra nullius, questions were
raised that challenged official narratives of Australian history and perceived threats
surrounding notions of legitimacy provoked an outburst,
[T]he reaction of the vested interests ranged against the Indigenous inheritors of native
title was hysterical and vindictive. While the Murray islanders celebrated, pastoralists
and miners expressed more and more wild theories and fears for the future of the
Australian land tenure system and whether Aborigines would demand compensation
(Langton & Loos 2008: 371).

Attwood states that this anxiety promotes ideas “that symbols of the British Australian past
will be abandoned or severely eroded, for instance, that the Union Jack will be replaced by a
symbol of the Aboriginal presence” (1996b: 105-6). The Union Jack is the signifier of white
possession and for many the Union Jack on the Australian flag is the tangible marker of what
it means to be ‘Australian’. For those whose vested interests lie in maintaining the mythology
surrounding a legitimate and peaceful settlement, the national flag is extolled as a symbol of
shared values, identity and heritage.115 The national flag however, as Mills attests, could not
‘speak’ to or for, Torres Strait Islanders.
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See http://www.jamesmcgrath.com.au/australians_urged_to_unite_under_our_iconic_national_flag for a
recent example of Australian national flag reverie spoken by James McGrath, Assistant Minister to the Prime
Minister (Jackson 2016).
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Figure 20: The Torres Strait Islander Flag (Flags Australia 2016).

The Torres Strait Islander flag was designed by the late Bernard Namok of Thursday
Island. It was created in 1992 as a result of a cultural revival workshop. The Torres Strait
Islander flag symbolises the unity and identity of all Torres Strait Islander peoples. The flag’s
colours: green, blue, black and white represent the land, the sea, the people, and peace,
respectively. The flag’s central symbols are the dhari and a five-pointed star. The former
represents a dancer’s head-dress and the latter represents the five major island groups. The star
is also a reminder of the importance of navigation to the seafaring people (Commonwealth of
Australia 2010: 28).
The Torres Strait Islander flag is now over twenty years old. Despite this, it is evident
that for some Australians knowledge about this flag is limited. For example in Melbourne’s
North West, the Australian, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags are flown at the
Malahang Reserve in Heidelberg West Park. However, over a period of two years the Torres
Strait Islander flag was stolen five times due to misconceptions about its origins. Banyule
Mayor Craig Langdon told the Heidelberg Leader that he believed the flag was being stolen
after he received a call from a local woman telling him she did not like the “Arabic” flag:
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He said the caller asked whether he was proud of the flags flying at the reserve.
“I said of course I was proud of the flags, and she said ‘we don’t like the Arabic flag’,”
Cr Langdon said.
“I said no it’s not, they’re the three official flags of Australia.”
Cr Langdon said the caller remained staunch that she and others in the community
believed the flag was Arabic (qtd. in Thorpe 2016).

In order to counter both the confusion and the expense of replacing the Torres Strait Islander
flag, the council decided to invest in educational signage to clarify the flags’ status and history.
Mayor Langton confirms that the signs, combined with the publicity attracted, have worked –
the Torres Strait Islander flag has not been stolen since March 2016 (pers. comm., 15 November
2016). Bernard Namok Jnr, from Badu and Darnley Islands, airs his frustration at the lack of
public education regarding his father’s flag, “twenty years on, there is still more education
needed about Australia’s Indigenous cultures and in particular the Torres Strait Islander flag,
colours, symbols and designer” (qtd. in Koori Mail 9 March 2016: 23). His response has been
to create a documentary which not only keeps his father’s legacy alive, but also informs and
educates the wider population (Thorpe 2016).116
Conclusion
Indigenous resistance to colonial rule is a long-standing practice which, since first
contact, has been expressed in a multitude of ways. In this chapter I have discussed a range of
these expressions. Grounded in culture, expressions of resistance by Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people stridently reject the imposition of an exclusive Australian identity that
has been forged out of colonial ideology and symbolism. This is made evident by McCrae, who
despite the ‘protection’ and assimilation policies which actively sought to extinguish age old
customs and traditions, has kept his culture alive through his artwork. Long-standing protests
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“Carry the Flag” (Namok 2017).
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also elucidate the resistance of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The protracted
fight for land rights as demonstrated by the Gurindji and Eddie Mabo was fortified by their
refusal to acquiesce. The Aboriginal Tent Embassy endures as a permanent visual protest site
of resistance, a place where ongoing activism to the colonial project is daily performed.
Through various acts which foreground the Aboriginal flag, Burnum Burnum and most
recently, elite athletes such as Freeman and Hooper demonstrate how the Aboriginal flag
signifies as both a statement of resistance, as well as a powerful marker of cultural identity.
The athletes’ responses cited in this chapter highlight how the Australian national flag fails to
be fully representative. In order to further understand this, Chapter Seven is devoted to various
reactions to the Australian national flag by Indigenous people.

219

CHAPTER SEVEN: Seeing Red … White and Blue
We want to be proud of a flag that we fly and the current Australian flag just doesn’t sit well
because of its dark history … How can we be proud as Aboriginal Australians and see the sight
of the Union Jack and what that flag has done in the past, the genocide the rape and the murder
and the stolen children? I can’t stand for that. That’s why I never fly that flag at my fights. I
want a flag that represents all of us.
(Anthony Mundine qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 22).
Introduction
Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues that for Indigenous people the effects of white
possession are palpable. She states “white possession is not unmarked, unnamed, or invisible;
it is hypervisible … signs of white possession are embedded everywhere in the landscape”
(Moreton-Robinson 2015: xiii). In order to discover what the national symbol might represent
to some Indigenous people, this chapter channels Moreton-Robinson’s theory of
‘hypervisibility’ directly onto the Australian flag. Currently, hegemonic ways of seeing or
understanding the national flag effectively seal and steal the discussions which frame it;
knowledge outside of dominant discourses is often silenced, or rendered invisible. Much of
today’s rhetoric about the flag is couched in comfortable terms of reference which speak to
tradition, sentiment and history. What is frequently ignored in this discourse, until it becomes
conspicuous through the manifestation of overt forms of nationalism, is the political component
of the flag. The Australian national flag is typically imagined as an everyday emblem and is
neither seen nor understood as an object which privileges white Australia.
In Chapter Five I note bell hooks’ comment that flags, when employed as symbols of
whiteness, have the capacity to transmit racialised messages of trauma, exclusion and
oppression. hooks’ understanding of the ways that flags function can be transposed to the
Australian context where we see that attachment to the national flag is also based on concepts
of white supremacy. For white Australia understandings of ownership, entitlement and
legitimacy have been inherited and are deployed under the flag to justify white autonomy over
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Indigenous dispossession. It is precisely this enduring act of dispossession, which is
symbolised in the flag that ensures the continuity of trauma referred to by hooks. The on-going
act of dispossession is accompanied by national narratives that ratify claims to sovereignty.
These stories formulate the nation’s understanding of itself and are derived from privileged
ways of ‘knowing’ that have generally avoided both intellectual analysis and public scrutiny
(see Stanner 1974; White 1981; Billig 2013; Moreton-Robinson 2015). If the racialised
properties of the national flag seldom receive considered attention in the public sphere, 117 it
follows that the manufacture of a nationalism deeply embedded in a white supremacist colonial
history remains tightly woven into the fabric of Australia’s national flag. With this in mind, the
task at hand, for this chapter, is to consider, through various forms of evidence, Indigenous
peoples’ understandings of the national flag. Dovetailed throughout this discussion are the
standpoints of Indigenous leaders who spoke out in support of Damien Hooper in the aftermath
of the 2012 London Olympic Games. They demand a new flag.118
“Welcome to my nightmare” (Kevin Buzzacott qtd. in Gilbert 2000: 8).
I begin with a narrative that tells of Uncle Kevin Buzzacott, a South Australian
Arabunna Elder, who spent several years traversing his country while taking stock of its
destruction. Armed with an Australian national flag Buzzacott tracked the damage done to his
country back to its source at Parliament House, Canberra,
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There are exceptions. Roz Ward, an academic from La Trobe University, Melbourne, Victoria, was suspended
over a private Facebook post in which she quipped the Australian flag was “racist” (Graham 2016; see also Ward
in Thornton 2017).
118
These interviews were conducted by then National Indigenous Times reporter, Geoff Bagnall, and arguably
provide the most comprehensive written collection of Indigenous responses to Australia’s national flag to date.
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… from Lake Eyre, where the largest uranium mine in the world, Western Mining’s
Roxby Olympic Mine, is depleting the underground waters of the Artesian Basin at the
rate of 42 million litres a day to wash yellowcake. Radioactive tailings have already
polluted the underground waters and the sacred mound springs are drying up. He has
tracked the trail of evil to the burrow [Parliament House] in the sacred mountain
[Capital Hill, Canberra] where the laws originate to permit the destruction to proceed
(Gilbert 2000: 8).
When Buzzacott arrived at the Tent Embassy, the Australian flag that had ‘accompanied’ him
and was referred to as ‘The Predator’ or ‘The White Flag of Genocide’, was buried in the ashes
of the Tent Embassy fire (Gilbert 2000). This sacred fire had been established on 26 January
1998 as part of a ‘Fire Ceremony for Peace’ (Dow 2000). Buzzacott states, “[W]e will keep
this fire burning until the law makers come and talk to us about recognising our sovereignty”
(Dow 2000: 20). In order to express a heightened sense of disdain and frustration with the white
Australian nation, Buzzacott periodically exhumed the national flag.
For example in July 1998, Supreme Court Judge Justice Crispin visited the Tent
Embassy to investigate acts of genocide committed against Aboriginal people. In a powerful
statement Buzzacott removed the flag from the ashes, laid it before Crispin and declared
“[W]elcome to my nightmare” (Gilbert 2000: 8). Here the national flag is conceptualised as a
terrifying dream from which Buzzacott cannot escape. The Australian flag symbolises the ongoing destruction of his country and kin. The Union Jack, the ‘honoured’ component of the
Australian national flag acts as a tangible reminder of colonial malevolence.119 As stated the
disparities experienced by many Indigenous people in areas of health, incarceration rates and
life expectancy are far greater than those of non-Indigenous people. Sherry Saggers and Dennis
Gray state that the “narratives of ill-health” experienced by Indigenous people, “are
inextricably linked to narratives of dispossession and exclusion … and from full participation
On 18 December 1998 Crispin found, “that no offence of genocide is known to the domestic law of Australia”
(Gilbert 2000: 10). At this time Australia had been a signatory to the Genocide Convention for fifty years. Kevin
Gilbert’s son, Euroka, notes the hypocrisy, “Australia will still punish and penalise others for their atrocities but
will not own up to atrocities against the Aboriginals of this land” (qtd. in Gilbert 2000: 10 emphasis in the original).
119
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in the social, political and economic life of post-invasion Australia” (2007: 17). The “narratives
of dispossession and exclusion” are made visually apparent through the symbolism of the
Australian national flag, which does little to reverse Buzzacott’s sense of malaise.
In February 1999 then Prime Minister John Howard refused to engage with delegates
at the Tent Embassy. Howard also rejected an invitation to attend a Fire Ceremony and discuss
the Declaration for Peace, which demanded recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty, and called
for an apology, as well as the termination of the ongoing policies and practices of genocide.
Howard’s negative responses prompted the Tent Embassy delegates to take “peace-talk making
fires” to Parliament House (Gilbert 2000: 10). On each occasion the Fire for Peace was
desecrated by officials.120 Two days after the desecration of the third fire, Buzzacott once more
removed the flag from the ashes of the Embassy fire and in a public ceremony he speared “the
ash-covered Australian flag, The Predator, to kill the evil power over this land” (Gilbert 2000:
8). The ‘evil’ referred to recalls the first days of white invasion which over time became a fullscale assault of the continent and its people. This offensive, Buzzacott argues, has been
authorised under the colours of red, white and blue,“[T]he Ceremony is our way of dealing
with the evil that is being committed under the banner of the blue, white and red” (Buzzacott
qtd. in Gilbert 2000: 8; see also Dow 2000). The Australian flag is thus marked by Buzzacott
as a hypervisible signifier: a blatant marker of evil and oppression that represents the continuity
of colonial violence.
Sam Watson adds a further dimension,
Aboriginal people have had no part in the selection of the Union Jack as part of the
Australian flag and as an Aboriginal person I totally reject that and as always I pay my
absolute respect for Uncle Harold Thomas and I thank him again for his contribution to
the struggle of our people by designing our flag.
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On the 8th, 10th and 15th of February (Dow 2000; Gilbert 2000).
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There is no history represented by the Union Jack, just a terrible litany of human rights
abuses. The Union Jack, if anything, should be elevated up there with the Swastika. It
really does not represent Aboriginal people, it represents the really worst aspects of
history since 1788 (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 27).

Watson draws attention to the fact that Aboriginal people have not been consulted about the
Union Jack’s inclusion on the national flag and that it symbolises the brutality and perpetuation
of the colonial project. In order to destroy the colours of ‘evil’: the red, white and blue, Michael
Anderson, of the Euahlayi Nation and Convenor of the Sovereign Union (see Chapter Three)
completed the journey which Uncle Kevin began, “The Predator is going back to the Queen in
London ... If we don’t destroy the evil before it destroys us, our spirituality and connectedness
to land is doomed” (Buzzacott qtd. in Gilbert 2000: 8).
1999: ‘The Australian Flag of Genocide’ aka ‘the Predator Flag’
On Commonwealth Day,121 8 March 1999, Anderson flung the well-travelled, ashcovered flag, “the Australian flag of genocide to the British Crown at Buckingham Palace”
(Gilbert 2000: 15). This was a foundational act which ensured the correct establishment of the
Sovereign Union:
Ghillar, Michael Anderson, was tasked with returning the evil in the Australian/British
‘Predator’ flag – the Union Jack – through a sacred ceremony, which he carried from
Euahlayi and other Nations, to the Gates of Buckingham Palace, where after conducting
the Ceremony and Song placed the flag on a ceremonial spear and hurled it over the
gates of Buckingham Palace and into its forecourt. This action permitted the rightway
to build the momentum for the current Sovereignty Movement (Sovereign Union 2016).
In this instance the Union Jack and by association the Australian national flag, are described
as the “Predator” flag. The flag is understood as being representative of a corporeal body, a
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Commonwealth Day is held on the second Monday in March every year. It celebrates the diversity of the
Commonwealth and promotes peace, democracy and equality.
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living predator that has preyed upon, plundered from, destroyed and exploited Aboriginal
peoples and their lands since first contact.

Figure 21: Michael Anderson returns the Australian national flag back to the British Crown -1999 (Image: Sovereign Union
2016).

Anderson explains,
[T]he genocide tracks back to the British Crown … Successive British monarchs signed
papers legalising the killing of Aborigines and approving the forced adoption program
of the Stolen Generations. By killing the evil and returning the flag to where it belongs,
our people are being released from the evils of colonialism. We can at last have a chance
to heal our wounds (qtd. in Gilbert 2000: 15).
Anderson states that the Australian flag is returned to “where it belongs” and with its
extradition there is a cathartic sense of liberation. This leads me to hypothesise about the
ubiquitous nature of the Australian flag, and how at each encounter, this symbol of colonial
rule makes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people ‘feel’; in other words, what emotional,
physical and psychological responses are produced in the presence of the national flag and what
impact this has on the health and wellbeing of Indigenous peoples in the everyday? The

225

Australian flag is however, more than just a colonial symbol, it cannot simply be relegated to
the symbolic domain. The flag’s ubiquity as an officially sanctioned material object, I would
argue, has a reach beyond symbolism that has the potential to generate fear and a distaste that
might produce real, psycho-physical effects. As this research has progressed, it has become
apparent that for many, the national flag is in fact a hypervisible manifestation of white
sovereignty. The national flag’s associated spectrum of uses and applications; its presence in
all public spheres of human activity constitutes a material documentation of white supremacy
and violence. The national flag’s importance to the colonial, and nation-building project are
best understood when we expose the rules and regulations that seek to protect the nation’s most
‘sacred’ and indeed ‘valuable’ emblem.
The Burning Issue
The national flag is saturated with bureaucratic regulations. These include protocols
which dictate the flag’s correct use, its flying, handling and disposal. According to the
Commonwealth of Australia the flag is also imbued with “dignity” (2010: 5). To preserve the
flag’s “dignity”:


The flag should not be allowed to fall or lie on the ground.



The flag should not be used to cover a statue, monument or plaque for an
unveiling ceremony; to cover a table or seat; or to mask boxes, barriers or the
space between the floor and the ground level on a dais or platform.



The flag should never be flown when in damaged, faded or dilapidated
condition (Commonwealth of Australia 2010: 5).

To dispose of a flag:


When a flag becomes dilapidated and no longer suitable for use, it should be
destroyed privately and in a dignified way. For example, it may be cut into small

226

unrecognisable pieces then disposed of with the normal rubbish collection
(Commonwealth of Australia 2010: 5).


The most dignified way to dispose of a flag when it is no longer serviceable is
to burn it (Smith 1975: 92-93).



The flag should be destroyed in such a way that it is no longer recognisable as
a flag, such as cutting up or shredding into small pieces of fabric. Disposal by
burning is only appropriate for a flag made of wool or cotton, as synthetic
materials are toxic when burned. When the flag has been destroyed, the remains
should be wrapped tightly or sealed in a bag or box before disposal (Kelly 2017:
134).

Archie Moore comments on the rigor of flag-flying rules and regulations. He argues that “the
very existence of National Flag Protocols – begs the question of who these protocols are for
and why we might need them” (Moore 2015: 120). Foucault explains that the discursive
formation of an object is facilitated by a “complex group of relations” which, “are established
between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms,
techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization” (1997: 45). Following Foucault,
the above-mentioned protocols constitute a prescriptive set of regulations which discursify the
flag according to established “systems of norms”. That is to say, the regulations set out above
are comprehensible (and deemed reasonable) precisely because they are formed through the
“complex group of relations” whose very complexity has been normalised. So, we do not see
how these protocols operate to “dignify” the flag; we just know that they do. According to these
protocols, the flag must represent newness, purity, and modernity. As a carefully preserved
icon, the flag must be revered and reflect the nation’s aspirations for self-preservation and
national unity, never to be tattered, frayed or disrespected in any way, but always emblematic
of a wholesome entirety that is upright, undivided, and knows its place in the world. The
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metaphorical resonances of these rules are significant: the flag must always be intact. Any
‘unrecognisable’ pieces, or a flag “no longer serviceable” (presumed aged or damaged) must
be discarded, unseen, or burnt in the interests of projecting an untarnished whole flag as the
symbol of a unified, coherent nation. Through the performative act of ‘flag- disposal’, (or
sacrifice), the nation is re-born, “…national life is redeemed and iterated as a reproductive
process” (Bhabha 1994: 209). What is aged or damaged, deemed unwholesome or unseemly,
must be removed from sight. Any ‘scraps’ must be discarded. The flag must not ‘fall or lie on
the ground’; it must conform to the illusion of social cohesiveness by demonstrating its uprightness.
In addition to what the flag can and cannot represent in nationalist discourse, its utility
is also decreed: it cannot be used to cover other cultural artefacts but should stand alone, its
authority undeterred and unchallenged. The flag, this most prominent symbol of national
culture, must at all costs reflect the conformity and uniformity of the nation. If or when it ceases
to do so, it must be expunged from the nation. Forged from of a complex network of power,
the flag is thus shaped and protected by an intricate web of relations, “… these relations are
not present in the object; it is not they that are deployed when the object is being analysed
(Foucault 1997: 45). The national flag therefore, presents as a seemingly innocuous signifier
of nation that is normalised through various systems of ‘knowing’ and strengthened by the
ubiquity of its presence as the primary cultural object of nation. Any failure to critically analyse
the Australian flag serves to reinforce it as an unmarked and invisible signifier of whiteness.
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1996: The White Flag
In response to the 1996 Federal budget cut of $400 million from a wide range of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander services,122 hundreds of protesters rallied in Canberra,
“… as a strong statement of unity by more than two thousand blackfellas: It’s our day today.
We’ll do this our way … dances, songs and stories are performed” (Gilbert & Williams 1996:
70 emphasis in the original). Eleanor Williams argues that it was the pain associated with the
stories, which compelled the group to act and burn the Australian flag. She recounts,
[A]s the TV cameras film, the white flag, ‘symbol of genocide’ burns to the drone of
didgeridoo:
Anyone, everyone, come stamp on the ashes
like they stamped on the ashes of our Peoples.
A gentle lady rises to speak:
I’ve waited fifty years to see this.
How many watching the news tonight will know ‘the ashes’ refer to the ‘boong123 fires’
lit to destroy the evidence of massacres?124 (Gilbert & Williams 1996: 70 emphasis in
the original).

From Williams’ account a correlation is made between the massacres committed and the
stamping on the ashes of the flag which highlights a new and traumatic facet to the national
symbol.

These included cuts to legal services, domestic violence centres, youth training, artists’ cooperatives, child care
and health centres (Gilbert & Williams 1996). Northern Land Council Chairman, Galarrwuy Yunupingu, was
reported as saying “the cuts were ‘a spear in our heart’ for self-determination. Aboriginal people would die at the
hands of the Federal Government because of the cuts” (qtd. in AIATSIS 2016).
123
A derogatory term used to describe Aboriginal people (Wilkes 1985).
124
In Western Australia, for example, Aboriginal bodies were burnt to destroy evidence of massacres. This
practice “continued into the 1920s and 1930s at least and was aided and abetted by the pervasive conspiracy of
silence that … remained stronger than any belief in the rule of law” (Owen 2016: 391; see also Charola & Meakins
2016: Chapter 3).
122
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As this work progresses it becomes evident that the Australian flag, a symbol which is
hegemonically endorsed via the projection of religious, political and regional affiliations to the
colonising nation, is guaranteed to be divisive,
… in new, insecure nations the flags and other national symbols … often bring to the
fore strong divisions within the putative nation … They [national symbols] must not
only keep alive, but create a national identity and an allegiance to a state that did not
exist before (Kolstø 2006: 679 emphasis in the original).

While Kolstø’s claims are not directed at the Australian nation, his argument can be
extrapolated. From evidence provided national inclusion is symbolically denied to Indigenous
people through the symbols which were designed to foster the creation of a white “national
identity” and an “allegiance to a state that did not exist before”. The creation of Australian
symbols typically function to lend legitimacy to the historically “new” claims of Australia as a
white possession. In addition to this, “… white subjects are disciplined … to invest in the nation
as a white possession that imbues them with a sense of belonging and ownership” (MoretonRobinson 2015: 52). While white perceptions of the Australian flag combine with an inherent
sense of ownership and entitlement, they are at odds with Indigenous understandings which as
the epigraph states, perceive the flag as an unrepresentative symbol of exclusion and division,
[T]he Australian flag is the white people’s flag. The things that have been done to
Aboriginal people, including dispossession, disempowerment, the Northern Territory
Intervention, the denial of the rights of Aboriginal people and even the taking away of
all of our children, were done under the colour of that rotten, stinking white flag
(Michael Mansell qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 25).
Mansell’s associations with the “white people’s flag” are explicit: the flag connotes
disempowerment, dispossession and destruction. Seen in this way, through its unambiguous
colonial associations, the Australian flag represents the exclusion of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people from the body politic. As it flies the current Australian flag is incapable
of facilitating mutual feelings of national belonging and inclusion for many Indigenous people:
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[T]he white flag doesn’t represent us. It represents our destruction, our enslavement.
Why would be (sic) bloody well wan (sic) to be represented by that flag.
… at some time in the future, at the stage where Aboriginal people are recognised as
human beings in this country, at the point where our sovereignty was recognised, the
flag would have to change (Les Coe qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 24).
2006: The Flag of Oppression
On 26 January 2006, Wayne Wharton burnt the Australian flag in Brisbane. As it burnt
he expressed his disdain to the media. Wharton argues that the flag represents “the continued
oppression of Indigenous Australians and represents all that is ugly about a Coalition
Government committed to minimising expenditure on Indigenous specific programs” (qtd. in
Hagan 2010: 32). Wharton’s act triggered a public outcry that caused Bill Mason, Queensland
President of the RSL to assert that burning the national flag should be made a criminal offence
(Hagan 2010). Prime Minister Howard responded, “[T]he Australian flag is more closely held
and held more dearly by Australians than at any time that I can remember” (qtd. in The Age
2006).125 He stated that while the desecration of the flag was “offensive, I don’t think it
represents mainstream Aboriginal opinion … Much as I despise what they did I do not believe
it should be a criminal offence” (qtd. in The Age 2006). He gave two reasons for his stance.
Firstly, he argued that burning the flag was a form of political protest. Furthermore, he claimed,
criminalising the act would “only turn yahoo behaviour into martyrdom” (qtd. in The Age
2006).
Howard’s response conveys a potent level of anxiety regarding democratic rights and
their potential for political dissension, or violence. This can be seen in fact, as a sleight of hand
where democratic freedom of speech is being sanctioned as an authorised right for all, while
being simultaneously disparaged as a potential call to dissent that could result in martyrdom,
the sacrificial elevation of a cause seen to transgress social unity. Actions such as flag burning

125

Note: Under Howard’s watch the 1996 National Flag Day and the Flags Amendment Bill were introduced.
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rarely happen in isolation and while the public might be ‘outraged’, the event needs to be
contextualised and understood as a deep-seated response. Robert Van Krieken et al. explain,
“[S]uch behaviours … are rooted in social processes that are highly complex and that cannot
be reduced to the dull weight of external social forces” (2000: 14). Wharton’s activism
exemplifies this claim; his burning of the flag is a direct response to the inter-generational
experiences of colonialism “[R]acism was at my doorstep for as long as I can remember. We
grew up in a camp … because blackfellas weren’t allowed to live in towns” (Wharton qtd. in
Hagan 2013:15).
The ensuing debate drew attention to the complexity of social processes that generates
Indigenous political activism and also, to the ways in which Indigenous activism can be excised
from Howard’s ideas about “yahoo behaviour” and re-scripted into a prolonged history of
Indigenous resistance,
[W]hen a street warrior goes out and burns the flag or challenges the system, the whole
world stops. They put our agenda back on the front page of the newspapers. Without
these people, we’d still be sitting in the concentration camps (Wharton qtd. in Hagan
2013:15).

Wharton’s cousin, Stephen Hagan, refuses to condemn the 2006 Invasion Day burning of the
national flag stating: “I understand the passion of his ways and its effect in bringing attention
to the plight of our people” (Hagan 2010: 35). Hagan further claims that “the Union Jack on
the national flag is a constant reminder of the British Empire that was characterised by greed,
arrogance and hypocrisy” (2010: 35).
2012: The Flag of Invasion and Division
26 January 2012 marked the 40th anniversary of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy as it
simultaneously commemorated the 224th anniversary of the First Fleet’s landing. From around
the continent Indigenous people gathered at the Embassy to celebrate an iconic 40 year protest.
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The event was marred by then Liberal-National Opposition leader, Tony Abbott who stated, “I
think the indigenous people of Australia can be very proud of the respect in which they are
held by every Australian” (ABC 2012a). Abbott argued “a lot has changed since [the Embassy
was established], and I think it probably is time to move on from that” (ABC 2012a). Abbott’s
comments quickly transformed, “[L]ike a game of Chinese whispers, media then embellished
it further until finally it was reported Abbott wanted the Embassy ‘torn down’” (Graham 2012:
19). As news of Abbott’s ‘tearing down the Embassy’ comments took hold Abbott, and then
Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, were attending an awards ceremony at a 5 star, glass enclosed
restaurant which was in close proximity to the Tent Embassy.
A group of protesters surrounded the restaurant, banged on the glass and chanted. In
the melee the Prime Minister’s bodyguards “dragged a stumbling Julia Gillard … missing a
shoe and clinging to one of her four federal police close personal protection officers” to ‘safety’
(Welch 2012: 4). Images of the ‘riot’ made headlines around the world. According to a New
York Times blog the riot was “a combustible mixture of race, social status and the juxtaposition
of a leader dining in a glass-walled restaurant only steps from a decades-old protest
encampment” (Welch 2012: 4). On 27 January, in the aftermath of the previous day’s
disturbance and with the intention of making white Australians take notice, protesters from the
Tent Embassy marched to Parliament House to burn the national flag,
[A] protester, Wayne “Coco” Wharton, announced that the Australian flag flying on the
building “had allowed white people to rape, murder and destroy our people for 224
years, and we’re going to burn it.” An Australian flag was then set alight as the crowd
chanted “Always was, always will be Aboriginal land” (Welch et al. 2012: 1).
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Figure 22: The Australian flag burns outside Parliament House (Image: Porritt 2012).

From the photographs (above and below) another dimension to this investigation is
considered. Could the Australian national flag have the capacity to transmit trans-generational
trauma? Christine Choo states,
[T]he health and welfare of contemporary Aboriginal people must be considered in the
context of the intergenerational impacts of their social, cultural and historical
backgrounds. This is especially true in our study of the health of children (2016:102).

The protesters here are young, some are children. Indicative of their vitriol they spit on and
participate in the ritualistic burning of the national flag. Neil Jarman notes that “destroying the
flag allows both for a real expression of anger and is also a symbolic act of revenge or
aggression against the particular enemy nation” (2007: 91). The questions raised here are
whether or not the Union Jack on the nation’s flag, alongside its colours of red, white and blue,
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place an additional psychological and emotional burden on the upcoming generations? Is it
possible that the flag can be internalised by children as a marker of their exclusion in the body
politic? Do they understand the flag as a symbol which signifies their disinheritance? Do they
carry with them the knowledge that the Australian flag is a symbol which has failed to serve
generations of their ancestors? Perhaps a closer look at the photographs may shed light on this.
Each photograph can be read as a manifestation of rage and outrage, and also sadness:
there is sadness on the faces of the children. There is also a sense of determination and resolve,
and in both images, a methodical intensity that resembles ritual whereby the flag is destroyed
and spat upon with a focused degree of intent. This is a solemn event staged near Parliament
House. The flag is reduced to ashes while its destroyers parade their sovereignty through a
display of Aboriginal colours, draped flags, t shirts, ochre and other cultural signifiers that
coalesce in a rite that erases both the symbolic and tangible power of the national flag.

Figure 23: The vitriol of Indigenous youth is directed onto the Australian national flag at Parliament House

(Image: Meares 2012).

Acts of resistance that seek to subvert the status quo inevitably attract attention.
Following this event, Chris Graham notes “Australians were outraged” (2012: 19). Then
Northern Territory Labor Minister for Young Territorians, Rob Knight claims,
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[F]or some little pricks to get there and stomp on our flag and set fire to it - there should
be laws against it … I think it’s absolutely disgusting, and they’ve lost my support, and
I think they’ve lost the majority support of Australians (qtd. in ABC News 2012b).

Knight’s condemnation in this instance whitewashes the lived realities of colonial domination
and perpetuates the disturbing pattern of bureaucratic complacency. Knight’s criticism is also
an exercise of power, “[T]he objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a
population of degenerate types … in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of
administration and instruction” (Bhabha 1994: 101). To further emphasise his moral outrage
Knight invoked an argument which continues to successfully ‘armour’ the flag. He claimed the
flag, under which Australians have gone into battle, had been defaced by the protestors. While
the effectiveness of this rhetoric has been discussed in Chapter Five, it is worth remembering
that for many Australians, this claim is as appealing as it is powerful. Mythologising the flag
by invoking “past sacrifices … in the name of the present” (Billig 2013: 77) effectively
obstructs the circulation of other perspectives.
In response to the criticism Dodson asserts that open condemnation is far too simplistic,
“[Y]ou have got to look to why people are frustrated and why people feel that aggressive
behaviour like that is required” (qtd. in ABC News 2012b). Jenny Munroe adds further context,
[T]he Union Jack has no relevance to our people. It is a symbol of our oppression, it is
a symbol of invasion, it’s a symbol of us being the beggars instead of the billionaires in
our own land … I think the Union Jack should be got rid of and we should find some
other symbol that unifies us rather than divides us, which is what that current flag
actually does – it divides us (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 24).
Munroe argues that the national flag does not serve her people; rather it is perceived as a symbol
of disinheritance, of poverty and division. In contrast for white Australians the interplay
between national flag, national values and national identity is compelling. Flag, ideals and
identity sustain each other as the embodiment of national belonging. For minority groups
however, the “flag may heighten the salience of national outgroup membership … potentially
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lowering collective self-esteem or heightening social exclusion” (Butz, Plant, & Doerr 2007:
406). Maurie Japarta Ryan states,
[T]he flag of Australia represents the British government and it’s a symbol for that …
When Cook landed this country was 100 per cent Aboriginal. In 2012 it is 2 per cent
Aboriginal. Get rid of the English flag… (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 25).

2014: “It’s really depressing … to continue to have such a flag” (Marianne Mackay qtd. in
Bagnall 2012: 25).
In 2014, leaders from the world’s 20 major economies including Australia, gathered in
Brisbane for the G20 Summit. Indigenous peoples from across the continent also gathered for
a week of cultural and political meetings at the Aboriginal Sovereign Tent Embassy in
Brisbane. Peaceful protest marches were held over four days which drew attention to the
unacceptable levels of Indigenous incarceration rates, suicide, deaths in custody, and child
removal. Then Prime Minister Tony Abbott once again ignited the wrath of many Indigenous
people at this time when he declared to the national and international media,
[I]t’s hard to think that back in 1788 (Australia) was nothing but bush and the marines
and the convicts and the sailors that straggled off those 12 ships just a few hundred
yards from where we are now must have thought they’d come almost to the moon (qtd.
in Waters 2014: 15).

Abbott’s comments impelled Wharton and others to act, “we have to resort to symbolism to
show our disgust in your colonial leadership” (Wharton qtd. in Piotrowski & Thackery 2014).
On the final day of the G20 Summit, six Australian flags were defaced with words and symbols.
The flags were paraded before a crowd of approximately 300 people by a group of about 50
who were outraged by Abbott’s comments. They were then set alight, one after the other, each
burning flag enflaming the next, as the protesters chanted “resist, revise, decolonise”
(Piotrowski & Thackery 2014).
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Figure 24: Images of skulls and words stating “Invasion Dogs” were drawn on Australian national flags before they were
publicly set on fire. (Image: Daily Mail Australia 2014).

Reactions to the flag burning were mixed within the Indigenous community as the protest once
again sent a signal to an international audience, “[I]mages of the Australian flag burning went
around the world and … let the world know relations between Aboriginal Australia and nonAboriginal Australia are not ideal” (Waters 2014: 15). The unyielding nature of race politics
underpins Wharton’s struggle. Anger and frustrations are vented on a flag which symbolises
the seismic failure of a nation to represent and include Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people. Wharton explains,
I still believe we haven’t got our rightful place in this country. But I don’t enjoy it, I
don’t get any pleasure out of it. I find it frustrating and I find it very disheartening that
we’ve still got to do this sort of stuff. I get really disillusioned at what the invaders have
done to my people … (qtd. in Hagan 2013:15).

Marianne Mackay’s struggle is similar and her words about the Australian national flag are
worth citing in detail,
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[T]he Australian flag is not allowed anywhere inside my house. To have a flag with the
Union Jack that represents everything that this country represents in regards to
dispossession of land and culture, I think it’s really depressing for the Australian
government to continue have such a flag that doesn’t truly represent the nation on a
national level.
To totally ignore everything our people have gone through since the invasion and to
celebrate the flag the way they do is just a total disregard for our feelings and what our
people have been through, but it’s also a total disregard for what Australia stands for.
They call Australia the lucky country, but it’s not lucky for us, and if they’re going to
have a flag that represents us today they just need to scrap it and get a whole new one
(qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 25).
Mackay’s words express justifiable anger and contempt but they also draw attention to what
she believes Australia ‘should’ stand for. She identifies the national flag as a symbol that white
Australians celebrate which she argues is incongruous, given the history of invasion and the
on-going realities of colonial oppression. Any ideological notions of Australia as the “lucky
country”, as inclusive and egalitarian are dispelled at the sight of the Union Jack and Mackay
mocks the hypocrisy by drawing attention to the “unlucky” and unrepresented. From Mackay’s
perspective official, or indeed civil endorsement of the national flag is representative of a
disdain, a ‘lack of care’ for her people. In other words, the national flag is a material artefact
that symbolises white peoples’ disregard for Aboriginal and Torres Strait islander people and
thus it presents as a hypervisible symbol which has the potential to exacerbate psychological
stress. To protect herself Mackay refuses to allow Australia’s national symbol into her home.
Arte-factual Responses: Re-painting the Flag
In order to present another dimension to this discussion, I now turn to some selected
works of art which explore the effects elicited by the British-Australian flag. As noted in the
previous chapter, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander artists can challenge white ways of
knowing and contest negative stereotypes through their creative output. Indigenous artistic
expression is a forum where conversations are generated and audiences educated. As a site of
contemporary resistance this art is invariably political,
239

[A]rt is political, as every action of Aboriginal People is political, and it must be
political and must always remain political and reflect the political feeling until we can
grow together, until people do not need to make very hard separate statement in their
art … (Gilbert qtd. in Gilbert & Williams 1996: 24 & 30).

As a potent site of activism the artworks provided make a powerful contribution to this
discussion. Understandings of the flag are re-defined and re-told through art; these competing
worldviews unsettle the commonplace understandings the British-Australian-symbol-ofnation.
1985: O.H.M.S. (Darren Kemp).
In 1985, Darren Kemp, a visual arts student from Eora Centre, Redfern, New South
Wales, made a line drawing, titled: ‘OHMS’.126

Figure 25: Darren Kemp (1985) ‘OHMS’, line drawing (Craven 1999: 101).

126

O.H.M.S: On His / Her Majesty's Service, dependent upon who is on the British throne.
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Kemp’s sketch details the early onslaught of colonial violence that was delivered in the name
of the British king. In the background of this work there is a sailing ship. To my mind this
vessel of invasion is slipping away from the shore. In its wake lies a trail of destruction.
Aboriginal bodies are scattered; their tools and weapons lie dormant. A small fire gently
smoulders, indicating that the assault was as unexpected as it was brutal. The most confronting
image however lies in the foreground. Kemp has drawn an Aboriginal man impaled by the
Union Jack. The man lies on the ground, and while it is not possible to say if he is alive or
dead, his left hand is firmly grasped around the base of the colonial spear. This leads me to
hypothesise that perhaps those who committed the crime artfully placed the British flag in his
hand: a symbolic statement of what was to come. Conversely the depiction can be construed
as a final act of resistance in which the victim endeavours to excise the coloniser’s weapon,
and all it represents, from his body.
The size of the colonial weapon is designed to make an impact. The flag pole is a similar
length to the man lying on the ground, and the flag is as long as his shield. In a visual statement
of resistance it appears as if the flag has speared the man to his country; they are as one in
death, as they are in life. While the British flag might symbolise the indomitable reach and
power of the colonisers,127 its force pales in comparison with the relationship that Indigenous
people had, and continue to have, with their land:
Rock stays,
earth stays.
I die and put my bones in cave or earth.
Soon my bones become earth….
all the same.
My spirit has gone back to my country….
my mother.

127

The explorer, John Stuart (see Chapter Four), provides an example of the power and reach exerted by the flag.
In 1860, Stuart went to extraordinary lengths to place the Union Jack on top of a mountain which he believed to
be the centre of the continent: Central Mount Stuart, “[W]e then gave three hearty cheers for the flag, the emblem
of civil and religious liberty, and may it be a sign to the natives that the dawn of liberty, civilization, and
Christianity is about to break upon them” (Stuart qtd. in Headon 1991:20).

241

This story is important.
It won’t change,
it is law.
It is like this earth,
it won’t move. (Neidjie 1985: 62-63).

Kemp presents us with a visual counter-narrative in which the Union Jack, the primary
symbol of dispossession, takes centre stage. In this work Kemp forcefully links the British flag
to brutal acts of violence and thus disturbs hegemonic understandings of the flag. Through
Kemp’s lens, the legacy of the performative act of British sovereignty, the implantation of the
flag, is a brutal one. Authorised and executed in the name of ‘His Majesty’ the flag is a
territorial signifier which relegates the status of Aboriginal people and their lands to that of
colonial ‘possession’ and gives weight to the assertion that “the theft of Indigenous lands and
the death of Indigenous people are inextricably tied to the assumption of patriarchal white
sovereignty in Australia” (Morton-Robinson 2015: 138).
From my analysis of Kemp’s work, a disconcerting reality presents itself. ‘OHMS’ was
sketched over 30 years ago. Reflecting on this it becomes evident that since first contact,
generations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have had no respite from the
significations of the British Empire inscribed in the red, white and blue. Following this, it is
not implausible to suggest that the impacts associated with the current flag’s exclusive
symbolism have not been given considered attention. Michael Woodley asserts,
[T]he Australian flag is a symbol of colonial Australia and that says it all. It doesn’t
represent Aboriginal people, or Indigenous people of this country, Aboriginal or Torres
Strait Islander … The Australian flag needs to represent the first Australians of this
country. We are not a symbol of colonial possession. We are the first Australians …
and we should be somewhere, somehow included in the flag that represents Australia
as a nation (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 26).
For Kemp and Woodley, the Union Jack, and by association the Australian flag, are colonial
symbols of (dis)possession, encoded with associations of violence and exclusion.
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2006: We Call Them Pirates Out Here (Daniel Boyd).
Daniel Boyd’s work, We Call Them Pirates Out Here (2006) contains his response to
the Anglo-centric visual narratives of ‘official’ history. In his re-working of one of the nation’s
most iconic works, E. Phillips Fox’s, The Landing of Captain Cook at Botany Bay 1770
(1902),128 Boyd presents us with his painting of this scene. Deploying artistic techniques that
appropriate and satirise the original, Boyd de-romanticises first contact. Cook is portrayed, not
as an explorer, but as a pirate, complete with eye-patch and parrot. Through the amalgamation
of the Union Jack and Jolly Roger,129 Boyd transforms Fox’s billowing red ensign and it
becomes the “Jolly Jack” (Museum of Contemporary Art [MCA] 2015) The Jolly Jack
symbolically interweaves piracy and land theft to signify the merciless act of dispossession.

Fox’s The Landing of Captain Cook at Botany Bay 1770, was commissioned to celebrate Federation (1901),
and was produced at a time of heightened nationalism. This painting appeased the new nation with its symbolism.
It portrayed Cook as a “charitable conqueror” (Nugent 2009: 33). Cook is ‘imagined’ and subsequently portrayed
in a paternalistic, somewhat heroic manner, his outstretched arm, in a command of authority, prevents his men
from shooting two approaching Aboriginal warriors. Commanding the scene is a huge British red ensign. It billows
behind Cook in readiness.
129
It is presumed that the original pirate flags were red as ‘Jolly Roger’ is thought to be derived from the French
term: jolie rouge. Certain Barbary corsairs, (pirates operating from North Africa) carried red flags adorned with
symbols of violence. At the turn of the eighteenth century, however, pirates used black flags which signified “no
quarter” (take no prisoners / show no mercy) or “fight to the death” (Crampton 1989a: 10). Each captain had his
own design; skulls, skeletons and weapons were employed to send a clear and quickly understood message.
128
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Figure 26: Daniel Boyd (2006) We Call Them Pirates Out Here, acrylic on canvas: 226 x 275 cm. Collection:
Museum of Contemporary Art.

The design of Boyd’s work is strategic. His painting looks like a postcard and this is
significant as Boyd first encountered Fox’s painting as a postcard. In their heyday postcards
were formidable messengers. Until recently, they were mass produced, widely used, and could
be circulated to a far-reaching audience. Holiday-makers would often send postcards to family
and friends, the picture postcard was often accompanied by a few lines of news and the slogan
“wish you were here”. Boyd strategically replaces this commonplace postcard slogan with, “we
call them pirates out here”. His message, perhaps a direct reply to Fox, leaves his audience with
little doubt that for Boyd, Cook’s act, under the auspices of the Union Jack, was one of piracy,
“it’s very important that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people continue to create
dialogue from their own perspective to challenge the subjective history that has been created”
(Boyd qtd. in Nugent 2009: 136). Robbie Thorpe says,
[W]hen I think about the Union Jack, I think about the Skull and Cross Bones too, they
go together those two. It’s the flag of the British Crown Pirate Corporation. They ruled
the waves and they waived the rules (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 27).
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Boyd would like to send his ‘postcard’ to England and inform the British about what happened
to his people in the name of the Empire (MCA 2015 video). A decade earlier I note, a group of
Indigenous artists were invited to present their responses to a British audience.
1994: “The colours of death are red, white and blue” (Lin Onus qtd. in Chambers
1994: 26).
In 1994 an exhibition, curated by Hetti Perkins and Brenda Croft: True Colours:
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Artists Raise the Flag, visited London, Liverpool and
Leicester. The tour was organised in response to a 1993 curation by Eddie Chambers: Black
people and the British Flag. Chambers argues that for British artists “the British flag has
increasingly come to symbolise little more than British bigotry, racism, intolerance, and the
remaining vestiges of the Rule Britannia Empire mentality” (1994: ii emphasis in the original).
Likewise the Boomalli Aboriginal Artists Co-operative state, “[A]s True Colours: Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Artists Raise the Flag demonstrates, this maxim is also true for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people” (qtd. in Chambers 1994: ii emphasis in the
original). Perkins and Croft co-authored the introductory essay of the exhibition catalogue
where they claim that Australia’s flag is the embodiment of allegiance and subservience to
Britain. Furthermore they note,
[I]f read from an aerial perspective, the continent of Australia is represented by the
Union Jack floating on a sea of blue under the Southern Cross. It fails to represent the
indigenous people who belong to this land or even the notion of multiculturalism which
is so often touted as indicating the enlightened state of the Australian consciousness
(Perkins and Croft 1994: 5).
The authority of British imperialism lingers in the Australian flag. The Union Jack remains a
visual signifier that tells the world the Australian continent was once a British ‘possession’,
[A]s a portrait of a ‘British’ continent in the Southern Hemisphere, the ‘Australian’ flag
well illustrates the driving force behind the implementation of the White Australia
policy… (Perkins and Croft 1994: 5).
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This point is well made, the White Australia Policy, the White Australian Flag and the White
Australian Nation were all ‘born’ in the same year and are inextricably linked as markers of
whiteness.
Richard Bell states, “[T]he white man’s flag is seen for what it is – a piece of rag
symbolising dispossession and oppression of our people. FUCK THE BRITISH FLAG (and its
derivatives)” (qtd. in Chambers 1994: 17 emphasis in the original). Lin Onus writes, “[T]he
presence of the Union Jack is a constant reminder of horrific times and despair. The colours of
death are red, white and blue” (qtd. in Chambers 1994: 26). These samples provide a range of
responses that are indicative of the flag’s capacity to act as an on-going reminder of the
devastating effects of colonisation. In fact the scale and scope of reactions I have encountered
during my research are far greater and more profound than I could have ever realised. I began
this work with a sense of disquiet and anticipated that findings would, in general, be negative.
As my research has progressed it has become evident that I had underestimated the intensity of
reactions and responses. I have been taken aback by the pain, trauma and disdain which are
evoked and provoked by the Australian national flag.
2014: Cloth on a stick

Figure 27: Colina Wymarra (2014) Eyes of Innocence, painting: 110 x 85 cm. Collection: National Museum of Australia.
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Colina Wymarra’s work, Eyes of Innocence (2014) was inspired by a story told by her father.
The Gudang are seafaring people who regularly visit Bedanug (“Possession Island”, where
Cook planted the British flag in 1770, as he sailed through the Torres Strait). On the beach one
day the Gudang saw a ‘cloth on a stick’,
[I]n their innocence, my people’s innocence, they grabbed that and used it as a blanket
and covering. ‘Flag’ was not a concept they knew of. I painted the traditional Gudang
woman as she covered herself and her baby in that cloth because they didn’t know what
that cloth was or what it meant or [has] come to mean centuries later (Wymarra qtd. in
Osborne & Simpkin 2015: 174).
In this work, the flag, a multi-coloured piece of calico, becomes a serviceable object that is
used to provide comfort and warmth. Feelings of safety are evoked as the coloniser’s artefact
is transformed into a blanket which seemingly nurtures as it provides shelter and protection.
Colonial meanings of “flag” however, as Wymarra notes were, for her people, the very
antithesis of comfort and warmth. The British land-claim-flag is anathema to Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people in that it signifies oppression, dispossession and violence. Under
the auspices of this ‘blanket’ women were raped, babies and children murdered (Perkins and
Croft 1994; Trudgen 2000: Chapter 1; Charola & Meakins 2016; Owen 2016). Wymarra
demonstrates how inconceivable it is that the flag, which her people had innocently used as a
blanket, could presume sovereignty over Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander lands. Through
Wymarra we also see the everyday implications of this cloth on a stick’s design. Nearly 250
years after the event, the flag of Australia represents a brutal yet living past that remains tightly
interwoven with the political present. Graeme Gardner asserts,
[T]he Australian flag represents a takeover of another people. It’s a flag that represents
part of Australia. It’s a flag that was brought over by another country to impose on
people who lived here for 60,000 or more years before their involvement … [the
Australian flag] represents the butcher’s apron. Why should we be proud with that
hanging over our head … I think the current flag should be put away … (qtd. in Bagnall
2012: 23).
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2013: Flag of Grief: Karla Dickens.
In 2013 Karla Dickens won the New South Wales Parliament Aboriginal Art Prize with
her entry: Jan 26, Day of Mourning. “Dickens’ art is a valuable invitation to better understand
personal and national histories” (Brodie 2015: 69). Dickens sees Australia Day, the national
day of celebration, as a day of profound grief,
[T]he majority of Australia celebrates January 26 by wrapping themselves in the red,
white and blue flag, having barbecues and feeling proud to be young and free …
I cringe, stay close to dear friends, do all I can not to leave the house and respectfully
hold my grief – the grief for the old, grief for the continuous denial, grief for the
disrespect, grief for the lack of acknowledgment and the poor choice of the day to
celebrate (Dickens qtd. in Taylor 2013: 16).

In an expression of her grief and as a way to draw attention to Australia’s ongoing race
relations, Dickens transformed an old Australian flag which she had found at her local tip. She
hand-stitched her grief onto the flag embellishing Australia’s most sacred national symbol with
black crosses.

Figure 28: Karla Dickens (2016) Flag of Grief. Vintage australia flag, thread, embroidered applique 280 x 124 cm.
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Dickens states that her reactions to 26 January are intensely personal and that she draws
strength from her peers,
[C]ontemporary artists who work to spotlight issues and humanity give me the
confidence and pride to keep speaking up in non-violent protest. Standing shoulder to
shoulder allows me the space for a safe connection, where growth and support open
doors for change if possible, or acceptance in the lack thereof (Dickens qtd. in MartinChew 2015: 74).
Jan 26, Day of Mourning “pays homage to all the lives that have been lost and respect for all
the people who are lost” (Dickens qtd. in Maxwell 2013: 15). I can count 82 black crosses,
representing 82 lives lost, stitched onto the Federation star alone. Dickens notes that the
defacement of the flag will be interpreted by some as provocative and she recognises that her
message may be difficult for others to comprehend,
I think it’s going to be hard for people to separate the icon of the Australian flag from
the message about Australia Day and what that means for most of Indigenous Australia
(Dickens qtd. in Maxwell 2013: 15).
Australia Day and national flag are synonymous. As a result, those who get caught up in the
red, white and blue celebration may fail to understand exactly what 26 January means for most
Indigenous people.130 The amalgamation of national flag and national day is further
conceptualised by Ali Gumillya Baker,
I remember the flag waving of Invasion Day and the young faces of invading white
primitives drunkenly swaying, wrapped in the colonising flag. It is a frightening space
for Aboriginal people. It is collective amnesia on a mass scale that is violent and
possessive. It causes us Nungas131 to be invisible and visible all at once and without
recognition of our sovereignty (qtd. in Wurm 2012: 6)
The concept of being both visible and invisible is powerful and well describes the violent
effects of the sight of inebriated flag-waving white people. To be both seen and unseen on
Australia Day marks both the hypervisibility of the flag, but also, as Baker notes, it is a stark

A.B.Original’s song January 26 was written to educate white Australians about Australia Day.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tZ9qeX4gUeo (A.B. Original 2016).
131
A term of self-identification used by some South Australian Aboriginal people.
130
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reminder of the “collective amnesia” that obliterates over two hundred years of massacres,
policies, and enduring practices of enforced assimilation. Warren Mundine states,
Indigenous people overwhelmingly feel anger, sadness and grief about the chain of
events beginning on January 26, 1788. That was when our ancestors began losing their
lands and their ability to speak their languages, practice ceremony and live under their
kinship systems. And we, their descendants, lost our birthright (2017: 24).

For Dickens, Baker and Mundine 26 January is a day of grief and pain. Each year this day is
framed as a national celebration, yet for Indigenous people in this country 26 January signifies
genocide: it recalls white violence and dispossession and is augmented by a flag which reigns
as a perpetual, hypervisible signal that invokes the brutality of colonial dispossession and its
associated trauma. Similar to the flag, the ongoing maintenance of 26 January effectively
upholds both the symbolic and real exclusion of Indigenous people.132 As Mundine explains,
[M]ost Indigenous people will never celebrate January 26. That doesn’t mean we won’t
celebrate Australia. Quite the opposite … I want Australia Day moved – not because I
don’t want to celebrate Australia, but because I do (2017: 24).
Accepting first prize, Dickens states,
[I]f my work was truly honouring the loss of lives, there would be no red, white and
blue visible, the colour would have disappeared. All that would be seen would be black,
a mass of hand-sewn black crosses (qtd. in Maxwell 2013: 15).

Here Dickens suggests that her embroidered black crosses fail to represent the scale of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander loss and also implies there can be no real justice until the
red, the white and the blue have been expunged from the national symbol. As a final point
Dickens draws attention to the flag-wavers who are imbued with double standards. She notes,

132

Since the time of writing several local councils have pushed for a new date to celebrate Australia Day. On 28
January 2017 Freemantle City Council in Western Australia held a culturally inclusive “Not Australia Day” event.
Most recently, in Victoria, Melbourne’s Yarra and Darebin councils have also opted to ‘change the date’. The
Commonwealth Government’s rebuke was swift, it decried the action of the councils and revoked their authority
to hold Citizenship ceremonies.
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… [I]t’s interesting that it’s all right for patriotic Aussies to take ownership of that flag
and wrap themselves in it during riots and aggression, but when it comes to a blackfella
having a voice about that same flag, it comes as a shock … (qtd. in Maxwell 2013: 15).
As noted throughout, for the colonising culture, flag, ownership and entitlement are
synonymous. White people ‘rapt’ in their flag claim it as the sacrosanct symbol of nation; its
status as everyday ‘banal’ object belies attention. White cultural ‘understandings’ of the flag
emanate from complex relationships of power which have been constructed through the
generations, ‘legitimised’ and endorsed by narratives, policy and practice that both privilege
and normalise whiteness. The Australian flag is thus an investment, the incarnation of values
and ideals that are central to hegemonic understandings of national identity. To protect the flag
from dissent, Indigenous voices are kept silent. This is not an oversight, but a deliberate
strategy of nation building and maintenance (Billig 2013). Through the medium of art
Indigenous artists stridently re-script Australia’s hegemonic narratives, “[W]e are cultural
activists and we state our cultural beliefs and position as indivisible from our political beliefs
and position – always have, always will” (Perkins and Croft 1994: 15). This affirmation of
resistance persists, and moving through the twenty first century Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander artists:
will continue to look to the past, to their ancestral or cultural teachings or histories, to
inform their present thoughts. Whether inspirational, informative or heartbreaking, their
works open up and encourage conversations that are essential to dispel myths,
stereotypes and outdated ideologies (Baum 2017: 19).
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Dis-Mantling the Symbol of Invasion and Oppression
The final section of this chapter discusses some Indigenous perspectives which relate
to a new flag built on the premise of inclusion. As noted in Chapter Two, a 1994 survey found
that Aboriginal people were united in their calls for the removal of the Union Jack (Foley
1996a). These demands remain strident,
[W]ith the British Union Jack as part of the current flag it represents the European
invasion of the land as far as Indigenous Australians are concerned. Indigenous leaders
almost universally believe if there is ever to be true acceptance of the history and
heritage of Indigenous Australia there has to be a new flag that features the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Island cultures (Stephen Hagan qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 22).
Hagan states that a new national flag which incorporates Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
cultures would indicate that the nation finally accepts and recognises Indigenous history and
cultures. Justin Mohamed asserts,
I think the change needs to come … We need to have something there that represents
all of us. I think Australia needs to recognise and have things that recognise Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 24).

The Mayor of Palm Island,133 Alf Lacy, notes the longstanding nature of the Australian flag
debate and argues that it’s time to foreground a discussion about a new Australian flag that
includes Indigenous perspectives. Lacy supports embedding the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander symbols into a new Australian flag however his primary concern is that of inclusion,
“we need to make sure we get recognised somewhere in the flag debate in this country” (qtd.
in Bagnall 2012: 22). Elverina Johnson contends,
I think the flag should include whatever they need to include, whether it be the colours
of the Indigenous people, the Aboriginal flag, but anything that will represent and speak
out loud about the Indigenous people of Australia and make it inclusive of who we are
here and that we exist (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 23).

133

Palm Island is one of a group of sixteen islands located 65kms north of Townsville, Queensland. In 1914 Palm
Island was gazetted as an Aboriginal reserve. From 1918, and for the next fifty years Aboriginal people from
around Queensland who were deemed ‘uncompliant’ according to the draconian laws of the colonial state were
incarcerated on Palm Island (Langton & Loos 2008).
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Torres Strait Island Regional Mayor, Fred Gela states Australia’s flag ought not to be
monocultural,
we need something that can truly reflect the various cultures, the oldest true living
cultures and race that sets Australia apart from any other country which is the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people … I think that is a debate in itself and it
needs to happen (Gela qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 23).

Gela’s claim that discussion about the flag is important in its own right is noteworthy.
Postponing the debate to ‘when Australia becomes a republic’ for example, or employing
excuses such as ‘when the Queen dies’ are strategies designed to obstruct such calls. Dissenting
voices are subsumed into bureaucratic discourse and power: the ‘special’ status of nation-aswhite-possession is reinforced. According to Graeme Gardner,
[I]t is a new era now. There is a need to represent Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people and that must be first and foremost, and whether anything else is put on there is
a matter for the people. But I think the flag needs to be based on the original people of
this land (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 23).
Graeme Mundine notes the importance of an on-going new flag discussion,
… because we need to develop what it is to be Australian, and it’s obvious … a lot of
people, not just Aboriginal people, don’t see it representing who we are as a nation”
(qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 23).
Jason King claims, “[W]e need a new symbol for Australia. Even if it is in the colours used it
needs to represent Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people” (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 24).
Lisa Jackson-Pulver argues for a flag, whose redesign is premised on inclusion,
it’s time we had a serious discussion about a new national flag ... it’s not inclusive
because it is not including us. It is only acknowledging one small slice of history, a tiny
little slice of history … I think we need to design a flag as a country that belongs to us
all, and we can all stand there hand on chest and say, I believe (qtd. in Bagnall 2012:
25).
Consultation and collaboration with Indigenous people are central tenets for both Marianne
Mackay and Richard Downs,
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what needs to be done is that it’s a consultative process where everyone around
Australia is involved and we come together as a nation to create a whole new flag that
truly does represent the nation, not one that represents the history of the oppression of
the Indigenous people (Mackay qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 25).
I think changing the flag is going to happen. We have to go down that pathway. All
Indigenous leaders and people throughout this country here will have to come up with
a design or proposal. We will need to play a major part of the whole design and how
the flag will look (Downs qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 27).
Conclusion
This chapter has provided evidence regarding the associated meanings of the Australian
national flag for some Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. A broad-spectrum of
responses indicate that for many Indigenous people the Australian flag in its current formation
is both a source of anxiety and sadness and, it can be argued, a direct contributor to on-going
health issues. Some twenty years ago, on the other side of the world, Aboriginal artists voiced
their disdain for the national flag. While in Australia, at around the same time, despite
overwhelming evidence calling for the removal of the Union Jack, Foley notes that the findings
of her survey while useful could not be considered as indicative of the wider Aboriginal
community. As stated, the breadth of reaction to the flag by Indigenous people has been
overwhelming and it leads me to consider the wider sociological implications associated with
the nation’s flag being understood by so many as a “nightmare”. According to the responses in
this chapter, the emotions transmitted through the presence of the Australian flag are profound;
they include rage, outrage, depression, grief and sorrow. The evidence presented in this chapter
demonstrates that the flag, as an ever present effigy of genocide for many that manifests in all
spheres of social and cultural activity constitutes a site of perpetual distress for many
Indigenous people.
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CONCLUSIONS: The Australian National Flag: A Re-View
…take some time to think about the Aboriginal people who have had these jewels of life taken
from them in the short history of our nation. I say this not to condemn your forebears, or
yourselves, but to merely to state the truth. Even today the truth is hard to bear, such is the loss
suffered by so many Aboriginal people, continuing to this day. The truth may help you
understand your own life better and allow you to be a contributor to the challenges that lie
ahead in making a settlement between our people within the nation.
(Galarrwuy Yunupingu qtd. in Koori Mail 10 August 2016: 4).

Nations are not static and this is a time of national and global tension where borders are
anxiously maintained by fleets and forces bearing national flags. The instability of nation states
continues to be countered by emerging new forms of nationalism that decree who and what
‘we’ are and in turn, what constitutes ‘Australian-ness’. The flag plays a pivotal role in this
discourse. For many non-Indigenous Australians, the banality of the flag with its colonial
imprimatur will serve well these new nationalistic forces. For many Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people however, the flag will continue to serve as a reminder of the loss of
sovereignty and the violence that continues to accompany colonial rule. As the nation’s most
powerful symbol, the Australian national flag,
symbolises a narrow slice of our history including a significant period when the rights
of Australia’s indigenous peoples were overlooked. For this reason, most of Australia’s
indigenous people cannot relate to the existing flag. For us, it symbolises dispossession
and oppression (Lowitja O’Donoghue qtd. in Ausflag 2013).

This thesis has demonstrated both the force and the fragility of the national flag, and by
extension, the nation itself. From the outset of my inquiry, it became increasingly evident that
a rigorous exploration of the flag’s dominant significations would provide the space required
to identify other contexts and narratives. The thesis has considered the multitudinous ways in
which the national flag signifies as a colonial emblem, and also, how this signification has
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become “banal”, unremarkable, and naturalised to the extent that by and large the flag remains
an unquestioned symbol, seamlessly embedded into the national landscape.
This work began as an enquiry relating to the national flag’s representational force and
its influence in the reproduction of national identity. My primary questions were how the flag
makes meaning – or makes meaningful – the articulations of nation through its symbolism and,
in particular, I was interested in how the flag is received and understood by Indigenous people.
My research has been shaped by my migrant and life experience, and in particular was
influenced by my return to education. As an adult female scholar I learnt how to critically
reflect on the process of my migrant experience and was able to focus my attention on various
questions, such as: “what is the flag of my birthplace doing here?” “How can this still be in the
twenty first century?”
Prior to commencing this work I had experienced increasing unease at every encounter
with the national flag, a disquiet I was often at odds with as I noticed the flag flying almost
everywhere in the public domain, in workplaces, and institutions. For me, the very presence of
the flag became noticeable, remarkable, and worthy of exploration, a source of keen interest
and indeed, concern, as my questions kept recurring. As I learned more about Australia’s
colonial history, I wondered what the Union Jack might represent to Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples. How did the Union Jack signify? Could the flag have a negative impact
on health and wellbeing? Is the flag yet another reminder of the on-going consequences of
colonisation? Or can such questions be construed as assumption based on how I imagine the
significatory potential of the flag? This investigation was generated by these queries which
refused to abate: they demanded answers. Over time, the simplicity of my questions revealed
a complexity of discursive forces. It seemed to me that the omnipresence and omnipotence of
the flag worked to construct national allegiance because of its “banal” acceptance. If, as my
research demonstrated, the construction of Australian national identity is forged through such
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powerful symbolism as a flag with the Union Jack in its canton, how then does this function
for Indigenous people? Reflecting on my desire for answers, I have learned that my analysis of
the Australian flag and its attendant and powerful symbolism for Australia as a nation state
tends to provoke more questions than answers. However, what is disclosed in this work is the
complex web of discourses that continues to produce and reproduce nation through the flag’s
ubiquity and the sacrosanct status afforded to white history, white traditions and white
sentiment.
In order to provide a comprehensive review of the flag’s potential as a signifier, it was
necessary to commence this investigation by tracing the construction of the modern nation and
then progress to its maintenance. Chapter Three grounds the thesis in theories of nation creation
and from this it emerges that the nation is both a discursive formation and an ideological
construct which resides in the minds of its people as a “banal” materiality that is routinely
accepted as natural. The true power of the nation, however, lies with its maintenance– without
nationalism’s repetitive rites and rituals, the fragile concept of nation is compromised. In view
of this, Chapter Four discusses the various ways in which the Australian nation is maintained.
Australian nationalism is constructed and endorsed through various discourses and symbols
which collaborate to mark and re-imagine the landscape as a white possession.
Chapter Five investigates flags as material objects that signify in multitudinous ways.
To facilitate my interrogation of the Australian national flag I have drawn from work in
Australian Indigenous Studies, Critical Whiteness Studies, Vexillology and History. This
multidisciplinary approach has allowed me to consider more broadly the implications of the
national flag’s history and symbolism. As the Australian nation was constructed, so too was its
flag and this thesis has highlighted how the racialised symbolic properties of the national
symbol work to sustain a hegemonic, white-Australian national identity. Accordingly, the
discursive framings of both flag and nation continue to perpetuate Anglo-centric perspectives.
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The flag as the primary symbol of the Australian nation continues to dominate the imagi-nation
and to promote the benefits of colonial traditions that sanction the perceived superiority of ‘our’
way of life, ‘our’ laws, and ‘our’ values.
Throughout the thesis I have presented accounts of Indigenous resistance to the colonial
project. These counter-narratives challenge dominant discourses of nation by exposing their
fragility and their need for continual reinforcement; thus they make available spaces for
intervention. In addition, the counter-narratives presented in this work demonstrate that despite
insurmountable odds, the world’s oldest living culture has survived. Chapter Six presents
research that examines resistance, and as such, underpins the final chapter. The responses and
reactions to the national flag by Indigenous people comprises research that must be
contextualised not as isolated incidents, but as expressions which are firmly grounded in nearly
two hundred and fifty years of oppression.
In exploring the discursive conditions that construct nation through the Australian
national flag, my study has both responded to some of my initial questions while generating
the potential for further inquiry. Early in this work I noted that there appeared to be a paucity
of Indigenous perspectives to be found about the Australian flag in the literature. This gap
however, was unexpectedly supplemented and enriched through the work of Indigenous artists
whose perspectives have made a valuable contribution. To this end, the thesis has re-viewed
the flag, and in so doing has made a small contribution to the extant scholarly knowledge that
serves as critique. The consequences of flying an identity-exclusive national flag are yet to be
fully realised as are the opportunities for further research which present in light of this work. I
see many possibilities that will extend the capabilities of this literature based study including
field-work and interviews.
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This work provides a solid foundation from which to undertake post-doctoral work,
further research will continue to reveal the pedagogical influence that the flag has on social
cohesion and most importantly on the health and wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people. In the discussion stages of my PhD it was suggested that I investigate what the
Aboriginal flag represents to white Australians. This was, and is indeed an important proposal
which warrants further investigation. To determine how informed white Australia is about the
significations of the Aboriginal flag and what they ‘feel’ when they see it flying, or on clothing
has a significant role to play in further understanding the socio-political force of Australian
nationalism. Out of these conversations different understandings and ways of ‘knowing’ the
flag may be generated. This in turn, will contribute to a shift in the discursive terrain which
surrounds the Australian flag and its affiliated nation.
As this research suggests, national flags are inextricably bound to the rise of the nation
state and these emblems ‘wave’ to their citizens in ways that are not always apparent. For white
Australia, flags serve a very particular purpose whereby the violence of colonial imposition
can be overlaid and ‘forgotten’ by the fabric of a ‘new nation’ whose flags fly in their thousands
to augment the necessary amnesia of nation building. This study also finds that there is a
disconcerting duality wrapped up in the threads of nation which permits the Union Jack
residency as point of honour. There is meaning attached to the Australian flag which goes
beyond symbolism and the seemingly ‘straightforward’ understandings of what the national
flag signifies in relation to history, sentiment and tradition. In light of this, I contend that a
more inclusive and robust Australian national identity lies somewhere between the flags and
waits to be ‘re-imagined’ in a flag which flies in the wind for all of its people.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
ULURU STATEMENT FROM THE HEART
We, gathered at the 2017 National Constitutional Convention, coming from all points of the
southern sky, make this statement from the heart:
Our Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander tribes were the first sovereign Nations of the
Australian continent and its adjacent islands, and possessed it under our own laws and
customs. This our ancestors did, according to the reckoning of our culture, from the Creation,
according to the common law from ‘time immemorial’, and according to science more than
60,000 years ago.
This sovereignty is a spiritual notion: the ancestral tie between the land, or ‘mother nature’,
and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples who were born therefrom, remain
attached thereto, and must one day return thither to be united with our ancestors. This link is
the basis of the ownership of the soil, or better, of sovereignty. It has never been ceded or
extinguished, and co-exists with the sovereignty of the Crown.
How could it be otherwise? That peoples possessed a land for sixty millennia and this sacred
link disappears from world history in merely the last two hundred years?
With substantive constitutional change and structural reform, we believe this ancient
sovereignty can shine through as a fuller expression of Australia’s nationhood.
Proportionally, we are the most incarcerated people on the planet. We are not an innately
criminal people. Our children are aliened from their families at unprecedented rates. This
cannot be because we have no love for them. And our youth languish in detention in obscene
numbers. They should be our hope for the future.
These dimensions of our crisis tell plainly the structural nature of our problem. This is the
torment of our powerlessness.
We seek constitutional reforms to empower our people and take a rightful place in our own
country. When we have power over our destiny our children will flourish. They will walk in
two worlds and their culture will be a gift to their country.
We call for the establishment of a First Nations Voice enshrined in the Constitution.
Makarrata is the culmination of our agenda: the coming together after a struggle. It captures
our aspirations for a fair and truthful relationship with the people of Australia and a better
future for our children based on justice and self-determination.
We seek a Makarrata Commission to supervise a process of agreement-making between
governments and First Nations and truth-telling about our history.
In 1967 we were counted, in 2017 we seek to be heard. We leave base camp and start our trek
across this vast country. We invite you to walk with us in a movement of the Australian
people for a better future (Referendum Council 2017b).
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Appendix B
Why should I acknowledge the Union Jack? (Minungka McInerney qtd. in Koori Mail 23
August 2017: 23).
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Appendix C
‘Up the Country’ was published 9 July 1892 and Lawson’s understandings of the bush
are explicit:
Land where gaunt and haggard women live alone and work like men,
Till their husbands, gone a-droving, will return to them again:
Homes of men! if home had ever such a God-forgotten place,
Where the wild selector’s children fly before a stranger’s face.
Home of tragedy applauded by the dingoes’ dismal yell,
Heaven of the shanty-keeper – fitting fiend for such a hell –
And the wallaroos and wombats, and, of course, the curlew’s call –
And the lone sundowner tramping ever onward through it all!
(Lawson & Baglin 1988: 202).

Paterson’s response, ‘In Defence of the Bush’ was published 23 July 1892:
… you found the bush was dismal and a land of no delight,
Did you chance to hear a chorus in the shearers’ huts at night?
Did they ‘rise up, William Riley’ by the camp-fire’s cheery blaze?
Did they rise him as we rose him in the good old droving days?
And the women of the homesteads and the men you chanced to meet –
Were their faces sour and saddened like the ‘faces in the street’,
And the ‘shy selector children’ – were they better now or worse
Than the little city urchins who would greet you with a curse?
Is not such a life much better than the squalid street and square
Where the fallen women flaunt it in the fierce electric glare,
Where the sempstress plies her sewing till her eyes are sore and red
In a filthy, dirty attic toiling on for daily bread?

Did you hear no sweeter voices in the music of the bush
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Than the roar of trams and buses, and the war-whoop of ‘the push’?
Did the magpies rouse your slumbers with their carol sweet and strange?
Did you hear the silver chiming of the bell-birds on the range?
But, perchance, the wild birds’ music by your senses was despised,
For you say you'll stay in townships till the bush is civilised.
Would you make it a tea-garden and on Sundays have a band
Where the ‘blokes’ might take their ‘donahs’, with a ‘public’ close at hand?
You had better stick to Sydney and make merry with the ‘push’,
For the bush will never suit you, and you’ll never suit the bush
(Paterson & Baglin 1988: 30).
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Appendix D
On National Flag Day 2000, former Governor General of Australia, Archbishop Peter
Hollingworth delivered a eulogy to the Australian national flag.
The Australian National Flag Prayer
Almighty and most merciful God,
the sovereign lord of all nations;
we give you thanks for this our flag,
the symbol of our nationhood,
which we raise this day.
We thank you for the abundant blessings
you have bestowed upon us,
for our heritage expressed in three crosses
of St George, St Andrew and St Patrick,
for the Southern Cross set in azure skies,
the symbol of the land where we live today,
and for the Federal star,
the symbol of the Commonwealth of Australia.
Finally we give thanks for the blessings of cultural diversity,
For though we are many people, yet we are one nation,
With one destiny under your good providence,
Through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen (qtd. in ANFA 2012c).
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Appendix E
The Burnum Burnum Declaration: England, 26th January 1988
I Burnum Burnum, being a nobleman of ancient Australia do hereby take possession of
England on behalf of the Aboriginal People.
In claiming this colonial outpost, we wish no harm to you natives, but assure you that we are
here to bring you good manners, refinement and an opportunity to make a Koopartoo – ‘a
fresh start’.
Henceforth, an Aboriginal face shall appear on your coins and stamps to signify our
sovereignty over this domain.
For the more advanced, we bring the complex language of the Pitjantjajara; we will teach you
how to have a spiritual relationship with the Earth and show you how to get bush tucker.
We do not intend to souvenir, pickle and preserve the heads of 2000 of your people, nor to
publicly display the skeletal remains of your Royal Highness, as was done to our Queen
Truganinni for 80 years. Neither do we intend to poison your waterholes, lace your flour with
strychnine or introduce you to highly toxic drugs.
Based on our 50,000 year heritage, we acknowledge the need to preserve the Caucasian race
as of interest to antiquity, although we may be inclined to conduct experiments by measuring
the size of your skulls for levels of intelligence. We pledge not to sterilize your women, not
to separate your children from their families.
We give an absolute undertaking that you shall not be placed into the mentality of
government handouts for the next five generations but you will enjoy the full benefits of
Aboriginal equality.
At the end of two hundred years, we will make a Treaty to validate occupation by peaceful
means and not by conquest.
Finally, we solemnly promise not to make a quarry of England and export your valuable
minerals back to the old country Australia, and we vow never to destroy three-quarters of
your trees, but to encourage Earth Repair Action to unite people, communities, religions and
nations in a common, productive, peaceful purpose.
Burnum Burnum (qtd. in Norst 1999: 2).
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